The Political Competition-Economic Performance Puzzle: Evidence from the OECD Countries and the Italian Regions

Empirical tests of the theories on the relationship between political competition and economic performance generate a puzzle: data tend to support the theory at the lower levels of government, but not in panels of countries. We argue that the larger set of policy instruments reduces the tax price of votes at the national level, increasing the incentives to use distortionary redistributive policies to win contested elections. Moreover, constitutions reserve competencies with a high ideological potential to the national government, reducing swing voters’ responsiveness to the economic performance of the central government. We thus expect political competition to produce efficiency-oriented policies at the sub-national level compared to the national one. We test this hypothesis on a panel of 24 OECD countries over 1974-2000 and a panel of 15 Italian regions over 1984-2000 and find support for our predictions.political competition, growth, redistribution, national and regional government

WOULD YOU TRUST AN ITALIAN POLITICIAN? PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM ITALIAN REGIONAL POLITICS

This paper evaluates the erosion of electoral accountability of the "Governors" of the Italian Regions in three subsequent political moments: 1) the elections; 2) the inaugural speeches of the Governor; 3) their first important policy decision, the long-term regional budget (DPEFR). We use content analysis (Laver et al., 2003) to assess the position of each Governor on a left to right distribution at the moment of the inaugural speeches and of the DPEFR. We then analyze the correlation between the distributions of 1) the electoral results and the inaugural speeches and 2) the inaugural speeches and the DPEFR, under the hypothesis that greater similarity can be interpreted as greater accountability. The analysis detects some erosion of accountability from the elections to the inaugural speeches, and a more serious one from the inaugural speeches to the DPEFR. A series of ANOVA tests suggests that the Region's relative economic position/dependency on transfers from the central governments partly explains such loss of accountability.

Causes and Consequences of Bailing out Expectations of Subcentral Governments: Theory and Evidence from the Italian Regions

This paper examines the strategic interactions among the central and a subcentral government where incomplete information forces both to form expectations about the other’s behaviour, especially the probability that the central government will bail out the local one. Various determinants and outcomes of the strategic interaction are explored. The model generates empirical restrictions about the central government’s transfer decisions and the lower government’s spending behaviour. These restrictions are tested on a sample of 20 Italian Regions. Data show that bailing out expectations are a quantitatively important component of local government spending.Expectations; intergovernmental relations; transfers; local public spending; bailing out; positive analysis

Comparing the growth effects of marginal vs. average tax rates and progressivity

The paper compares the appropriateness and explanatory power of marginal tax rates, average tax rates and tax progressivity as measures of the impact of taxation on growth. Data are organized as a panel of 25 industrialized countries from 1970 to 1998. Contrary to previous empirical research, but consistently with theory, we find that marginal effective tax rates and tax progressivity have a negative influence on economic growth. This negative correlation turns out to be robust after controlling for state and policy variables. Average tax rates, on the other hand, seem not to affect output dynamics. © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V

Fiscal rules vs. political culture as determinants of soft budget spending behaviors: Evidence from Italian and French regions

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether, and to which extent, the rules introduced by central governments effectively restrain the spending behaviour of the decentralized authorities. In this paper, the authors provide an innovative comparative analysis by considering two countries that share the same degree of economic development and many cultural traits - France and Italy. Yet, these two countries differ in one crucial respect. France has a tradition of strong centralization,This paper analyses intergovernmental transfers in France and Italy to assess how soft budget spending behaviors may result from slacks in institutional constraints or from phenomena related to political culture, like administrative practices or implementation of rules. It innovates on the previous literature, which concentrated on single countries, by adopting a comparative perspective. We estimate two separate but identical autoregressive forecasting model on French and Italian data to evaluate the extent to which regional administrators of each country can expect to be bailed out given the fiscal rules and institutions they face. This allows to proxy the bailout expectations in both countries and their role in determining soft budget spending behaviors. A larger impact of expectations is taken as evidence of greater discretion in fiscal decisions over and beyond the formal fiscal rules in place, evincing a more lax political culture. The estimates indicate that soft budget constraints and bailing out expectations are a quantitatively important component of local government spending in both countries, regardless the different degrees of stringency of fiscal rules and the type of grants and expenditures (total, current and capital) examined

Grant legislation vs. political factors as determinants of soft budget spending behaviors. Comparison between Italian and French regions

Abstract This paper analyses intergovernmental transfers in France and Italy to assess to which extent soft budget spending behaviors result from slack in fiscal constraints or from political factors. It innovates on the previous literature, which concentrated on single countries, by adopting a comparative perspective. We estimate two separate but identical autoregressive forecasting models on French and Italian data to evaluate how rules and political factors lead the regional administrators of each country to form their expectations about the amount of transfers they will receive from the central government. This allows to proxy the transfer expectations in both countries and their role in determining soft budget spending behaviors. The estimates indicate that transfer expectations are a quantitatively important component of regional spending in both countries, regardless the different degrees of stringency of grant legislations and the type of grants and expenditures (total, current and capital) examined. JEL: H71, H73, H77, D78, P43, P48, P5

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Regole e discrezionalita' in politica fiscale

Dottorato di ricerca in analisi economica, matematica e statistica dei fenomeni sociali. 7. cicloConsiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche - Biblioteca Centrale - P.le Aldo Moro, 7, Rome; Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale - P.za Cavalleggeri, 1, Florence / CNR - Consiglio Nazionale delle RichercheSIGLEITItal