Sn(IV)-corroles reversibly bind carboxylates in the axial position

We present the synthesis of Sn(IV)-corrole complexes that bind to carboxylate moieties reversibly, via axial ligation. The systems have been predominantly characterized using H-1 NMR spectroscopy, X-ray crystallography, and MALDI mass spectrometry. The dynamic nature of the Sn(IV)-O2CR bond has been studied in solution using 2D-NMR spectroscopy

Popularity functions, partisan effects, and support in parliament

This paper analyzes the popularity of the main political entities in Portugal. Estimation results of popularity functions validate the responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting popularity levels. There is also evidence of personality effects, of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of honeymoon effects. Finally, we found that voters' evaluations of incumbents' performance regarding unemployment is affected by their support in Parliament when an incumbent faces more opposition in Parliament, voters are less likely to hold him responsible for unemployment increases.(undefined

Negotiating employability: migrant capitals and networking strategies for Zimbabwean highly skilled migrants in the UK

In this paper we focus on highly skilled migration from Zimbabwe to the UK, exploring these migrants’ social capital sources/structures and content. In doing so we pay attention to routes of migration and how they shape migrants’ networking capabilities and patterns. We further take a Bourdieusian perspective and explore the intersection between social capital and cultural capital in the process of migrants’ negotiation of employment opportunities, giving closer attention to how the distinctive habitus associated with being highly skilled migrants from Zimbabwe shape migrants’ attitudes towards work. By exploring the interplay between external processes and internalised structures, we bring to the fore the multiple positioning of our participants, who we see not as simply depending on social networks, but as complex actors whose negotiation of employability in the UK is shaped by various factors including intersecting aspects of differentiation

A Political Winner’s Curse: Why Preventive Policies Pass Parliament so Narrowly

Preventive policy measures such as bailouts often pass parliament very narrowly. We present a model of asymmetric information between politicians and voters which rationalizes this narrow parliamentary outcome. A successful preventive policy impedes the verification of its own necessity. When policy intervention is necessary but voters disagree ex-ante, individual politicians have an incentive to loose the vote in parliament in order to be rewarded by voters ex-post. Comfortable vote margins induce incentives to move to the loosing fraction to avoid this winner's curse. In equilibrium, parliamentary elections over preventive policies are thus likely to end at very narrow margins.Politikmaßnahmen zur Prävention einer drohenden Krise wie Bankenrettungen oder Finanzhilfen an notleidende Staaten erhalten häufig nur eine knappe Mehrheit im Parlament. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird ein polit-ökonomisches Modell asymmetrischer Informationen zwischen Politikern und Wählern vorgestellt, aus dem sich diese knappen Parlamentsabstimmungen erklären lassen. Annahmegemäß haben die Politiker im Vorfeld der Parlamentsabstimmung (ex-ante) einen Informationsvorsprung gegenüber den Wählern was die Notwendigkeit der präventiven Politikmaßnahme betrifft. Selbst nach der Entscheidung über die Durchsetzung der Maßnahme (ex-post) erfahren die Wähler nur dann, ob die Maßnahme notwendig war, wenn sie nicht durchgesetzt wurde und die Folgen der ausbleibenden Krisenprävention sichtbar werden. Sofern die präventive Politik tatsächlich notwendig ist, um Schaden abzuwenden, die Wähler dies ex-ante aber nicht glauben, ergibt sich eine interessante Konstellation: Folgen die Politiker dem ex-ante-Willen der Wähler und wird dementsprechend die Politik nicht umgesetzt, tritt der volkswirtschaftliche Schaden auf. Dies wird ex-post offenkundig und die Wähler strafen die Politiker für ihre fehlerhafte Politik bei der nachfolgendenden Wahl ab. Entscheiden sich die Politiker hingegen dafür, die Politik zur Krisenprävention durchzusetzen, kann der Schaden abgewendet werden. Allerdings bleiben die Wähler ex-post im Unklaren darüber, ob die Politikmaßnahme tatsächlich notwendig war und somit bei ihrer ex-ante-Einstellung. Auch dann werden die Politiker für ihre als fehlerhaft erachtete Politik abgestraft. Hieraus ergibt sich für einen einzelnen Politiker im Parlament eine Situation, die im Aufsatz als Winner's Curse bezeichnet wird: Er erhält nur dann die Zustimmung der Wähler, wenn die Politik im Parlament durchgesetzt wird, er aber dagegen gestimmt hat, oder die Politik keine Mehrheit im Parlament erhält, er aber dafür gestimmt hat. Im Falle eines eindeutigen Mehrheitsverhältnisses entstehen somit individuelle Anreize, zur Minderheit abzuweichen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines knappen Wahlausgangs steigt durch diese Anreize zur Abweichung

