Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments

The equilibrium of a two-stage conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding stage-one offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 98% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 49% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 51% from reduced conflict expenditures.contest, conflict resolution, side payments, experiments

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures.contests, conflict resolution, side-payments, experiments

Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device

We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by randomization. However, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent prefers to fight. Laboratory experiments confirm that the availability of the random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are relatively symmetric; however, the device also reduces conflict between substantially asymmetric agents.Beauty contest, conflict resolution, experiments

Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements and the Costs of Conflict

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder’s decision to accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures

Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflicts Through A Random Device

Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. The model predicts that “parity promotes peace”: in the pure-strategy equilibrium, agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by using a random device; however, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent prefers to fight. The results of the experiment confirm that the availability of the random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are relatively symmetric; however, the device also reduces conflict between substantially asymmetric agents

Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to opt-in

Вплив часу штучного осіменіння відносно овуляції на запліднюваність кобил

The results of the study of the effect of artificial insemination of horses by the cooled and thawed semen which was prepared by Kharkiv technology depending on the time of the dominant follicle ovulation using the atraumatic tool developed for insemination of mares have been presented in the article. In modern practice of artificial insemination of horses, there are two opposing views on the timing of insemination of mares (before or after ovulation) so we decided to investigate the impact of this factor on sperm, obtained, chilled and kriokonse–rvovana for Kharkiv technology. The time of semen administration into the reproductive tract of mares depending on the ovulation of the dominant follicle is the least investigated factor that effects the efficiency of mare insemination. The artificial insemination of the horses by the semen that was prepared by Kharkiv technology with the use of the atraumatic instrument developed by us for artificial insemination of mares depending on the time of ovulation of the dominant follicle was conducted for the first time. It has been stated that the optimal time for the insemination of mares by the cooled or thawed semen of stallions depending on the ovulation with the use of the atraumatic instrument developed by us is the time period for 4 hours before and after ovulation. When insemination of mares Ukrainian horse breed tools we have and the sperm that chilled by Kharkivtion technology for 4 hours before and after ovulation received about the same output foals. When artificial insemination Ukrainian horse breed mares we developed noninvasive device after 4 or more hours of ovulation foals output decreased by 50.77% (P < 0.01) compared with insemination to ovulation and the 50.12% (P < 0.01) compared with insemination after ovulation. When artificial insemination of mares Ukrainian horse breed tools we have and sperm cryopreserved for that Kharkov Technologies for 4 hours after ovulation received incredibly more foals out at 3.47% compared with insemination before ovulation. When artificial insemination of mares Ukrainian horse breed developed our noninvasive device after 4 or more hours of ovulation foals output decreased by 35.23% (P < 0.01) compared with insemination to ovulation and the 38.70% (P < 0,01) compared to the insemination after ovulation. When carrying out the artificial insemination of the mares of Ukrainian horse breed for more than 4 hours after the ovulation the fertility decreased by 50,12 – 50.77% (P < 0.01) and by 35,23 – 38,70% (P < 0.01) by  cooled and thawed semen, respectively.У статті представлено результати дослідження впливу штучного осіменіння коней охолодженою та відталою спермою, що заготовлена за Харківською технологією залежно від часу овуляції домінуючого фолікула при використанні розробленого атравматичного пристрою для осіменіння кобил. У сучасній практиці штучного осіменіння коней існує дві протилежні думки щодо часу проведення осіменіння кобил (до або після овуляції) тому нами було вирішено дослідити вплив цього чинника на спермі, що отримана, охолоджена та кріоконсервована за Харківською технологією. Найменш дослідженим чинником, який впливає на ефективність осіменіння кобил є час введення сперми у статеві шляхи конематок залежно від овуляції домінуючого фолікула. Уперше проведено штучне осіменіння коней спермою, що заготовлена за Харківською технологією із застосуванням розробленого нами пристрою атравматичного для штучного осіменіння кобил залежно від моменту овуляції домінуючого фолікула. Встановлено, що оптимальним часом штучного осіменіння кобил охолодженою або розмороженою спермою жеребців залежно від настання овуляції розробленим нами атравматичним пристроєм є час впродовж 4 годин до та після овуляції. При осіменінні кобил української верхової породи розробленим нами інструментом та спермою, що охолоджена за Харківською технологією впродовж 4 годин до та після овуляції отримано приблизно однаковий вихід лошат. При штучному осіменінні кобил української верхової породи розробленим нами атравматичним пристроєм після 4 та більше годин з моменту овуляції вихід лошат зменшився на 50,77% (Р < 0,01) порівняно з осіменінням до овуляції та на 50,12% (Р < 0,01) порівняно з осіменінням після овуляції. При штучному осіменінні кобил української верхової породи розробленим нами інструментом та спермою, що кріоконсервована за Харківською технологією впродовж 4 годин після овуляції отримано невірогідно більший вихід лошат на 3,47% порівняно з осіменінням перед овуляцією. При штучному осіменінні кобил української верхової породи розробленим нами атравматичним пристроєм після 4 та більше годин з моменту овуляції вихід лошат зменшився на 35,23% (р < 0,01) порівняно з осіменінням до овуляції та на 38,70% (Р < 0,01) порівняно з осіменінням після овуляції. При проведенні штучного осіменіння кобил української верхової породи більше ніж 4 години після овуляції запліднюваність зменшується на 50,12 – 50,77% (Р < 0,01) та на 35,23 – 38,70% (Р < 0,01) відповідно по охолодженій та відталій спермі

ПРО НЕОБХІДНІСТЬ ОЦІНЮВАННЯ РІВНЯ ЕМОЦІЙНОГО СТРЕСУ ПРИ ПРОГНОЗУВАННІ ВИНИКНЕННЯ ІНСУЛЬТУ

The article deals with various kinds of stress and emotional state and their influence on the prediction of apoplectic stroke. The subjective evaluation of the stress state of doctors and patients was investigated.В статье рассмотрены различные виды стрессов и эмоциональных состояний человека и их влияние на прогнозирование возникновения инсульта. Исследовано субъективное оценивание стрессового состояния врачами и пациентами.В статті розглянуто різні види стресів та емоційних станів людини та їх вплив на прогнозування виникнення інсульту. Досліджене суб’єктивне оцінювання стресового стану лікарями та пацієнтами

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30 % of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87 % of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39 % of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61 % from reduced conflict expenditures