- A MODEL OF VOTING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND OPINION POLLS

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with incomplete information is developed.It is assumed that voters care about the distribu-tion of votes among the two candidates. Votershave an incomplete infor-mation about the distribution of voters´ types. We provide conditions forwhich the publication of opinion polls may solve the informational problem voters face. The mainresult states that only when the distribution of voters is polarized we could expect that voters actas if they were fully informed.Spatial competition, Incomplete Information, Opinion Polls.

- IDEOLOGICAL VERSUS DOWNSIAN POLITICAL COMPETITION

We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the contrary, only care about winning the election. We consider two possibilities: that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which professional politicians have much better information than the members of the party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional politicians choose.party competition, delegation, asymmetric information

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability.

This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levelsMajority voting; Income taxation; Uncertainty; Status quo;

Robust implementation under alternative information structures

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbours and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the economy. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about what is going on in the rest of the economy. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechanism which any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto powet in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view of the designer of the information possesed by agents about the economy

Tax enforcement problems

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.Publicad

Tax enforcement problems.

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levelsPublicad

Endogennous party formation and the effect of income distribution on policy.

We develop a model of spatial political competition with ideological parties and uncertainty. The political issue is the income tax rate and the amount of a public good. The ideology of each party is determine endogenously. We show that the tax rate does not coincide with the ideal policy of the median voter. Moreover, the tax rate is not increasing in the di¤erence between the mean income and the median income.Party formation; Redistribution; Growth;

Ideological versus Downsian political competition

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comWe analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters’ types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities: that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which professional politicians have much better information than the members of the party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional politicians choose.I wish to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Educacion, projects no. PB94 1504, PB93 0342, PB97 0131 and D.G.I.C.T. mobility grantPublicad

Analysis of interregional labor migration in Spain using gross flows

This paper studies the economic determinants, from an aggregate perspective, of Spanish interregional labor force flows. Its main characteristics are that it is based on a matching model of the labor market applied to migration, and that uses gross flows instead of net ones as other studies do. Among the main results, we get that unemployment increases out-migration because unemployed people search more actively, but when the unemployment rate is above certain level, this effect is reduced. We also get that wages are a significant variable with the expected sign when entered as the rate of change of relative wages