The lean core in digital platforms

This paper intends to illustrate and make more explicit the decentralization argument put forward in the literature on platform leadership. The analysis shows that in the digital economy, where rapid scalability and evolvability are so important, decentralization has played a crucial role in the success of some open platforms, as against the failure of other, also open but more centralized, platforms. More specifically, on the basis of four comparative case studies, the paper shows that platform leaders should beware of offering the market too heavy a platform core, lest the platform’s neutrality, scalability and evolvability be compromise

The power of non-contractual innovation

Currently, all major IT and telecom firms are busy trying to stimulate non-contractual complementary\ud developments around their own core competences and offerings. But little has\ud been done to explain the logic, strengths, andweaknesses of non-contractual innovation. The\ud literature on open-platform leadership recognises the importance of non-contractual innovation,\ud but only within the limited confines of a normative approach based on two implicit\ud assumptions: that a platform’s core and periphery are sharply and easily differentiated and\ud that platforms are always grown and orchestrated from a monolithic core. Through analysis\ud of two cases of decentralised open innovation: the emergence of video rental stores and the\ud emergence of desktop-publishing systems. I argue that these assumptions do not apply to\ud all open platforms. I conclude that by forcing a hierarchical framework onto the analysis,\ud the normative approach underplays the role of non-contractual innovation and turns a blind\ud eye to the radically self-organised and unforeseeable nature of some platforms’ success

The dynamics of games of innovation

Many executives see innovation as an unmanageable process, riddled with risks. The\ud research we conducted with the Industrial Research Institute, interviewing over 200 vicepresidents\ud of research and development and chief technical officers in many sectors around\ud the world, yields a more nuanced view. Innovation becomes manageable once managers\ud move away from normative prescriptions that view the process as uniform and recognise\ud that different rules and practices apply to different circumstances.\ud Our argument is that clusters of interdependent firms contributing to the building of a set of\ud interacting products and services tend to self-organise themselves into distinct and relatively\ud persistent “games of innovatio

Innovation Games: A new approach to the competitive challenge

Firms need to be innovative to stay ahead of the competition. But what form does innovation take in today's fast-moving world? The conventional view is that innovation is confined to the R&D departments of large firms, where boffins labour to perfect new products that meet presently unmet customer needs, and patents and copyrights protect market supremacy. In this ‘closed system’ scenario, all managers are striving to follow universal best practices, and as a consequence can find themselves trapped in competition that ultimately gets no one very far. The authors argue that in reality, 21st century innovation is a much more fluid affair. For example, rather than being released as a finished product, the first generation of a new product may be a prototype with corners still to be rubbed off when it enters the market: adventurous early customers themselves help to hone performance over time. Similarly, rather than R&D being an internal business, an entire ecosystem of smaller firms may collaborate and interact, under the direction of the lead company, in the innovation process. Analysing data collected from a large number of firms across different industry sectors, the authors set out to create a more holistic, multi-dimensional approach to understanding innovation. To this end, they draw up a typology of seven ‘games of innovation’ with different characteristics; games cut across industries and sectors, and different firms may play one or more. Their empirical findings highlight the fact that ‘design rules’ are not always drawn up in R&D laboratories but in many cases emerge as a result of negotiations and competition between many players. Rather than imitating competitors, managers should focus on identifying the games their own firm is playing and the strategic issues that shape those games

Healthcare workers hospitalized due to COVID-19 have no higher risk of death than general population. Data from the Spanish SEMI-COVID-19 Registry

Aim To determine whether healthcare workers (HCW) hospitalized in Spain due to COVID-19 have a worse prognosis than non-healthcare workers (NHCW). Methods Observational cohort study based on the SEMI-COVID-19 Registry, a nationwide registry that collects sociodemographic, clinical, laboratory, and treatment data on patients hospitalised with COVID-19 in Spain. Patients aged 20-65 years were selected. A multivariate logistic regression model was performed to identify factors associated with mortality. Results As of 22 May 2020, 4393 patients were included, of whom 419 (9.5%) were HCW. Median (interquartile range) age of HCW was 52 (15) years and 62.4% were women. Prevalence of comorbidities and severe radiological findings upon admission were less frequent in HCW. There were no difference in need of respiratory support and admission to intensive care unit, but occurrence of sepsis and in-hospital mortality was lower in HCW (1.7% vs. 3.9%; p = 0.024 and 0.7% vs. 4.8%; p<0.001 respectively). Age, male sex and comorbidity, were independently associated with higher in-hospital mortality and healthcare working with lower mortality (OR 0.211, 95%CI 0.067-0.667, p = 0.008). 30-days survival was higher in HCW (0.968 vs. 0.851 p<0.001). Conclusions Hospitalized COVID-19 HCW had fewer comorbidities and a better prognosis than NHCW. Our results suggest that professional exposure to COVID-19 in HCW does not carry more clinical severity nor mortality

