Adam Smith and the theory of punishment

A distinctive theory of punishment plays a central role in Smith's moral and legal theory. According to this theory, we regard the punishment of a crime as deserved only to the extent that an impartial spectator would go along with the actual or supposed resentment of the victim. The first part of this paper argues that Smith's theory deserves serious consideration and relates it to other theories such as utilitarianism and more orthodox forms of retributivism. The second part considers the objection that, because Smith's theory implies that punishment is justified only when there is some person or persons who is the victim of the crime, it cannot explain the many cases where punishment is imposed purely for the public good. It is argued that Smith's theory could be extended to cover such cases. The third part defends Smith's theory against the objection that, because it relies on our natural feelings, it cannot provide an adequate moral justification of punishment

Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory

Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201

Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: building equity considerations into agency theory

In this article we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior executives, and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory and the design of top-management incentives. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first advanced by Fehr and Schmidt in 1999. We propose a number of amendments to Fehr and Schmidt’s model. We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account. We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory

Denying reciprocity

When individuals receive benefits as a result of the burdens assumed by other people, they are expected to make a return in similar form. To do otherwise is considered as a failure to treat those other people with appropriate respect. It is this which justifies the expectation that individuals share in the labour that is necessary to preserve just institutions and productive practices that characterise complex schemes of social cooperation. In this paper, I argue that where benefits do not meet thresholds specifying the expected function and efficacy of those benefits, this does not simply issue in a ‘downward adjustment’ in the work expectations and reciprocal demands that are made of people. Rather, it legitimates refusal to engage in productive labour even where limited benefits are still being received. Other costs and obligations emerge that contribute to the creation of disruptive political, economic and social associations. These not only replace the demands of reciprocity but actively target and disrupt the practices and exchanges that give form to reciprocity

Free Will in a Quantum World?

In this paper, I argue that Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem (1,2) to the conclusion that quantum mechanics and relativity entail freedom for the particles, does not change the situation in favor of a libertarian position as they would like. In fact, the theorem more or less implicitly assumes that people are free, and thus it begs the question. Moreover, it does not prove neither that if people are free, so are particles, nor that the property people possess when they are said to be free is the same as the one particles possess when they are claimed to be free. I then analyze the Free State Theorem (2), which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption that people are free, and I show that it does not prove anything about free will, since the notion of freedom for particles is either inconsistent, or it does not concern our common understanding of freedom. In both cases, the Free Will Theorem and the Free State Theorem do not provide any enlightenment on the constraints physics can pose on free will

Big data: Finders keepers, losers weepers?

This article argues that big data’s entrepreneurial potential is based not only on new technological developments that allow for the extraction of non-trivial, new insights out of existing data, but also on an ethical judgment that often remains implicit: namely the ethical judgment that those companies that generate these new insights can legitimately appropriate (the fruits of) these insights. As a result, the business model of big data companies is essentially founded on a libertarian-inspired ‘finders, keepers’ ethic. The article argues, next, that this presupposed ‘finder, keepers’ ethic is far from unproblematic and relies itself on multiple unconvincing assumptions. This leads to the conclusion that the conduct of companies working with big data might lack ethical justification

Contingency contractor optimization. Phase 2, requirements document.

Abstract Not Provide

Measurement of psychological entitlement in 28 countries

This article presents the cross-cultural validation of the Entitlement Attitudes Questionnaire, a tool designed to measure three facets of psychological entitlement: active, passive, and revenge entitlement. Active entitlement was defined as the tendency to protect individual rights based on self-worthiness. Passive entitlement was defined as the belief in obligations to and expectations toward other people and institutions for the fulfillment of the individual’s needs. Revenge entitlement was defined as the tendency to protect one’s individual rights when violated by others and the tendency to reciprocate insults. The 15-item EAQ was validated in a series of three studies: the first one on a general Polish sample (N = 1,900), the second one on a sample of Polish students (N = 199), and the third one on student samples from 28 countries (N = 5,979). A three-factor solution was confirmed across all samples. Examination of measurement equivalence indicated partial metric invariance of EAQ for all national samples. Discriminant and convergent validity of the EAQ was also confirmed

The commodification of human reproductive materials.

This essay develops a framework for thinking about the moral basis for the commnodification of human reproductive nmaterials. It argues that selling and buyinlg gametes and genes is morally acceptable although there should not be a market for zygotes, embryos, or genomes. Also a market in gametes and genes shouild be regutlated in order to address concerns about the adverse social consequences of conmmodification. Originally published Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 24, No. 6, Dec 199