Animal-assisted Therapy as a Pain Relief Intervention for Children

Animal-assisted therapy (AAT) is a healing modality involving a patient, an animal therapist, and handler with a goal of achieving a specified therapeutic outcome. Despite the myriad of studies documenting the benefits of AAT, no studies have yet determined the impact of animals on alleviation of pain in children. Therefore, a quasi-experimental intervention design was used to capture the change in pain and vital signs with (n = 18) or without (n = 39) AAT in children ages 3–17 in one acute care pediatric setting. The AAT intervention group experienced a significant reduction in pain level compared to the control group, t(55) = −2.86, p = .006. Although blood pressure and pulse were not impacted, respiratory rates became significantly higher in the AAT group (by an average of 2.22 breaths/min) as compared to the control group, t(55) = −2.63, p = .011. This study provides further support to the numerous health benefits of AAT, particularly for children in pain

The demandingness of Nozick’s ‘Lockean’ proviso

Interpreters of Robert Nozick’s political philosophy fall into two broad groups concerning his application of the ‘Lockean proviso’. Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without that particular ownership are unjust. While I argue that the former reading is correct as an interpretive matter, I suggest that this reading is nonetheless highly demanding. In particular, I argue that it is demanding when it is expanded to include the protection of nonhuman animals; if such beings are right bearers, as more and more academics are beginning to suggest, then there is no nonarbitrary reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso

Robert Nozick on nonhuman animals : rights, value and the meaning of life

In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally

Chapter 9 Moral Responsibility and the Justification of Policies to Preserve Antimicrobial Effectiveness

Restrictive policies that limit antimicrobial consumption, including therapeutically justified use, might be necessary to tackle the problem of antimicrobial resistance. We argue that such policies would be ethically justified when forgoing antimicrobials constitutes a form of easy rescue for an individual. These are cases of mild and self-limiting infections in otherwise healthy patients whose overall health is not significantly compromised by the infection. In such cases, restrictive policies would be ethically justified because they would coerce individuals into fulfilling a moral obligation they independently have. However, to ensure that such justification is the strongest possible, states also have the responsibility to ensure that forgoing antimicrobials is as easy as possible for patients by implementing adequate compensation measures

Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements

Non invasive prenatal testing for single gene disorders:Exploring the ethics

Non-invasive prenatal testing for single gene disorders is now clearly on the horizon. This new technology offers obvious clinical benefits such as safe testing early in pregnancy. Before widespread implementation, it is important to consider the possible ethical implications. Four hypothetical scenarios are presented that highlight how ethical ideals of respect for autonomy, privacy and fairness may come into play when offering non-invasive prenatal testing for single gene disorders. The first scenario illustrates the moral case for using these tests for ‘information only', identifying a potential conflict between larger numbers of women seeking the benefits of the test and the wider social impact of funding tests that do not offer immediate clinical benefit. The second scenario shows how the simplicity and safety of non-invasive prenatal testing could lead to more autonomous decision-making and, conversely, how this could also lead to increased pressure on women to take up testing. In the third scenario we show how, unless strong safeguards are put in place, offering non-invasive prenatal testing could be subject to routinisation with informed consent undermined and that woman who are newly diagnosed as carriers may be particularly vulnerable. The final scenario introduces the possibility of a conflict of the moral rights of a woman and her partner through testing for single gene disorders. This analysis informs our understanding of the potential impacts of non-invasive prenatal testing for single gene disorders on clinical practice and has implications for future policy and guidelines for prenatal care