Is the Homunculus "Aware" of Sensory Adaptation?

Neural activity and perception are both affected by sensory history. The work presented here explores the relationship between the physiological effects of adaptation and their perceptual consequences. Perception is modeled as arising from an encoder-decoder cascade, in which the encoder is defined by the probabilistic response of a population of neurons, and the decoder transforms this population activity into a perceptual estimate. Adaptation is assumed to produce changes in the encoder, and we examine the conditions under which the decoder behavior is consistent with observed perceptual effects in terms of both bias and discriminability. We show that for all decoders, discriminability is bounded from below by the inverse Fisher information. Estimation bias, on the other hand, can arise for a variety of different reasons and can range from zero to substantial. We specifically examine biases that arise when the decoder is fixed, “unaware ” of the changes in the encoding population (as opposed to “aware ” of the adaptation and changing accordingly). We simulate the effects of adaptation on two well-studied sensory attributes, motion direction and contrast, assuming a gain change description of encoder adaptation. Although we cannot uniquely constrain the source of decoder bias, we find for both motion and contrast that an “unaware ” decoder that maximizes the likelihood of the percept given by the preadaptation encoder leads to predictions that are consistent with behavioral data. This model implies that adaptation-induced biases arise as a result of temporary suboptimality of the decoder

Predicted contextual modulation varies with distance from pinwheel centers in the orientation preference map

In the primary visual cortex (V1) of some mammals, columns of neurons with the full range of orientation preferences converge at the center of a pinwheel-like arrangement, the ‘pinwheel center' (PWC). Because a neuron receives abundant inputs from nearby neurons, the neuron's position on the cortical map likely has a significant impact on its responses to the layout of orientations inside and outside its classical receptive field (CRF). To understand the positional specificity of responses, we constructed a computational model based on orientation preference maps in monkey V1 and hypothetical neuronal connections. The model simulations showed that neurons near PWCs displayed weaker but detectable orientation selectivity within their CRFs, and strongly reduced contextual modulation from extra-CRF stimuli, than neurons distant from PWCs. We suggest that neurons near PWCs robustly extract local orientation within their CRF embedded in visual scenes, and that contextual information is processed in regions distant from PWCs

Neural Computation via Neural Geometry: A Place Code for Inter-whisker Timing in the Barrel Cortex?

The place theory proposed by Jeffress (1948) is still the dominant model of how the brain represents the movement of sensory stimuli between sensory receptors. According to the place theory, delays in signalling between neurons, dependent on the distances between them, compensate for time differences in the stimulation of sensory receptors. Hence the location of neurons, activated by the coincident arrival of multiple signals, reports the stimulus movement velocity. Despite its generality, most evidence for the place theory has been provided by studies of the auditory system of auditory specialists like the barn owl, but in the study of mammalian auditory systems the evidence is inconclusive. We ask to what extent the somatosensory systems of tactile specialists like rats and mice use distance dependent delays between neurons to compute the motion of tactile stimuli between the facial whiskers (or ‘vibrissae’). We present a model in which synaptic inputs evoked by whisker deflections arrive at neurons in layer 2/3 (L2/3) somatosensory ‘barrel’ cortex at different times. The timing of synaptic inputs to each neuron depends on its location relative to sources of input in layer 4 (L4) that represent stimulation of each whisker. Constrained by the geometry and timing of projections from L4 to L2/3, the model can account for a range of experimentally measured responses to two-whisker stimuli. Consistent with that data, responses of model neurons located between the barrels to paired stimulation of two whiskers are greater than the sum of the responses to either whisker input alone. The model predicts that for neurons located closer to either barrel these supralinear responses are tuned for longer inter-whisker stimulation intervals, yielding a topographic map for the inter-whisker deflection interval across the surface of L2/3. This map constitutes a neural place code for the relative timing of sensory stimuli

A Common Cortical Circuit Mechanism for Perceptual Categorical Discrimination and Veridical Judgment

Perception involves two types of decisions about the sensory world: identification of stimulus features as analog quantities, or discrimination of the same stimulus features among a set of discrete alternatives. Veridical judgment and categorical discrimination have traditionally been conceptualized as two distinct computational problems. Here, we found that these two types of decision making can be subserved by a shared cortical circuit mechanism. We used a continuous recurrent network model to simulate two monkey experiments in which subjects were required to make either a two-alternative forced choice or a veridical judgment about the direction of random-dot motion. The model network is endowed with a continuum of bell-shaped population activity patterns, each representing a possible motion direction. Slow recurrent excitation underlies accumulation of sensory evidence, and its interplay with strong recurrent inhibition leads to decision behaviors. The model reproduced the monkey's performance as well as single-neuron activity in the categorical discrimination task. Furthermore, we examined how direction identification is determined by a combination of sensory stimulation and microstimulation. Using a population-vector measure, we found that direction judgments instantiate winner-take-all (with the population vector coinciding with either the coherent motion direction or the electrically elicited motion direction) when two stimuli are far apart, or vector averaging (with the population vector falling between the two directions) when two stimuli are close to each other. Interestingly, for a broad range of intermediate angular distances between the two stimuli, the network displays a mixed strategy in the sense that direction estimates are stochastically produced by winner-take-all on some trials and by vector averaging on the other trials, a model prediction that is experimentally testable. This work thus lends support to a common neurodynamic framework for both veridical judgment and categorical discrimination in perceptual decision making

Charles Bonnet Syndrome:Evidence for a Generative Model in the Cortex?

Several theories propose that the cortex implements an internal model to explain, predict, and learn about sensory data, but the nature of this model is unclear. One condition that could be highly informative here is Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS), where loss of vision leads to complex, vivid visual hallucinations of objects, people, and whole scenes. CBS could be taken as indication that there is a generative model in the brain, specifically one that can synthesise rich, consistent visual representations even in the absence of actual visual input. The processes that lead to CBS are poorly understood. Here, we argue that a model recently introduced in machine learning, the deep Boltzmann machine (DBM), could capture the relevant aspects of (hypothetical) generative processing in the cortex. The DBM carries both the semantics of a probabilistic generative model and of a neural network. The latter allows us to model a concrete neural mechanism that could underlie CBS, namely, homeostatic regulation of neuronal activity. We show that homeostatic plasticity could serve to make the learnt internal model robust against e.g. degradation of sensory input, but overcompensate in the case of CBS, leading to hallucinations. We demonstrate how a wide range of features of CBS can be explained in the model and suggest a potential role for the neuromodulator acetylcholine. This work constitutes the first concrete computational model of CBS and the first application of the DBM as a model in computational neuroscience. Our results lend further credence to the hypothesis of a generative model in the brain

Overview of the basic CBS experiment.

<p>A model has been trained on simple images (here, MNIST digits). Initially, decoded internal representations correspond to what is given as input in the visible layer. To model visual impairment or blindness, sensory input is then removed, eliciting internal representations devoid of content. Subsequent homeostatic adaptation of neuronal excitability leads to spontaneous hallucinatory representations emerging (right-hand side images are decoded from the hidden layers, receiving no sensory input, 3, 20, or 30 sampling cycles after initialisation).</p

Decoding the internal state.

<p>During perception, the states of any hidden layer are decoded using a copy of the DBM as a decoder. Starting from the hidden states of the layer in question, a single deterministic top-down pass is performed to obtain a reconstructed image.</p