561 research outputs found
Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory
|When international relations theorists use the concept of risk aversion, they usually cite the economics conception involving concave utility functions. However, concavity is meaningful only when the goal is measurable on an interval scale. International decisions are usually not of this type, so that many statements appearing in the literature are formally meaningless. Applications of prospect theory face this difficulty especially, as risk aversion and acceptance are at their center. This paper gives two definitions of risk attitude that do not require an interval scale. The second and more distinctive one uses the property of submodularity in place of concavity. R. D. Luce has devised a theory of choice with features of prospect theory but not requiring on an interval scale, and the second definition in combination with this theory yields the traditional claim that decision makers are risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses.risk aversion, prospect theory, international relations, joint receipts, measurement theory.
Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige
Leaders and historians see prestige as important, but international relations theorists have neglected the concept, in part for lack of a clear definition. It is proposed that a party "holds prestige" when group members generally believe that the party has a certain desirable quality, and this situation gives the party perceived power in the group. The definition gains support from a survey of international affairs writings on the sources of prestige. Prestige is strategically important when a party wants support from others who would rather join the side that more of the others are joining. Some general ways of acquiring prestige are discussed. Compared to achieving social progress, building and testing nuclear weapons is better at bearing prestige because it has distinct borders separating success and failure, because it is salient and because it involves the symbolism of power. In some cases when prestige is a factor, one can better demonstrate one’s ability to perform an accomplishment by refraining from doing it. The analysis yields suggestions for reducing nuclear proliferation.prestige, nuclear weapons, common knowledge, signaling, countersignaling, global games, symbolism
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games
A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of the rules, lexicographic composition, where a coalition wins G_1 => G_2 when it either wins in G_1, or blocks in G_1 and wins in G_2. It is the most decisive of the five. A lexicographically decomposable game is one that can be represented in this way using components whose player sets partition the whole set. Games with veto players are not decomposable, and anonymous games are decomposable if and only if they are decisive and have two or more players. If a player's benefit is assessed by any semi-value, then for two isomorphic games a player is better off from having a role in the first game than having the same role in the second. Lexicographic decomposability is sometimes compatible with equality of roles. A relaxation of it is suggested for its practical benefits.simple games, voting, game composition, game decomposition, semi-value, decisiveness, fairness
Bargaining with an Agenda
We propose a new framework for bargaining in which the process follows an agenda. The agenda is represented by a family, parameterized by time, of increasing sets of joint utilities for possible agreements. This is in contrast to the single set used in the standard framework. The set at each time involves all possible agreements on the issues discussed up to that time. A \emph{bargaining solution} for an agenda specifies a path of agreements, one for each time. We characterize axiomatically a solution that is ordinal, meaning that it is covariant with order- preserving transformations of the utility representations. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining process in which the agreement point of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others, and the ordinal solution will still emerge as the steps tend to zero. Shapley showed that ordinal solutions exist for the standard framework for three players but not for two; the present framework generates an ordinal solution for any number of bargainers, in particular for two.bargaining, ordinal utility
The cost of systemic corticosteroid-induced morbidity in severe asthma : a health economic analysis
The study data-set was supported by the Respiratory Effectiveness Group through their academic partnership with Optimum Patient Care. Ciaran O'Neill was funded under a HRB Research Leader Award (RL/13/16).Peer reviewedPublisher PD
Conservative Management of Paediatric Clavicle Fractures
Paediatric clavicle fractures have traditionally been treated nonoperatively. Recent studies have recommended operative management for displaced midshaft fractures. We conducted a retrospective review of all clavicle fractures in children aged one to sixteen over a two-year period. We classified fractures and evaluated followup and clinical outcome. We identified 190 fractures. There were 135 boys and 55 girls. 65% of fractures were displaced and 35% undisplaced. Mean radiographic and clinical followup was 35 days and 44 days, respectively. Clavicle fractures in children heal with nonoperative management. Radiographs of clavicle fractures in children are unnecessary in the absence of clinical symptoms
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