Tutkimustemme lähteistö kaventumassa kotimaiseksi ja anglosaksiseksi

Aikuiskasvatus tutkijoiden silmin : tutkimusta 2000-luvun taitteessa, Jyri Manninen ... [et al.] (toim.), Helsinki (2003

Vaikutusperusteinen operatiivinen ajattelu (EBAO) – prosesseja, tekniikkaa vai uutta ajattelua?

The first breakthrough for EBO is usually associated with the first Gulf War in 1991, primarily as a development of targeting at operational level. Further experience from the late the 1990´s, e.g. during operations in Serbia and Kosovo, pointed to the need to develop a faster, better co-ordinated and more focused use of a wider spectrum of means to reach the strategic end-state. Subsequently, EBO evolved to a concept for planning, execution and assessment of actions in order to realise effects at the operational and strategic levels. The general idea of EBO remained much the same – i.e. to systematically influence the behaviour of adversaries of other actors, and that the effect of specified actions shall be in focus – but new perspectives were added. Following targeting and C2 methodology, development of better knowledge and understanding of the whole operational environment, including exploitation of networked enabled capabilities (NEC), became integral to EBO. The Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) seeks to harmonize military and civilian activities to influence the overall behaviour of other actors – national and transnational, belligerent and benign – in an operational environment. Its application allows the planning, execution, and assessment of those activities to be based on a holistic and dynamic understanding of the actors in that environment. EBAO is designed to provide military organizations the ability to, with their civilian partners, better focus on a shared desired end state, the specific behaviors on the parts of other actors in the environment that would make that end state possible, and the specific “effects” that would facilitate those behaviours. The treatment of these effects (understood as intermediate system states on the way to the end state) in planning, execution, and assessment is what makes an operation essentially effects-based. The resulting benefits are a set of actions that are explicitly linked by effects to a desired end state, coherently harmonized with those of other governmental organizations, and made adaptive within the course of their execution by effective assessment. The Effects-Based Approach to Operations can be described in terms of four major functions: knowledge development, effects-based planning, execution, and assessment. EBAO proposes a few key divergences from traditional approaches in each of these areas. Knowledge Development (KD): The EBAO challenge is to take full advantage of vital information obtained from systems synthesis but not to be enslaved to, or delayed by, data analysis and information acquisition. These system descriptions help the military and civilians apply operational experience to the situation. The intent is to gain situational understanding and awareness based on synthesis of the larger interagency aspects present. Essential to EBAO is the development of knowledge through effective networking with a larger base of experts and disciplines. Situational understanding and awareness are not delivered only from a data base but is gained though professional dialogue and leadership. Effects-Based Planning (EBP): In EBP, the development and application of effects statements bridges the gap between end state and actions. It supports a thorough review of the actors in the operational environment and their potential responses to our actions. Not only is a bridge of reason provided between the two, but a context for civil-military interaction is built, and the basis for continuous assessment of the effectiveness of the operation is created. Effects-Based Execution (EBE): once effects are developed, and supporting actions planned, sequenced, and resourced, those actions are taken in what might appear to be a relatively traditional manner. But beyond the fact of those actions’ effects basis, there are two subtle but vital differences in execution. The first is that military and civilian actions should be complementary whenever possible. The second is that in combination with continuous assessment, opportunities are created to make adjustments to the plan in a less disruptive manner, making even fundamental changes potentially less costly in terms of