Boundedness of intrinsic square functions and their commutators on generalized weighted Orlicz-Morrey spaces

We shall investigate the boundedness of the intrinsic square functions and their commutators on generalized weighted Orlicz-Morrey spaces $M^{\Phi,\varphi}_{w}({\mathbb R}^n)$. In all the cases, the conditions for the boundedness are given in terms of Zygmund-type integral inequalities on weights $\varphi$ without assuming any monotonicity property of $\varphi(x,\cdot)$ with $x$ fixed.Comment: 21pages. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1311.612

Quantified Stability Investigations for Reaction-Diffusion Systems

The main focus of this thesis lies in the investigation of the properties of stationary solutions to reaction-diffusion systems. Using the computer-assisted approach the questions on the stability and existence of stationary solutions of pattern formation, spruce budworm, predator-prey and competition models are answered. Moreover, granted that the stationary solution is stable, a computer-assisted method for the quantification of its domain of attraction is proposed

Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech Regulation

“Fintech” refers to a variety of digital assets, technologies, and infrastructure that deal with the operation of today’s financial markets. The regulation of this presents both legal and regulatory challenges. This article examines the regulatory responses to fintech disruption; specifically, the “experimentation” approach, the “incorporation” approach, and the “accommodation” approach. These approaches provide a baseline for further discussion and policy analysis in response to “Fintech.

The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age?

This short essay is an attempt to present a few early big picture observations on the broad regulatory philosophy underlying the Dodd-Frank Act. The question raised here is whether the Dodd-Frank Act, in fact, provides a blueprint for the twenty-first-century version of the New Deal - a qualitatively new approach to resolving the regulatory challenges posed by today\u27s financial markets. Answering this complex question in full is hardly possible at this stage in the process, when many critical details of the new legal and regulatory regime are yet to be determined. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to reflect upon some of the overarching themes built into the foundation of the Act, bound to shape the course of the ongoing reform

From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act

This Article examines the recent history and implementation of one of the central provisions in U.S. banking law, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. Enacted in 1933 in response to one of the perceived causes of the Great Depression, section 23A imposes quantitative limitations on certain extensions of credit and other transactions between a bank and its affiliates that expose a bank to an affiliate\u27s credit or investment risk, prohibits banks from purchasing low-quality assets from their nonbank affiliates, and imposes strict collateral requirements with respect to extensions of credit to affiliates. The key purpose of these restrictions is twofold: to protect federally insured depository institutions from excessive credit exposure to their affiliates, and to prevent transfer of federal subsidy to nondepository financial institutions. After the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which removed the Glass-Steagall era prohibition on affiliation between commercial banks and investment banks, section 23A effectively became the principal statutory safeguard preventing the depository system from subsidizing potentially risky activities of nonbanking institutions. However, despite its officially endorsed significance, section 23A remains a largely obscure statute that has not attracted much scholarly attention to date. This Article seeks to fill that important gap and to explore how effective section 23A is in achieving its purported goals in practice. It examines the body of interpretive letters issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board ) between 1996 and 2010, in which the Board granted individual banking institutions\u27 requests to exempt their proposed transactions with affiliates from the requirements of section 23A. This Article argues that section 23A falls short of delivering the kind of robust protection for the depository system it allegedly promises, primarily because it was not designed for fulfilling such a grand task. This mismatch between its professed function and practical efficacy became particularly clear during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The Article puts together a comprehensive record showing how the Board\u27s use of exemptive authority effectively rendered section 23A irrelevant during the crisis, by allowing commercial banks to provide financing to their affiliated securities firms, derivatives dealers, money market funds, and even automotive companies, in order to prevent potentially disastrous effects of their failure on the financial system and the broader economy. Crisis containment and systemic risk considerations consistently prevailed over the statutory purpose of preventing the leakage of the federal subsidy outside the depository system. This Article further argues that the recent amendments to section 23A under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 fail to address this fundamental tension in the operation of the statute. The Article concludes with a discussion of potential implications of this argument for future financial regulatory reform

License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products

This Article explores the possibility of creating a system of mandatory pre-approval of complex financial products as an ex ante solution to the problem of systemic risk containment. Building on the concept of regulatory precaution borrowed from environmental and health law, and elements of pre-CFMA regulation of commodity futures, the Article outlines the broad contours of a new licensing scheme that would place the burden of proving social and economic utility of complex financial instruments on the intermediaries that structure and market them. Fundamentally a thought experiment, this proposal seeks to enrich the current policy debate by expanding the range of potentially plausible reform options

Current trends of investment climate in the Republic of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is a leader in terms of foreign investment per capita in the CIS countries today. Direct foreign investment in Kazakhstan is about $1,300 per capita. This suggests that the investment attractiveness of the country will rise. In addition, the intention of the republic to enter the 30 most developed countries of the world by 2050 opens up numerous new opportunities for companies from different sectors. According to opinion polls, the investment attractiveness of Kazakhstan is due to the following factors: 1) it Recommendations for further improvement of the investment climate in Kazakhstan include: 1. Informing potential investors about the attractiveness of Kazakhstan (through diplomatic missions, non-governmental organizations, mass media, social networks, etc.). 2. Reduction of regional disparities and the development of economically backward regions. Today, only three cities – Astana, Almaty and Atyrau – can attract foreign investors. 3. Enhancing the transparency of business in Kazakhstan.peer-reviewe

Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech Regulation

“Fintech” refers to a variety of digital assets, technologies, and infrastructure that deal with the operation of today’s financial markets. The regulation of this presents both legal and regulatory challenges. This article examines the regulatory responses to fintech disruption; specifically, the “experimentation” approach, the “incorporation” approach, and the “accommodation” approach. These approaches provide a baseline for further discussion and policy analysis in response to “Fintech.