Contracts, Human Rights and Taxation: How a Company Exploits a Country, the Case of Glencore in the Drc

Deals with the exploitation of resourcesin DR

CEO Centrality

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO’s receiving a “lucky” option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers.

Myths and Untold Stories - Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany

The paper offers an empirical analysis of private antitrust enforcement in Germany based on cases that were decided by courts between 2005 and 2007. The study presents information about the magnitude and nature of civil antitrust actions in Germany. The data includes inter alia, information about the courts involved in litigation, the relationship of the parties, affected industries, the remedies sought, the outcome of the claim, the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the proportion of stand-alone and follow-on litigation, and the length of proceedings before a given court. The study shows that a large number of private cases were concluded even when compared with public investigations in Germany. It seems that private antitrust actions complement rather than duplicate public enforcement efforts because of the overwhelming proportion of stand-alone claims and the amount of actions based on the abuse of market power. Only a small number of litigants asked for the compensation of loss suffered from anticompetitive conduct. Interpreting the results from the study cautiously, the paper suggests that the European Commission and other stakeholders may have misunderstood the nature of private actions in Germany (and maybe Europe) and, consequently, asked the wrong question, focusing on compensation. Expensive damages actions for the breach of the antitrust rules might not be as important as commonly assumed

Lucky CEOs

We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky grant -- defined as grants given at the lowest price of the month -- due to opportunistic timing. Lucky grants were more likely when the board did not have a majority of independent directors and/or the CEO had longer tenure -- factors associated with increased influence of the CEO on pay-setting. We find no evidence that gains from manipulated grants served as a substitute for compensation paid through other sources; total reported compensation from such sources was higher in firms providing lucky grants. Finally, opportunistic timing has been widespread throughout the economy, with a significant presence in each of the economy's twelve (Fama-French) industries.

Shortest Paths and Steiner Trees in VLSI Routing

Routing is one of the major steps in very-large-scale integration (VLSI) design. Its task is to find disjoint wire connections between sets of points on a chip, subject to numerous constraints. This problem is solved in a two-stage approach, which consists of so-called global and detailed routing steps. For each set of metal components to be connected, global routing reduces the search space by computing corridors in which detailed routing sequentially determines the desired connections as shortest paths. In this thesis, we present new theoretical results on Steiner trees and shortest paths, the two main mathematical concepts in routing. In the practical part, we give computational results of BonnRoute, a VLSI routing tool developed at the Research Institute for Discrete Mathematics at the University of Bonn. Interconnect signal delays are becoming increasingly important in modern chip designs. Therefore, the length of paths or direct delay measures should be taken into account when constructing rectilinear Steiner trees. We consider the problem of finding a rectilinear Steiner minimum tree (RSMT) that --- as a secondary objective --- minimizes a signal delay related objective. Given a source we derive some structural properties of RSMTs for which the weighted sum of path lengths from the source to the other terminals is minimized. Also, we present an exact algorithm for constructing RSMTs with weighted sum of path lengths as secondary objective, and a heuristic for various secondary objectives. Computational results for industrial designs are presented. We further consider the problem of finding a shortest rectilinear Steiner tree in the plane in the presence of rectilinear obstacles. The Steiner tree is allowed to run over obstacles; however, if it intersects an obstacle, then no connected component of the induced subtree must be longer than a given fixed length. This kind of length restriction is motivated by its application in VLSI routing where a large Steiner tree requires the insertion of repeaters which must not be placed on top of obstacles. We show that there are optimal length-restricted Steiner trees with a special structure. In particular, we prove that a certain graph (called augmented Hanan grid) always contains an optimal solution. Based on this structural result, we give an approximation scheme for the special case that all obstacles are of rectangular shape or are represented by at most a constant number of edges. Turning to the shortest paths problem, we present a new generic framework for Dijkstra's algorithm for finding shortest paths in digraphs with non-negative integral edge lengths. Instead of labeling individual vertices, we label subgraphs which partition the given graph. Much better running times can be achieved if the number of involved subgraphs is small compared to the order of the original graph and the shortest path problems restricted to these subgraphs is computationally easy. As an application we consider the VLSI routing problem, where we need to find millions of shortest paths in partial grid graphs with billions of vertices. Here, the algorithm can be applied twice, once in a coarse abstraction (where the labeled subgraphs are rectangles), and once in a detailed model (where the labeled subgraphs are intervals). Using the result of the first algorithm to speed up the second one via goal-oriented techniques leads to considerably reduced running time. We illustrate this with the routing program BonnRoute on leading-edge industrial chips. Finally, we present computational results of BonnRoute obtained on real-world VLSI chips. BonnRoute fulfills all requirements of modern VLSI routing and has been used by IBM and its customers over many years to produce more than one thousand different chips. To demonstrate the strength of BonnRoute as a state-of-the-art industrial routing tool, we show that it performs excellently on all traditional quality measures such as wire length and number of vias, but also on further criteria of equal importance in the every-day work of the designer

Private antitrust enforcement in England and Wales after the EU Damages Directives: Where are we heading?

The framework for private antitrust actions in the England and Wales has undergone a number of changes in recent years. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 introduced measures to facilitate access to justice for victims of anticompetitive conduct. It created a fast track procedure in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and granted the Tribunal the powers to permit opt-out representative actions. More changes were brought on with the implementation of the EU Damages Directive in March 2017. In this chapter, I will take stock of those recent developments and offer an insight into the functioning of private enforcement of competition law in England and Wales. I will document key developments and issues regarding access to documents (disclosure), joint and several liability of co-infringers, and claim aggregation (opt-out representative actions). The recent legislative measures seem to pull private enforcement of competition law in different directions facilitating both small claims and large compensation actions. The Consumer Rights Act implemented a number of measures to encourage private litigation but the impact of the changes following the Damages Directive are not clear yet

Compensation and the Damages Directive

The EU Damages Directive came into force in December 2014. One of its objectives is to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by infringements of competition law can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation in the courts of the EU Member States. This paper looks closely at the Directive’s compensation goal and the key arrangements that are to encourage victims to seek redress in the national courts. The paper uses a simple framework to demonstrate that the legal measures in the Damages Directive are unlikely to foster compensation because they fail to create incentives for harmed individuals to seek redress. If Member States seek to encourage full compensation, they should devise a framework for private antitrust actions that goes beyond the Directive’s remit by, for example, allowing class actions

Lucky Directors

While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events in which public firms granted options to outside directors during 1996-2005, we find that 9% were "lucky grant events" falling on days with a stock price equal to a monthly low. We estimate that about 800 lucky grant events owed their status to opportunistic timing, and that about 460 firms and 1400 outside directors were associated with grant events produced by such timing. There is evidence that the opportunistic timing of director grant events has been to a substantial extent the product of backdating and not merely spring-loading based on private information. We find that directors' luck has been correlated with executives' luck. Furthermore, grant events were more likely to be lucky when the firm had more entrenching provisions protecting insiders from the risk of removal, as well as when the board did not have a majority of independent directors.