Scepticism about Scepticism

Skeptical arguments are intuitively gripping. Or at least they seem to be. They readily capture the imagination and curiosity of beginners in philosophy. The arguments are easy to state but seemingly impossible to answer. Furthermore there is a powerful pessimistic induction. Those who think they have a reply inevitably haven’t appreciated the force of skeptical arguments. So, at least, I believed for many years, along with most of my fellow philosophers. In this paper I reconsider epistemological skepticism within a framework in which the dependence of epistemic properties on non-epistemic properties plays a central role. I argue that a notable consequence of foregrounding dependence is that skeptical arguments no longer have even a prima facie grip on us. At very least, parity is established between skepticism and its opposite. The presumption in favor of skepticism is obliterated. At most, the main types of skeptical argument are refuted. It sounds unlikely, I know, given the history of failures to refute skepticism, and the number of papers and books that begin with similar bravado yet end up failing with panache. Nevertheless, let’s see

Why do Chapman & Huffman think humans are not different?

This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman’s (2018) denial of differences between human beings and animals and the ethical consequences they think turn on this. Rationality is proposed as a candidate for such a difference, one that also has acceptable ethical consequences

Clouds of illusion in the aesthetics of nature

I defend extreme formalism about the aesthetics of inorganic nature. I outline the general issue over aesthetic formalism as it manifests itself in the visual arts. The main issue is over whether we need to know about the history of artworks in order to appreciate them aesthetically. I then turn to nature and concede that with organic nature we need to know a thing's biological kinds if we are fully to appreciate it. However, with in organic nature I deny that we need to know the deeper nature of the things we experience. What is important, I argue, are the appearances of those things not their real natures. I consider the beauty of clouds, which depends on an illusion of solidity, and I argue that scientific knowledge does not reveal beauty that is not available to the ignoramous. There is only the beauty of appearances, and it does not matter whether those appearances are accurate or illusory

Why do Chapman & Huffman think humans are not different?

This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman’s (2018) denial of differences between human beings and animals and the ethical consequences they think turn on this. Rationality is proposed as a candidate for such a difference, one that also has acceptable ethical consequences

Moral dependence and natural properties

I explore the Because Constraint—the idea that moral facts depend on natural facts and that moral judgements ought to respect the dependence of moral facts on natural facts. I consider several issues concerning its clarification and importance

Appropriate Musical Metaphors

I argue that we should avoid a unitary account of what makes metaphorical descriptions of music in terms of emotion appropriate. There are many different ways in which musical metaphors can be appropriate. The right view of metaphorical appropriateness is a generously pluralist one

Hanslick's deleted ending

We question Mark Evan Bonds’ interpretation of the deleted ending of Eduard Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful. We argue that there is no evidence that it reveals a commitment to Pythagoreanism or Idealism. We supply an alternative explanation of the deletion

Música, Metáfora e Conceitos Estéticos

Uma parte importante do realismo estético é a ideia de que os conceitos estéticos designam propriedades estéticas. No caso da música, o realista estético sustenta que os conceitos estéticos que aparecem nas experiências e nos julgamentos estéticos em muitos casos designam propriedades estéticas da música (e talvez dos sons que a constituem). Empregamos conceitos estéticos para representar propriedades estéticas que a música possui. Entretanto, tem sido discutido – principalmente por Roger Scruton – que existem problemas na compreensão do realista estético sobre a relação entre conceitos estéticos e não estéticos. Acredita-se que esses problemas sejam gerados pelo uso das metáforas na descrição da música e da experiência musical. No presente trabalho tratarei de algumas questões que isto levanta, em resposta a alguns pontos abordados por Malcolm Budd, e veremos que o realismo estético precisa ser desenvolvido em uma certa direção. Neste artigo, eu desenvolvo e defendo o realismo estético mais do que argumento contra visões não realistas