The Supply of Catastrophe Insurance Under Regulatory Constraints

Klein and Kleindorfer provide a brief overview of the current extent of their research on this topic. The intent of this research is to empirically address interactions across the multiple stakeholders in the Catastrophe Insurance Business, i.e. homeowners, businesses, insurers, reinsurers, the construction and real estate sector, and regulatory institutions. Their analysis is aimed at addressing three questions: What is the structure and performance of the catastrophe insurance market? How do factors such as, interdependencies, profits, risk exposures, and distribution impact the performance of the market? What is the impact of regulation of this market on pricing adequacy, pricing precision, and financial risk? What is the current state of the market, and what future sustainable states of the market are possible? This paper is primarily devoted to describing what authors consider to be the structural drivers of supply and demand and the impact of regulatory controls. These drivers are: "Demand structure" (i.e. why consumers buy what they do) obviously contains several components. Items such as location, demography, price, policy features such as the presence of absence of bundling, "quality" effects such as perceived solvency and claims processes, and finally, how products are distributed, all impact consumer choice. In addition, consumers have other risk management options open to them, the most obvious being where to live, what type of construction to choose and what type of "mitigation", if any to employ. "Supply Structure" describes how the consumer business of insurance is conducted. Salient features would be the degree of competition, geography, profitability, solvency, exposure, loss costs, marketing costs, organizational form, financial structure, and regulatory/solvency constraints. Obviously, insurance companies attempt to maximize profits in the face of these variables "Regulatory Impact" on such things as pricing adequacy, pricing precision, and financial risk has important effects on all parties. In particular the freedom to manage ones risk exposure is critical to everyone from the individual consumer to the largest company, and regulation may produce. In an analysis to come later, the researchers will utilize detailed premium record data obtained from ISO on insurance transactions, supplemented by information on expected costs for different policies and risk characteristics. The data will, for the first time, provide and empirically grounded understanding of the supply and demand for CAT-related coverage provided in residential insurance policies. The study will seek to identify the factors that most affect supply and demand and the magnitudes of their relative effects, including the pricing of CAT coverage and alternative policy provisions.

The demand for homeowners insurance with bundled catastrophe coverages : Wharton project on managing catastrophic risks

In this paper, we estimate the demand for homeowner insurance in Florida. Since we are interested in a number of factors influencing demand, we approach the problem from two directions. We first estimate two hedonic equations representing the premium per contract and the price mark-up. We analyze how the contracts are bundled and how contract provisions, insurer characteristics and insured risk characteristics and demographics influence the premium per contract and the price mark-up. Second, we estimate the demand for homeowners insurance using two-stage least squares regression. We employ ISO's indicated loss costs as our proxy for real insurance services demanded. We assume that the demand for coverage is essentially a joint demand and thus we can estimate the demand for catastrophe coverage separately from the demand for noncatastrophe coverage. We determine that price elasticities are less elastic for catastrophic coverage than for non-catastrophic coverage. Further estimated income elasticities suggest that homeowners insurance is an inferior good. Finally, we conclude based on the results of a selection model that our sample of ISO reporting companies well represents the demand for insurance in the Florida market as a whole

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DIALECTS OF THE BAYESIAN BELIEF REVISION LANGUAGE

Rule-based expert systems must deal with uncertain data, subjective expert opinions, and inaccurate decision rules. Computer scientists and psychologists have proposed and implemented a number of belief languages widely used in applied systems, and their normative validity is clearly an important question, both on practical as well on theoretical grounds. Several well-know belief languages are reviewed, and both previous work and new insights into their Bayesian interpretations are presented. In particular, the authors focus on three alternative belief-update models the certainty factors calculus, Dempster-Shafer simple support functions, and the descriptive contrast/inertia model. Important "dialectsâ of these languages are shown to be isomorphic to each other and to a special case of Bayesian inference. Parts of this analysis were carried out by other authors; these results were extended and consolidated using an analytic technique designed to study the kinship of belief languages in general.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

The Demand for Homeowners Insurance with Bundled Catastrophe Coverage

This paper analyzes the demand for homeowners insurance in markets subject to catastrophe losses and where consumers have choices in configuring their coverage for catastrophe and non-catastrophe perils. We estimate the demand for homeowner insurance in Florida and New York using two-stage least squares regression with advisory indicated loss costs as our proxy for the quantity of real insurance services demanded. We decompose the demand for insurance into the demand for coverage of catastrophe perils (i.e., hurricanes or windstorms) and the demand for non-catastrophe coverage and estimate these demand functions separately. Our results are relatively consistent in New York and Florida, including evidence that catastrophe demand is more price elastic than non-catastrophe demand. We also find evidence that consumers value options that expand coverage, buy more insurance when it is subsidized through regulatory price constraints, and consider state guaranty fund provisions when purchasing insurance.

Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks

This paper examines the law and economics of informational regulation (IR) of environmental risks. Informational regulation here means regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will then exert pressure on these entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves the interests of stakeholders. As such, IR reinforces and augments direct regulatory monitoring and enforcement through third-party monitoring and incentives. The paper provides two contrasting frameworks, from law and economics, to analyze the costs and benefits likely to arise from IR and concludes with a discussion of the appropriate scope of IR as a substitute for and complement of traditional environmental regulation and law

Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks

This paper examines the law and economics of informational regulation (IR) of environmental risks. Informational regulation here means regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will then exert pressure on these entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves the interests of stakeholders. As such, IR reinforces and augments direct regulatory monitoring and enforcement through third-party monitoring and incentives. The paper provides two contrasting frameworks, from law and economics, to analyze the costs and benefits likely to arise from IR and concludes with a discussion of the appropriate scope of IR as a substitute for and complement of traditional environmental regulation and law

Single-Year and Multi-year Insurance Policies in a Competitive Market

This paper examines the demand and supply of annual and multi-year insurance contracts with respect to protection against a catastrophic risk in a competitive market. Insurers who offer annual policies can cancel policies at the end of each year and change the premium in the following year. Multi-year insurance has a fixed annual price for each year and no cancellations are permitted at the end of any given year. Homeowners are identical with respect to their exposure to the hazard. Each homeowner determines whether or not to purchase an annual or multi-year contract so as to maximize her expected utility. The competitive equilibrium consists of a set of prices where homeowners who are not very risk averse decide to be uninsured. Other individuals demand either single-year or multi-year policies depending on their degree of risk aversion and the premiums charged by insurers for each type of policy

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DIALECTS OF THE BAYESIAN BELIEF REVISION LANGUAGE

Rule-based expert systems must deal with uncertain data, subjective expert opinions, and inaccurate decision rules. Computer scientists and psychologists have proposed and implemented a number of belief languages widely used in applied systems, and their normative validity is clearly an important question, both on practical as well on theoretical grounds. Several well-know belief languages are reviewed, and both previous work and new insights into their Bayesian interpretations are presented. In particular, the authors focus on three alternative belief-update models the certainty factors calculus, Dempster-Shafer simple support functions, and the descriptive contrast/inertia model. Important "dialectsâ of these languages are shown to be isomorphic to each other and to a special case of Bayesian inference. Parts of this analysis were carried out by other authors; these results were extended and consolidated using an analytic technique designed to study the kinship of belief languages in general.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

Technical Appendix to "Integrating Long-term and Short-term Contracting in Beef Supply Chains"

Article DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1362</p

Integrating Long-Term and Short-Term Contracting in Beef Supply Chains

Published version made available with the permission of INFORMS</p