Does Partisan Alignment Affect the Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor.voting, parties, grants

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to the opposition do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor.grants, voting, parties

The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain

In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities.grant allocation, alignment, electoral competition

The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain

In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities. Length: 33 pagesgrant allocation, alignment, electoral competition

Do Politicians’ Preferences Matter for Voters’ Voting Decisions?

Using unique survey data that allows us to observe both voters’ and politicians’ preferences for local public spending as well as voting decisions, this paper tests if voters typically support parties in which the politicians’ preferences are closest to their own. Doing so would be rational for the voters to do if politicians’ preferences matter for policy outcomes, as is the case in e.g. the citizen-candidate model. It is found that this is indeed the case. This finding is in line with theoretical models such as the citizen-candidate model arguing that politicians cannot credibly commit to election platforms that differ from their true policy preferences.Elections; voting; preferences for public services

Escola Nova: una nova pedagogia de la lectura a Catalunya

L'article analitza els factors que incidiren en l'aparició d'una nova pedagogia de la lectura en el primer terç del segle XX a Catalunya. A banda de figures destacades com Pere Vergés, Artur Martorell o Anna Rubiés, altres factors van determinar i contribuir a difondre les propostes didàctiques i metodològiques que anirien configurant una nova pedagogia de la lectura a partir del moviment de l'Escola Nova. La implantació de la xarxa de biblioteques populars i escolars, l'eclosió de grans editorials especialitzades en llibres per a infants, tota la generació de mestres que assumia el repte de renovar l'escola i, també, l'impuls institucional dels dos períodes d'autogovern, en temps de la Mancomunitat i durant la Generalitat republicana, van fer possible la transformació.The article analyses the factors that impacted the appearance of a new pedagogy in reading in the first third of the 20th century in Catalonia. Apart from the outstanding figures such as Pere Vergés, Artur Martorell or Anna Rubiés other factors determined and contributed to spreading the didactic and methodological proposals that would make up a new pedagogy of reading, based on the New School movement. The establishment of the network of public and school libraries, the emergence of large publishing houses specialising in children’s books, the whole generation of teachers who took up the challenge of renewing the school and, also, the institutional boost from the two periods of self-government, in times of the Catalan Commonwealth and during the Republican Government of Catalonia, made the transformation possible.El artículo analiza los factores que incidieron en la aparición de una nueva pedagogía de la lectura durante el primer tercio del siglo XX en Cataluña. Al lado de figuras destacadas como Pere Vergés, Artur Martorell o Anna Rubiés, otros factores fueron determinantes y contribuyeron a difundir las propuestas didácticas y metodológicas que aportaron elementos decisivos en la configuración de una nueva pedagogía de la lectura a partir del movimiento de la Escuela Nueva. La implantación de la red de bibliotecas escolares y populares, el auge de grandes editoriales especializadas en la edición de libros infantiles, el trabajo de toda una generación de maestros y maestras que asumieron el reto de renovar la escuela y, también, el impulso institucional de los dos periodos de autogobierno, durante la Mancomunidad de Cataluña (1914-23) y la Generalitat de la Segunda República (1931-39), hicieron posible esta transformación

La caligrafía de Mercator y otras singularidades de la rotulación de mapas

En el transcurso de una investigación* en archivo no es infrecuente encontrar documentos singulares o inéditos. Pasamos recientemente por una de estas experiencias cuando consultábamos unos mapas en la Biblioteca Nacional de España al aparecer una carpeta en ¿Papeles diversos¿ que contenía nada menos que un manuscrito sobre caligrafía de Gerardus Mercator, el célebre cartógrafo, editor de mapas y constructor de globos y aparatos científicos. El afortunado hallazgo fue el desencadenante de la serie de reflexiones que siguen, y que se enmarcan dentro de la más general e importante cuestión de la rotulación cartográfica en las diferentes épocas, e incluso en cualquier manifestación gráfico-plástica