Atom Formation Rates Behind Shock Waves in Hydrogen and the Effect of Added Oxygen, July 1965 - July 1966

Formation rate of atomic hydrogen behind shock waves in hydrogen-argon mixture

Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figures. to appea

Experimental realization of a quantum game on a one-way quantum computer

We report the first demonstration of a quantum game on an all-optical one-way quantum computer. Following a recent theoretical proposal we implement a quantum version of Prisoner's Dilemma, where the quantum circuit is realized by a 4-qubit box-cluster configuration and the player's local strategies by measurements performed on the physical qubits of the cluster. This demonstration underlines the strength and versatility of the one-way model and we expect that this will trigger further interest in designing quantum protocols and algorithms to be tested in state-of-the-art cluster resources.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figure

Quantum Games

In these lecture notes we investigate the implications of the identification of strategies with quantum operations in game theory beyond the results presented in [J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. After introducing a general framework, we study quantum games with a classical analogue in order to flesh out the peculiarities of game theoretical settings in the quantum domain. Special emphasis is given to a detailed investigation of different sets of quantum strategies.Comment: 13 pages (LaTeX), 3 figure

Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations

We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted price mechanisms are conceptually simple mechanisms that work by proposing a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each buyer. We apply sequential posted price mechanisms to single-parameter multi-unit settings in which each buyer demands only one item and the mechanism can assign the service to at most k of the buyers. For standard sequential posted price mechanisms, we prove that with the valuation distribution having finite support, no sequential posted price mechanism can extract a constant fraction of the optimal expected revenue, even with unlimited supply. We extend this result to the the case of a continuous valuation distribution when various standard assumptions hold simultaneously. In fact, it turns out that the best fraction of the optimal revenue that is extractable by a sequential posted price mechanism is proportional to ratio of the highest and lowest possible valuation. We prove that for two simple generalizations of these mechanisms, a better revenue performance can be achieved: if the sequential posted price mechanism has for each buyer the option of either proposing an offer or asking the buyer for its valuation, then a Omega(1/max{1,d}) fraction of the optimal revenue can be extracted, where d denotes the degree of dependence of the valuations, ranging from complete independence (d=0) to arbitrary dependence (d=n-1). Moreover, when we generalize the sequential posted price mechanisms further, such that the mechanism has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the i-th buyer that depends on the valuations of all buyers except i's, we prove that a constant fraction (2-sqrt{e})/4~0.088 of the optimal revenue can be always be extracted.Comment: 29 pages, To appear in WINE 201

Biology helps you to win a game

We present a game of interacting agents which mimics the complex dynamics found in many natural and social systems. These agents modify their strategies periodically, depending on their performances using genetic crossover mechanisms, inspired by biology. We study the performances of the agents under different conditions, and how they adapt themselves. In addition the dynamics of the game is investigated.Comment: 4 pages including 6 figures. Uses REVTeX4. Submitted for Conference Proceedings of the "Unconventional Applications of Statistical Physics", Kolkat

Effect of Air Injection on Nucleation Rates: An Approach from Induction Time Statistics

From disruption of the supersaturated solution to improved mass transfer in the crystallizing suspension, the introduction of a moving gas phase in a crystallizer could lead to improved rates of nucleation and crystal growth. In this work, saturated air has been injected to batch crystallizers to study the effects on formation of the first crystal and subsequent turbidity buildup. To account for the typically large sample-to-sample variation, nucleation rates were evaluated for a large number of replicates using probability distributions of induction times. The slope and the intercept of the distributions were studied independently, allowing the simultaneous determination of the mean induction time and a certain detection delay related to the rate of crystal growth after formation of the first nucleus. When saturated air was injected in aqueous glycine solutions, the average detection delay was reduced from 69 to 13 min, and the mean induction time decreased from 128 to 36 min. The effect on aqueous solutions of l-arginine was less apparent, with a detection delay reduction from 15 to 3 min, and no significant changes on the rate of primary nucleation. These results demonstrate the potential of this technique for reduction in nucleation induction time and improved mass deposition rates in crystallization operations