Antirival goods, network effects and the sharing economy

Nothing facilitates large-scale collaboration like the prospect of inclusive, all-win games. Modern humans have gotten much better at large-scale collaboration because they have discovered, or invented, a broad range of collective goods that are easy to share and become more valuable the more they are shared, thus multiplying the opportunities for all-win outcomes. Steven Weber (2004) and Mark Cooper (2006a, 2006b) have drawn our attention to ‘antirival goods’ — subject to increasing returns to shared use — to differentiate them from ‘rival goods’ — subject to decreasing returns to shared use — and ‘nonrival goods’ — subject to constant returns to shared use. Unlike Weber and Cooper, I argue that nonrivalness and antirivalness are orthogonal properties of some collective goods, rather than stages along the same continuum away from rivalness. Collective goods, I also argue, are most inclusive when they are both nonrival and antirival. In an economy rich in both nonrival and antirival goods, the collaborative stance will often be the default collective choice, at large and small scales alike. Digital technologies are ushering in a transformative age as they expand the cornucopia of nonrival and antirival goods available to us. This inclusiveness of many digital goods eliminates the free-riding problem and mobilizes large amounts of volunteer work

THE POWER OF NON-CONTRACTUAL INNOVATION

Currently, all major IT and telecom firms are busy trying to stimulate non-contractual complementary developments around their own core competences and offerings. But little has been done to explain the logic, strengths, and weaknesses of non-contractual innovation. The literature on open-platform leadership recognises the importance of non-contractual innovation, but only within the limited confines of a normative approach based on two implicit assumptions: that a platform's core and periphery are sharply and easily differentiated and that platforms are always grown and orchestrated from a monolithic core. Through analysis of two cases of decentralised open innovation: the emergence of video rental stores and the emergence of desktop-publishing systems. I argue that these assumptions do not apply to all open platforms. I conclude that by forcing a hierarchical framework onto the analysis, the normative approach underplays the role of non-contractual innovation and turns a blind eye to the radically self-organised and unforeseeable nature of some platforms' success.Contracts, hierarchy, collaboration, coordination, platform, modularity, emergent innovation, innovation strategy

THE DYNAMICS OF GAMES OF INNOVATION

Many executives see innovation as an unmanageable process, riddled with risks. The research we conducted with the Industrial Research Institute, interviewing over 200 vice-presidents of research and development and chief technical officers in many sectors around the world, yields a more nuanced view. Innovation becomes manageable once managers move away from normative prescriptions that view the process as uniform and recognise that different rules and practices apply to different circumstances.Our argument is that clusters of interdependent firms contributing to the building of a set of interacting products and services tend to self-organise themselves into distinct and relatively persistent "games of innovation". Such games operate at a meso level of analysis, grouping together many complementary agents, such as competitors, suppliers, public regulators, universities, innovation-support agencies, and venture capitalists. Six games of innovation, each with a distinct set of rules for innovating, have been identified around value-creation exchanges between buyers and sellers. Three games focus on market creation: "patent-driven discovery", "systems integration" and "platform orchestration". Market maintenance games are "cost-based competition", "systems extension and engineering" and "customised mass production".The perspective proposed in this paper recognises that heterogeneous innovation patterns and strategies can coexist within a single industrial sector and that the same game can be played in many sectors. Specific conditions call for distinct rules and practices. Customer expectations, for example, are central in some games but almost irrelevant in others. Rules for managing innovation are neither generic best practices that can be applied universally nor narrow industry recipes. They are game- and role-specific ways to create and capture market value.Strategy, value creation, heterogeneity, innovation, strategic logic, eco-system, dominant logic

Innovation in complex industries : the case of flight simulation

Communication to : 3e conference internationale de management strategique, Lyon, 15-17 decembre 1993Available at INIST (FR), Document Supply Service, under shelf-number : DO 3662.8 / INIST-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et TechniqueSIGLEFRFranc