momentum, resources, and even political will. Effects-Based Assessment (EBA): effects-based plans are not presumed to be perfect; during their execution they will require continuous assessment-informed adjustments. In EBA, progress toward the accomplishment of actions, the creation of effects, and the a"ainment of the end state are all assessed. The assessment of progress as well as the evaluation of causality requires close cooperation with civilian partners. The Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept is new in NATO and has not been officially adopted and integrated into doctrine and practice. Despite this limitation, NATO´s different Commands seeks to modify the current planning, execution and assessment processes in order to adapt an effects based approach. Additionally, the incorporation of the “Comprehensive Approach” to NATO operations necessitates effective liaison with individuals and organizations, beyond the strictly military sphere; organizations which can effect the Civil, Political and Economic systems within the Joint Operations Area. Effects Based Targeting Joint Targeting is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritizing targets, and the synchronization of fires with other military capabilities and the assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. It is both an operational level and component level command function. The joint targeting cycle has a logical progression that aids decision-making and provides the Joint Force Commander with effects throughout the ba"lespace. It is flexible enough to be adapted to any military operation desired and across diverse functional areas, such as air interdiction and information operations. This process enables the joint force commander to most effectively employ allocated resources to achieve the assigned objectives. The full article is in Finnish.The Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) The first breakthrough for EBO is usually associated with the first Gulf War in 1991, primarily as a development of targeting at operational level. Further experience from the late the 1990´s, e.g. during operations in Serbia and Kosovo, pointed to the need to develop a faster, better co-ordinated and more focused use of a wider spectrum of means to reach the strategic end-state. Subsequently, EBO evolved to a concept for planning, execution and assessment of actions in order to realise effects at the operational and strategic levels. The general idea of EBO remained much the same – i.e. to systematically influence the behaviour of adversaries of other actors, and that the effect of specified actions shall be in focus – but new perspectives were added. Following targeting and C2 methodology, development of better knowledge and understanding of the whole operational environment, including exploitation of networked enabled capabilities (NEC), became integral to EBO. The Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) seeks to harmonize military and civilian activities to influence the overall behaviour of other actors – national and transnational, belligerent and benign – in an operational environment. Its application allows the planning, execution, and assessment of those activities to be based on a holistic and dynamic understanding of the actors in that environment. EBAO is designed to provide military organizations the ability to, with their civilian partners, better focus on a shared desired end state, the specific behaviors on the parts of other actors in the environment that would make that end state possible, and the specific “effects” that would facilitate those behaviours. The treatment of these effects (understood as intermediate system states on the way to the end state) in planning, execution, and assessment is what makes an operation essentially effects-based. The resulting benefits are a set of actions that are explicitly linked by effects to a desired end state, coherently harmonized with those of other governmental organizations, and made adaptive within the course of their execution by effective assessment. The Effects-Based Approach to Operations can be described in terms of four major functions: knowledge development, effects-based planning, execution, and assessment. EBAO proposes a few key divergences from traditional approaches in each of these areas. Knowledge Development (KD): The EBAO challenge is to take full advantage of vital information obtained from systems synthesis but not to be