Basic Operations : minimal Syntax-Semantics

In this programmatic paper, we articulate a minimalist conception of linguistic composition, syntactic and semantic, with the aim of identifying fundamental operations invoked by the human faculty of language (HFL). On this view, all complex expressions are formed via the operation COMBINE(A, B). But this operation is not primitive: COMBINE(A, B) = LABEL[CONCATENATE(A, B)]. We take labeling to be a computationally simple but perhaps distinctively human operation that converts a mere concatenation of expressions, like A^B, into a more complex unit like [A A^B], with the subscript indicating a copy of the dominant constituent. We discuss several virtues of this spare conception of syntax. With regard to semantics, we take instances of COMBINE(A, B) to be instructions to build concepts. More specifically, we claim that concatenation is an instruction to conjoin monadic concepts, while labeling provides a vehicle for invoking thematic concepts, as indicated by the relevant labels

Adjunction, Labeling, and Bare Phrase Structure

The primary aim in this paper is to propose a phrase structure for adjunction that is compatible with the precepts of Bare Phrase Structure (BPS). Current accounts are at odds with the central vision of BPS and current practice leans more to descriptive eclecticism than to theoretical insight. A diagnosis for this conceptual disarray is suggested here: It stems from a deeply held though seldom formulated intuition; the tacit view that adjuncts are the abnormal case while arguments describe the grammatical norm. In actuality, it is argued, adjuncts are so well behaved that they require virtually no grammatical support to function properly. Arguments, in contrast, are refractory and require grammatical aid to allow them to make any propositional contribution. This last remark should come as no surprise to those with neo-Davidsonian semantic sympathies. Connoisseurs of this art form are well versed in the important role that grammatical (aka, thematic) roles play in turning arguments into modifiers of events. Such fulcra are not required for meaningfully integrating adjuncts. into sentences. In what follows, we take this difference to be of the greatest significance and we ask ourselves what this might imply for the phrase structure of adjunction

Islands in the grammar? Standards of evidence

When considering how a complex system operates, the observable behavior depends upon both architectural properties of the system and the principles governing its operation. As a simple example, the behavior of computer chess programs depends upon both the processing speed and resources of the computer and the programmed rules that determine how the computer selects its next move. Despite having very similar search techniques, a computer from the 1990s might make a move that its 1970s forerunner would overlook simply because it had more raw computational power. From the naïve observer’s perspective, however, it is not superficially evident if a particular move is dispreferred or overlooked because of computational limitations or the search strategy and decision algorithm. In the case of computers, evidence for the source of any particular behavior can ultimately be found by inspecting the code and tracking the decision process of the computer. But with the human mind, such options are not yet available. The preference for certain behaviors and the dispreference for others may theoretically follow from cognitive limitations or from task-related principles that preclude certain kinds of cognitive operations, or from some combination of the two. This uncertainty gives rise to the fundamental problem of finding evidence for one explanation over the other. Such a problem arises in the analysis of syntactic island effects – the focu

Secondary predication and the distribution of raising to object

In Den Dikken (2017b) arguments are presented for a predicational approach to hyperraising and copy raising constructions in which the ‘raised’ DP serves as the subject of the matrix clause. In this sequel, I show that hyperraising and copy raising also occur in secondary predication constructions embedded under propositional attitude verbs such as consider. An examination of the properties of these hyperraising and copy raising to object constructions leads to the conclusion that overt subject-toobject raising (‘object shift’) definitely exists in English but is obligatory only for subjects of small-clause complements of verbs. Apart from yielding a clearer perspective on the distribution of overt object shift in English, the study also delivers a unified account of a variety of restrictions on the subject of the non-finite complement of propositional attitude verbs