Bricoleurs Extraordinaire: Sports Coaches in Inter War Britain

In Inter War Britain, individuals exploited their athletic skills by pursuing professional careers, or adopting amateur roles, as instructors, trainers and coaches, invariably drawing from, and elaborating on, existing practices. The coach was the master of a body of specialist craft knowledge, the tacit nature of which was transmitted through ‘stealing with the eyes’ as the apprentice watched the master in action (Gamble, 2001). Professional coaches saw themselves as practical men whose experiential knowledge concerning diet, physiological and psychological preparation, stimulants, massaging, medical treatments, talent identification, and so on provided critical components in their coaching ‘toolbox’ (Nelson, 1924, 25-26). Craft knowledge was never static. Coaching expertise is a fluid, cyclical process with practitioners continuously redeveloping their competencies (Turner, Nelson and Potrac, 2012, 323), and part of traditional craft expertise was the ability to react positively to shifting circumstances. Coaches were constantly stimulated to experiment by competitors, commercialisation, and emerging technologies (Clegg, 1977, 244), and they exemplified the notion of the ‘Bricoleur’ in constantly trialling emerging knowledge, intuitively accepting or rejecting appropriate material. This paper explores the ways in which practitioners developed their coaching ‘toolbox’ in Inter War Britain by drawing on examples from newspaper reports, personal and public archives, and instructional texts (eg. Tilden, 1920; Gent, 1922; Nelson, 1924; Mussabini, 1926; Lowe and Porritt, 1929; Abrahams and Abrahams, 1936). The author highlights the range of knowledge that coaches had at their command, well before the emergence of sports science and coaching certification programmes, and questions assumptions that coaches can no longer rely solely on ‘learning the trade’ through experience (Evans and Light, 2007). As Winchester et al. (2013) have emphasised, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and insights are developed from daily experiences in sport, work and at home, as well as through exposure to the coaching environment, and contemporary coaches still employ a largely implicit form of knowledge, closely connected to past experiences, which shares similarities with Inter War craft knowledge (Smith and Cushion, 2006, 363; Jones, Armour and Potrac, 2003), while identifying experimentation and experience as key reference points (Irwin, Hanton and Kerwin, 2004, 436, 439; Potrac, Jones and Cushion, 2007)

A Blessing and a Curse? Political Institutions in the Growth and Decay of Generalized Trust: A Cross-National Panel Analysis, 1980–2009

Despite decades of research on social capital, studies that explore the relationship between political institutions and generalized trust–a key element of social capital–across time are sparse. To address this issue, we use various cross-national public-opinion data sets including the World Values Survey and employ pooled time-series OLS regression and fixed- and random-effects estimation techniques on an unbalanced panel of 74 countries and 248 observations spread over a 29-year time period. With these data and methods, we investigate the impact of five political-institutional factors–legal property rights, market regulations, labor market regulations, universality of socioeconomic provisions, and power-sharing capacity–on generalized trust. We find that generalized trust increases monotonically with the quality of property rights institutions, that labor market regulations increase generalized trust, and that power-sharing capacity of the state decreases generalized trust. While generalized trust increases as the government regulation of credit, business, and economic markets decreases and as the universality of socioeconomic provisions increases, both effects appear to be more sensitive to the countries included and the modeling techniques employed than the other political-institutional factors. In short, we find that political institutions simultaneously promote and undermine generalized trust

Legitimacy and the cost of government

While previous research documents a negative relationship between government size and economic growth, suggesting an economic cost of big government, a given government size generally affects growth differently in different countries. As a possible explanation of this differential effect, we explore whether perceived government legitimacy (measured by satisfaction with the way democracy works) influences how a certain government size affects growth. On the positive side, a legitimate government may get away with being big since legitimacy can affect people's behavioral response to, and therefore the economic growth cost of, taxation and government expenditures. On the negative side, legitimacy may make voters less prone to acquire information, which in turn facilitates interest-group oriented or populist policies that harm growth. A panel-data analysis of up to 30 developed countries, in which two different measures of the size of government are interacted with government legitimacy, reveals that legitimacy exacerbates a negative growth effect of government size in the long run. This could be interpreted as governments taking advantage of legitimacy in order to secure short-term support at a long-term cost to the economy

Voting Islamist or Voting Secular? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Outcomes in 'Arab Spring' Egypt

This paper empirically studies the voting outcomes of Egypt's first parliamentary elections after the Arab Spring. In light of the strong Islamist success in the polls, we explore the main determinants of Islamist vs. secular voting. We identify three dimensions that affect voting outcomes at the constituency level: the socio-economic profile, the economic structure and the electoral institutional framework. Our results show that education is negatively associated with Islamist voting. Interestingly, we find significant evidence which suggests that higher poverty levels are associated with a lower vote share for Islamist parties. Later voting stages in the sequential voting setup do not exhibit a bandwagon effect