enslaved to, or delayed by, data analysis and information acquisition. These system descriptions help the military and civilians apply operational experience to the situation. The intent is to gain situational understanding and awareness based on synthesis of the larger interagency aspects present. Essential to EBAO is the development of knowledge through effective networking with a larger base of experts and disciplines. Situational understanding and awareness are not delivered only from a data base but is gained though professional dialogue and leadership. Effects-Based Planning (EBP): In EBP, the development and application of effects statements bridges the gap between end state and actions. It supports a thorough review of the actors in the operational environment and their potential responses to our actions. Not only is a bridge of reason provided between the two, but a context for civil-military interaction is built, and the basis for continuous assessment of the effectiveness of the operation is created. Effects-Based Execution (EBE): once effects are developed, and supporting actions planned, sequenced, and resourced, those actions are taken in what might appear to be a relatively traditional manner. But beyond the fact of those actions’ effects basis, there are two subtle but vital differences in execution. The first is that military and civilian actions should be complementary whenever possible. The second is that in combination with continuous assessment, opportunities are created to make adjustments to the plan in a less disruptive manner, making even fundamental changes potentially less costly in terms of momentum, resources, and even political will. Effects-Based Assessment (EBA): effects-based plans are not presumed to be perfect; during their execution they will require continuous assessment-informed adjustments. In EBA, progress toward the accomplishment of actions, the creation of effects, and the a"ainment of the end state are all assessed. The assessment of progress as well as the evaluation of causality requires close cooperation with civilian partners. The Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept is new in NATO and has not been officially adopted and integrated into doctrine and practice. Despite this limitation, NATO´s different Commands seeks to modify the current planning, execution and assessment processes in order to adapt an effects based approach. Additionally, the incorporation of the “Comprehensive Approach” to NATO operations necessitates effective liaison with individuals and organizations, beyond the strictly military sphere; organizations which can effect the Civil, Political and Economic systems within the Joint Operations Area. Effects Based Targeting Joint Targeting is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritizing targets, and the synchronization of fires with other military capabilities and the assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. It is both an operational level and component level command function. The joint targeting cycle has a logical progression that aids decision-making and provides the Joint Force Commander with effects throughout the ba"lespace. It is flexible enough to be adapted to any military operation desired and across diverse functional areas, such as air interdiction and information operations. This process enables the joint force commander to most effectively employ allocated resources to achieve the assigned objectives. Artikkeli on suomeksi

Sivistystä vapaasti kaikille? Tutkimus kansalaisopistojen ja kansanopistojen esteettömyydestä

Vapaan sivistystyön esteettömyys -tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää esteettömyyden toteutumista kansalaisopistoissa ja kansanopistoissa. Tutkimus rajattiin niin, että opistojen esteettömyyttä tarkasteltiin erityisesti vammaisten ja erilaisten oppijoiden kannalta. Tutkimuksen kokonaisuus muodostui opistoille tehdystä esteettömyystutkimuksesta, kahdesta opiskelijoiden kokemuksia kartoittaneesta tutkimuksesta sekä kuuden opiston esteettömyyskartoituksesta. Tässä raportissa esitetään sekä kokooma projektin toteutuksesta ja tuloksista että yksityiskohtainen raportti opistoille tehdyn esteettömyystutkimuksen tuloksista. Tutkimuksen lähtökohtana on ollut Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien vuonna 2006 hyväksymä vammaisten ihmisoikeussopimus, johon Suomikin on sitoutunut. Se velvoittaa viranomaisia ja koulutuksen järjestäjiä huolehtimaan