¿Por qué debemos preferir la versión débil de la nueva teoría de la fotografía?

Diarmuid Costello has recently supported a radical version of what he calls, following Dominic Lopes, The new theory of photography and he has criticized a position within this theory that he considers weaker and restrictive. Both views – radical and restrictive – are opposed to the received view in the analytic philosophy of photography. However, Costello argues that the weaker version is too close to orthodoxy. This paper constitutes a defense of the purported restrictive view and argues that, as a matter of fact, the radical version is more prescriptive, restrictive and inadequate.Diarmuid Costello ha defendido recientemente una versión fuerte de lo que él llama, siguiendo a Dominic Lopes, La nueva teoría de la fotografía y ha criticado una versión anterior de esta nueva teoría, que él considera más débil y restringida. Ambas posiciones —radical y restringida— se oponen a la visión tradicional en filosofía analítica de la fotografía. Sin embargo, Costello sostiene que la posición débil está aún demasiado cerca de esta tradición. Este artículo defiende la posición débil y argumenta que la supuesta versión fuerte es más prescriptiva, restrictiva e inadecuada.

The new theory of photography : critical examination and responses

Dominic McIver Lopes’ Four Arts of Photography and Diarmuid Costello’s On Photography: A Philosophical Inquiry examine the state of the art in analytic philosophy of photography and present a new approach to the study of the medium. As opposed to the orthodox and prevalent view, which emphasizes its epistemic capacities, the new theory reconsiders the nature of photography, and redirects focus towards the aesthetic potential of the medium. This symposium comprises two papers that critically examine central questions addressed in the two books, with responses by the two authors in defence of their respective positions

The New Theory of Photography: Critical Examination and Responses

Dominic McIver Lopes’ Four Arts of Photography and Diarmuid Costello’s On Photography: A Philosophical Inquiry examine the state of the art in analytic philosophy of photography and present a new approach to the study of the medium. As opposed to the orthodox and prevalent view, which emphasizes its epistemic capacities, the new theory reconsiders the nature of photography, and redirects focus towards the aesthetic potential of the medium. This symposium comprises two papers that critically examine central questions addressed in the two books, with responses by the two authors in defence of their respective positions

Digital Fabrication and Its Meanings for Photography and Film

Bazin, Cavell and other prominent theorists have asserted that movies are essentially photographic, with more recent scholars such as Carroll and Gaut protesting. Today CGI stands as a further counter, in addition to past objections such as editing, animation and blue screen. Also central in debates is whether photography is transparent, that is, whether it allows us to see things in other times and places. I maintain photography is transparent, notwithstanding objections citing digital manipulation. However, taking a cue from Cavell—albeit one poorly outlined in his work—I argue this is not so much because of what photography physically is, but because of what “photography” has come to mean. I similarly argue digital technologies have not significantly altered what cinematic media “are” because they have not fundamentally modified what they mean; and that cinema retains a photographic legacy, even when it abandons photographic technologies to digitally manufacture virtual worlds

Imagination, Perception and Memory. Making (some) sense of Walton’s view on Photographs and Depiction.

Walton has controversially claimed (a) that all pictures (including photographs) are fiction because, in seeing a picture one imagines that one is seeing the depicted content in the flesh; and (b) that in seeing a photograph one literally – although indirectly – sees the photographed object. Philosophers have found these claims implausible for various reasons: (1) it is not the case that all pictures are fiction; (2) explaining depiction does not require an imaginative engagement and (3) seeing objects in photographs is not tantamount to seeing the object. I agree with Walton’s critics in all of these claims. However, I try to give some plausibility to Walton’s view. Firstly, I claim that (1) is a misunderstanding. Second, I try to clarify (but not defend) Walton’s view of depiction by contrasting pictorial experience with perceptual experience more generally. Finally, I focus on the case of photographs and I l claim that although Walton is not right in claiming that seeing objects in photographs is a case of literally perceiving the objects, photographs share an important feature with perceptual experience: the content of photographs, like the content of pictorial experience, is particular in character, and that explains their peculiar phenomenology. I content, however, that the experience of photographs is closer to memory than to perception.Walton sostiene que todas las representaciones pictóricas (incluidas las fotografías) son ficciones y que, al ver una fotografía uno literalmente –aunque indirectamente– ve el objeto fotografiado. Los filósofos han considerado estas afirmaciones implausibles y yo estoy de acuerdo con ellos. No obstante, intentaré dar una lectura razonable de estas ideas waltonianas. Intentaré clarificar (que no defender) la visión waltoniana de la representación pictórica y para ello contrastaré la experiencia pictórica con la experiencia perceptual en general. Me centraré en el caso concreto de la fotografía y sostendré que, a pesar de que ver objetos en una fotografía no constituye un ejemplo de percepción literal de un objeto, las fotografías comparten un rasgo fundamental con la experiencia perceptual: el contenido de las fotografías, como el de la experiencia pictórica, es un contenido particular. Esto explica su fenomenología. Las fotografías, sin embargo, son más cercanas a las experiencias de la memoria que la experiencia perceptual

¿Por qué debemos preferir la versión débil de la nueva teoría de la fotografía?

Diarmuid Costello ha defendido recientemente una versión fuerte de lo que él llama, siguiendo a Dominic Lopes, La nueva teoría de la fotografía y ha criticado una versión anterior de esta nueva teoría, que él considera más débil y restringida. Ambas posiciones —radical y restringida— se oponen a la visión tradicional en filosofía analítica de la fotografía. Sin embargo, Costello sostiene que la posición débil está aún demasiado cerca de esta tradición. Este artículo defiende la posición débil y argumenta que la supuesta versión fuerte es más prescriptiva, restrictiva e inadecuada.