Regulatory Benchmarking with Panel Data

This paper considers panel data procedures for regulatory benchmarking that allow for both latent heterogeneity and inefficiency, encapsulating the regulatory dilemma in comparative efficiency analysis for incentive regulation. It applies a distance function model with appropriate concavity properties for econometric estimation to a panel of electricity distribution utilities in Turkey, since electricity industry reform is a major policy issue there. The results confirm the importance of allowing simultaneously for heterogeneity and inefficiency and emphasise the need for specific time-invariant heterogeneity information, such as geographical data, on regulated utilities in different regions.efficiency and productivity analysis, regulation, electricity distribution.

Regulatory benchmarking with panel data

This paper considers panel data procedures for regulatory benchmarking that allow for both latent heterogeneity and inefficiency, encapsulating the regulatory dilemma in comparative efficiency analysis for incentive regulation. It applies a distance function model with appropriate concavity properties for econometric estimation to a panel of electricity distribution utilities in Turkey, since electricity industry reform is a major policy issue there. The results confirm the importance of allowing simultaneously for heterogeneity and inefficiency and emphasise the need for specific time-invariant heterogeneity information, such as geographical data, on regulated utilities in different regions

The Regulation of National Roaming

National roaming is a measure that can be agreed commercially between operators to extend coverage or can be imposed or facilitated by governments as a means to increase competition amongst networks. It has been used with varying degrees of success in a range of countries, notably in the European Union. It has generally faced resistance from established operators, reluctant to assist prospective competitors and reduce their shares of the market. In some countries implementation has been so poor as to fail in the objectives. The absence of agreed procedures and performance indicators may have contributed to some of those failures. The costs of deploying third generation networks are causing some operators to look at more extensive agreements, sharing radio access networks, rather than national roaming. A further factor has been the lack of prospective entrants in mature markets, making national roaming less important than had been expected

Privatisation, ownership and technical efficiency in the Turkish electricity supply industry using data envelopment analysis.

Abstract not available

Turkish electricity reform

Turkish electricity reform has progressed slowly due to internal resistance against privatisation, and gained momentum after Electricity Market Law of 2001, prepared in line with EU Energy Acquis and established required institutional and legal framework. Although the eligibility threshold has reached 39% market opening rate, the dominant position of public both as owner and decision-maker is still the major problem in the sector. Currently Turkey is self-sufficient in electricity, but likely to face shortages in 10 years if the growing demand is not met by either speeding the liberalisation process, or joining the South East Europe Electricity Market.Electricity reform Industrial organisation Government policy Regulation

Sequencing in telecommunications reform: A review of the Turkish case

This paper reviews the Turkish case of telecommunications reform with reference to the evidence from the sequencing literature. Turkey's progress is in line with the proper sequencing of reform suggested by the literature. Accordingly, Turkey has pursued a gradualist approach by restructuring its public utility, the Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Company, and creating Turk Telecom in 1994; establishing the sector regulator, the Turkish Telecommunications Authority, in 2000; and liberalising the sector in 2003 before selling 55% of Turk Telecom to Oger Telecom, a private company, in 2005. Although the proper sequencing of reform was implemented, the Turkish telecommunications sector has not been functioning satisfactorily as yet, as indicated in the recent progress report of the European Union about Turkey's accession and as revealed by the performance indicators analysed in this paper. The prevailing information, incentive and commitment problems require a close cooperation by the government with the regulators so as to ensure and reinforce the autonomy of the Telecommunications Authority and to establish a more transparent decision-making process.Privatisation Regulation Industrial policy Telecommunications

Sequencing in telecommunications reform: A review of the Turkish case

This paper reviews the Turkish case of telecommunications reform with reference to the evidence from the sequencing literature. Turkey's progress is in line with the proper sequencing of reform suggested by the literature. Accordingly, Turkey has pursued a gradualist approach by restructuring its public utility, the Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Company, and creating Turk Telecom in 1994: establishing the sector regulator, the Turkish Telecommunications Authority, in 2000; and liberalising the sector in 2003 before selling 55% of Turk Telecom to Oger Telecom, a private company, in 2005. Although the proper sequencing of reform was implemented, the Turkish telecommunications sector has not been functioning satisfactorily as yet, as indicated in the recent progress report of the European Union about Turkey's accession and as revealed by the performance indicators analysed in this paper. The prevailing information, incentive and commitment problems require a close cooperation by the government with the regulators so as to ensure and reinforce the autonomy of the Telecommunications Authority and to establish a more transparent decision-making process. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Modelling For Regulatory Benchmarking: An Application To The Turkish Electricity Distribution Sector

This paper considers stochastic frontier panel data methods for regulatory benchmarking that allow for both latent heterogeneity and inefficiency encapsulating the regulatory dilemma in comparative efficiency analysis for incentive regulation. It applies a distance Junction model with appropriate concavity properties for econometric estimation to a panel of electricity distribution utilities in Turkey since, in preparation for accession to the European Union, Turkey is required to align the sector with incentive benchmarking regulation that characterizes the European Union. The results confirm the importance of allowing simultaneously for heterogeneity and inefficiency and emphasize the need for specific time-invariant heterogeneity information, such as geographical data, on regulated companies in different regions.Wo