siitä, että vammaisille tarjotaan samat mahdollisuudet koulutukseen osallistumiseen kuin muille kansalaisille. Esteettömyys on tutkimuksessa ymmärretty suhdekäsitteenä, jonka jäseninä ovat opistossa toimivat ihmiset, sen tarjoama opiskeluympäristö ja toiminnassa noudatetut käytänteet. Esteettömyys toteutuu, kun opiston toimintaa kehitetään hyödyntämään myös vammaisten ja oppimisvaikeuksisten opiskelijoiden ja opettajien kannalta parhaita toimintatapoja, välineitä ja palveluja. Siitä hyötyvät myös muut opistoyhteisön jäsenet. Opistotutkimuksessa oli kuusi tutkimusongelmaa. Ne koskivat (1.) kansalaisopistojen ja kansanopistojen esteettömyyden yleisyyttä ja sisältöä, (2.) esteettömyyden kuvausrakennetta, (3.) mahdollisuutta muodostaa opistojen esteettömyystypologia, (4.) esteettömyyden selittymistä opistoa ja (5.) sen kotikuntaa kuvaavilla tekijöillä sekä (6.) Suomen suuralueiden (Etelä-Suomi, Länsi-Suomi, Itä-Suomi, Pohjois-Suomi) opistojen välisiä esteettömyyseroja. Tiedot opistoista kerättiin kyselylomakkeella, jonka kysymykset koskivat opistojen rakennettua ympäristöä, opiskelua ja hallintoa. Lisäksi kysyttiin muutamia opistoa ja lomakkeen vastaajaa koskevia taustatietoja. Lomake lähetettiin kaikille Suomen kansalaisopistoille ja kansanopistoille (198+83=281), joista 231 (82,2 %) palautti lomakkeen viimeistään kolmannen kyselykerran jälkeen, joten kato oli 17,8 %. Tutkimus osoitti, että useimmissa opistoissa oli selviä puutteita erityisesti vammaisten opiskelijoiden näkökulmasta, reilusti yli puolessa tarkastelluista esteettömyystekijöistä puutteita oli yli sadassa opistossa. Rakennetussa ympäristössä oli vakavia esteitä sekä tilojen liikkumisesteettömyydessä että näkemis- ja kuulemisympäristöjen esteettömyydessä. Joka toisessa opistossa vain noin puolet sisätiloista soveltui apuvälineen kuten esimerkiksi pyörätuolin tai rollaattorin käyttäjille. Induktiosilmukan käyttömahdollisuus oli alle kolmasosassa opistoista. Erilaisten oppijoiden kannalta tulkinta ei ollut yhtä selkeä. Opistokyselyn vastaajat arvioivat opetuksen esteettömyyttä hyvin myönteisessä hengessä ja opistojen vastaukset viittasivat muutenkin siihen, että henkilökunnan halukkuus ottaa vammaisuudesta ja oppimisvaikeuksista aiheutuvia tarpeita huomioon oli hyvä. Esteettömyyden huomioonottaminen näkyi kuitenkin suhteellisen heikosti opistojen hallinnossa, erityisesti opetushenkilöstön koulutuksessa, ohjeistuksessa ja tiedotuksessa. Kaikkien opistojen opettajat eivät saaneet kylliksi tukea esteettömän opetuksen toteuttamiseen. Esteettömyyttä tarkasteltiin sekä yleisen esteettömyyden kannalta että monimuuttuja-analyyseilla muodostettua kolmitekijäistä kuvausrakennetta käyttäen. Rakenne koostui Hallinnon esteettömyydestä, Opetuksen esteettömyydestä ja Rakennetun ympäristön esteettömyydestä. Tutkitut opistot jakautuivat neljään esteettömyystyyppiin, jotka olivat Hallinnon esteettömyyden kärkityyppi, Opetuksen esteettömyyden kärkityyppi, Rakennetun ympäristön kärkityyppi ja Esteettömyyden keskityyppi. Kärkityyppiin kuuluminen kertoi opiston keskimääräistä paremmasta sijoittumisesta jollakin esteettömyyden alueella. Muutamat keskityyppiin sijoittuneet opistot olivat hyvin esteellisiä, mutta suuressa osassa esteettömyys oli tyydyttävällä tasolla. Yhtään täysin esteetöntä opistoa ei silti kärkityypeistäkään löytynyt. Opistotyyppien tarkastelu osoitti, että opetuksen esteettömyyden parannukset sekä rakennusten ja pihojen korjaukset eivät ilman hallinnon määrätietoista johtamista, aikatauluttamista ja motivointia sekä henkilöstön kouluttamista tuota vammaisten ja erilaisten oppijoiden kannalta esteetöntä opistoa. Parhaat opiston esteettömyyden opistokohtaiset selittäjät olivat opiston tyyppi (kansalaisopisto / kansanopisto) ja opiston päätoimisen henkilöstön määrä. Tämä päti myös esteettömyystyyppeihin. Kansanopistot olivat esteettömämpiä kuin kansalaisopistot ja ne olivat myös yliedustettuina hallinnon esteettömyyden ja opetuksen esteettömyyden kärkityypeissä; rakennetun ympäristön kärkityypissä opistotyypeillä ei ollut eroa, mutta keskityypissä kansalaisopistoilla oli selvä yliedustus. Opiston kotikuntaa kuvaavat tekijät eivät selittäneet johdonmukaisesti yleisen esteettömyyden tai sen osatekijöiden vaihtelua. Alueellinen tasa-arvo toteutui vapaan sivistystyön opistojen esteettömyyden osalta: suuralueiden välillä ei ollut havaittavissa selkeitä eroja opistojen esteettömyydessä. Raportin lopussa esitetään suositukset vapaan sivistystyön esteettömyyden kehittämiseksi