Methods of Studying False Memory

The study of memory is one of those domains in psychology which has clear practical relevance. Think, for example, about people with Alzheimer’s disease. Devastating dysfunction experienced by these patients makes it abundantly evident that our memory constitutes an overarching and critical role in our daily life. However, in the study of memory, there is another memory phenomenon that also carries with it enormous theoretical and practical implications, namely, memory illusions. That is, people frequently claim that they remember details or even an entire event that never actually happened. These false memories can have serious consequences when they appear in the testimony of witness, victims, or suspects in legal cases (Howe & Knott, 2015; Otgaar, De Ruiter, Howe, Hoetmer, & van Reekum, in press). A person, for example, might falsely remember that he/she was sexually abused when he/she was a child, and this memory illusion might lead to false accusations that may result in wrongful convictions

Believing Does Not Equal Remembering: The Effects of Social Feedback and Objective False Evidence on Belief in Occurrence, Belief in Accuracy, and Recollection

We examined the impact of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection of an autobiographical experience. Participants viewed six virtual scenes (e.g., park) and were tested on their belief/recollection. After 1-week, participants were randomly assigned to four groups. One group received social feedback that one scene was not experienced. A second group received objective false evidence that one of the scenes was not shown. A third group received both social feedback and objective false evidence and the control group did not receive any manipulation. Belief in occurrence dropped considerably in the social feedback group and in the combined group. Also, nonbelieved memories were most likely to occur in participants receiving both social feedback and objective false evidence. We show that social feedback and objective false evidence undermine belief in occurrence, but that they leave belief in accuracy and recollection unaffected

When children’s testimonies are used as evidence: how children’s accounts may impact child custodial decisions

In child custody cases, children oftentimes provide allegations of experienced trauma against one of their parents. Such allegations can happen before any investigative interviews (e.g., by the police or child protective services) have taken place. A central theme here concerns how to appraise such allegations and make certain that children’s accounts are taken seriously. In the current special issue, the focus is on new work on the functioning of children’s memory and its relation to trauma or work on children’s suggestibility and memory when they are traumatized. Specifically, key experts in the field of children’s memory provided contributions on: (1) the impact of interviewer support and rapport building on children’s testimonies, (2) the role of parental alienation in children’s testimonial accuracy, and (3) different types of false memories in children’s memory reports

Manipulating Memory Associations Changes Decision-making Preferences in a Preconditioning Task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making . We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money . Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined . Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by fasle feedback on memories . The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories

Dealing with False Memories in Children and Adults: Recommendations for the Legal Arena

Children are often viewed as poor eyewitnesses. Fact-finders, lawyers, and researchers assume that children are exceptionally prone to accept external suggestive (leading) questions and to create false memories. Is this assumption justified? This review will show it is not. First, studies on spontaneous false memories— elicited without any suggestive pressure—reveal that children are less likely than adults to produce them. Second, under certain circumstances, children are even less prone to accept external suggestions than adults. This counterintuitive finding happens when false suggestions contain information that is associatively related but in actuality not experienced by children or adults. Using empirically-based interview protocols can maximize the retrieval of accurate memories in children and adults. Furthermore, expert witnesses should use alternative scenarios in order to better evaluate whether statements by children or adults are based on truth or fiction

Who is the better eyewitness? Sometimes Adults but at Other Times Children

Suggestibility is regarded as a major issue when children testify in court. Many legal professionals and memory researchers view children as inferior witnesses. Although differences exist between children and adults in suggestibility, these are much more complex than is usually assumed. We show that under certain conditions, adults are more susceptible to suggestion and false memories than children. We demonstrate that age-related shifts in suggestibility and false memory appear contingent on how fast and automatic children and adults make associations when experiencing events. Specifically, when confronted with suggestive information about a related, but non-experienced detail, adults more frequently than children, automatically generate links between items experienced and those already in memory making them more susceptible to suggestion than children

Associative Activation as a Mechanism Underlying False Memory Formation

We recently made the case that associative activation is a viable mechanism underlying false memory formation and hence, also false memory formation in psychopathology (Otgaar, Muris, Howe, & Merckelbach, 2017). Tryon (in press) argued that our description of associative activation did not meet the criteria of causation and explanatory value in order to quality as a mechanism. In this commentary, we explain why we disagree with Tryon. Many studies focused on associative activation and false memory creation. We believe that these studies provide good arguments for associative activation as a likely causal antecedent in the production of false memories

The Malleability of Developmental Trends in Neutral and Negative Memory Illusions

Among many legal professionals and memory researchers there exists the assumption that susceptibility to false memory decreases with age. In four misinformation experiments, we show that under conditions that focus on the meaning of experiences, children are not always the most susceptible to suggestion-induced false memories. We begin by presenting a short overview of previous developmental false memory studies, the majority of which have found that the susceptibility to misinformation decreases with age. In Experiment 1, 6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults received a video and were confronted with misinformation about related but non-presented details. Older children and adults had higher misinformation acceptance rates than younger children. In Experiment 2, we replicated this finding adding a younger child group (4/6-year-olds). In Experiments 3 and 4, we used new material and again found that susceptibility to misinformation increased with age. Together, these experiments show that children’s memory accuracy is not necessarily inferior to that of adults’

The ease of lying

Brain imaging studies suggest that truth telling constitutes the default of the human brain and that lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response. By manipulating the truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we investigated whether the dominance of the truth response is malleable. Results showed that frequent truth telling made lying more difficult, and that frequent lying made lying easier. These results implicate that (1) the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by increasing the dominance of the truth response and that (2) habitual lying makes the lie response more dominant