The diffusion of a new service: Combining service consideration and brand choice

We propose an individual-level model of a two-stage service diffusion process. In the first stage, customers decide whether to "consider" joining the service. This (Consideration) stage is modeled by a hazard model. Customers who decide to consider the service move on to the Choice stage, wherein they choose among the service alternatives and an outside No Choice option. This stage is modeled by a conditional Multinomial Logit model. The service provider does not observe the transition in the first stage of potential customers who have yet to choose a brand. Such potential customers may have started to consider joining the service, yet chose the outside alternative in each period thereafter. One of the main contributions of the model is its ability to distinguish between these two non-adopter types. We estimated the model using data on the adoption process of newly introduced service plans offered by a commercial bank. We employed the hierarchical Bayes Monte Carlo Markov Chain procedure to estimate individual as well as population parameters. The empirical results indicate that the model outperforms competing models in breadth of analysis, model fit, and prediction accuracy

Price Competition in Markets with Consumer Variety Seeking

We investigate price competition between firms in markets characterized by consumer variety seeking. While previous research has addressed the effect of consumer inertia on prices, there exists no research on the effects of variety seeking on price competition. Our study fills this gap in the literature. Using a two-period duopoly framework as in Klemperer's analysis of inertial markets, we show that the noncooperative pricing equilibrium in a market with consumer variety seeking may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without variety seeking. Specifically, our variety-seeking model implies tacit collusion between firms in periods, unlike the inertia model of Klemperer that implies tacit collusion between firms only in the period but implies fierce price competition in the first period. When consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about future prices, the implied first-period prices increase further, which is consistent with what Klemperer finds in an inertial market. To summarize, while our variety-seeking analyses support two key results (pertaining to second-period prices and rational expectations) previously derived for inertial markets by Klemperer, they depart from one key result (pertaining to first-period prices)

Cross-category demand effects of price promotions

Do promotions in a certain category lead to higher revenues in other categories? If so, to what degree? The answers to these questions are highly relevant for retailers that supply products in different categories. Empirical findings in studies that consider a limited number of categories indicate small promotional cross-category effects. This study develops a framework to determine the impact of price promotions on category revenues that include interdependencies among a substantial number of categories at the category demand level. The own- and cross-category demand effects are moderated by variables such as promotion intensity, category characteristics (own-category effects), and spatial distances between shelf locations (cross-category effects). The empirical results based on daily store-level scanner data show that approximately half of all price promotions expand own-category revenues, especially for categories with deeper supported discounts. There is a high probability (61%) that a price promotion affects sales of at least one other category. The number of categories affected is not greater than two. Moderate evidence supports the existence of cross-promotional effects between categories more closely located in a store

A new multivariate count data model to study multi-category physician prescription behavior

Simultaneous Poisson model, Cross-category, MCMC, Endogeneity, C30, C13, C51, M31, C11,