Property in Labour and the Limits of Contract

As has long been recognized, the contract of employment depends on the commodification of labour power. Notwithstanding debates amongst political theorists and trade union activists about whether individuals should be viewed as self-owners, and whether it is possible to sell one’s capabilities without selling one’s self, the law does treat labour power as a commodity. There has been little research on the ways in which the law does so, however, for the simple reason that self-ownership of one’s laboring capacities is often taken as fact, as the starting premise for analysis, and treated as a necessary pre-condition for individual self-realization through contract. Moreover, proprietary and contractual forms of regulating work are often presented as diametrically opposed: a proprietary method of labour regulation is said to create a relationship of slavery, while contract is presented as an institution of choice. This paper argues that an analysis of labour power as property, and its relationship to contract, emphasizes that both contract and property are enmeshed in the legal regulation of waged employment. Examining the ways in which the courts have given shape to individuals\u27 proprietary rights over their labour power, and have set the terms for its exchange, demonstrates that the limitations on employer\u27s rights of control are not inherent to the contractual form. Instead, they often depend on wider social processes, such as production and labour processes, collective bargaining, and statutory regulation. Examining proprietary rights over labour power provides another window onto the malleability of the contractual form, and the degree to which political choices are made by courts and legislators in determining the terms of the employment contract.This paper therefore investigates the relationship between contract, and labour power as property. To do so the historical evolution of contractual limitations on employers’ rights of control will be canvassed, and the ways in which these limitations are now fraying. In particular, the development of the managerial prerogative from a property to a contract-based interest is described, and the ways in which concepts of working-time have operated, in theory, to separate in law the commodification of labour power from the commodification of self. Finally, the paper concludes by examining the ways in which these limiting mechanisms are beginning to disappear, as collective bargaining protections dissipate and the statutory protections are rolled back

The Ontario Human Rights Code’s Distributive and Recognitional Functions in the Workplace

In her analysis of the purpose of the Ontario Human Rights Code, the author draws on Nancy Fraser’s distinction between the two main strategies that have been used to combat inequality. Strategies of redistribution, which prevailed among equality activists in the early twentieth century, see inequality as arising from unequal access to economic resources. Strategies of recognition, which have come into prominence more recently, see inequality as arising from sociocultural prejudices that deny equal recognition to disadvantaged groups. Although the Ontario Human Rights Code is often seen as focusing on recognitional issues, the author argues that through the market relationships the Code regulates and the remedial powers it grants, it also adopts a redistribution strategy designed to address the economic impact of prohibited discrimination: that is, the Code aims to change how resources and opportunities are to be allocated for those with protected identity traits. An understanding of the interaction between the Code’s recognitional and redistributive functions sheds light on its purpose and method of operation, as well as on its relationship to other equality-seeking legal mechanisms such as collective bargaining and the equality rights provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, the need for a range of legal tools to counter inequality in different contexts comes more clearly into focus

Bhasin v. Hrynew: A New Era For Good Faith in Canadian Employment Law, or Just Tinkering at the Margins?

In Commonwealth Bank Australia v Barker the High Court of Australia refused to impose an implied duty of mutual trust and confidence into the employment contract, reasoning that doing so would take the Court beyond its legitimate authority.[1] Issued a bare two months later, the Supreme Court of Canada went in a different direction. In Bhasin v. Hrynew, the Court acknowledged good faith as a central organizing principle of contract law, and announced a new duty of honest performance applicable to all contracts. A few months later the Court applied the new organizing principle of good faith to circumscribe the exercise of an employer’s discretion in Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission.[2] This paper will assess the potential impact of Bhasin and Potter on the shape of Canadian employment law. In particular, it will reflect on whether these two cases open to the door to greater judicial oversight of the day-to-day interactions between employers and employees, an area as yet relatively unregulated by the Canadian common law. [1] Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32 (10 September 2014) [Barker] [2] Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 [Bhasin]; Potter v. Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10 [Potter]

That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind : The Contract of Employment at Common Law in Ontario, 1890-1979

“The relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by the indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the \u27contract of employment\u27.” Otto Kahn-Freund , Labour and the Law (London: Stevens, 1977). This study examines the legal evolution of the common law of employment contracts in Ontario between the 1890s and the 1970s. It focuses on the changing relationship between notions of property and contract in employment, as visible through the judicial discourse of reported common law cases. I argue that between the 1890s and the end of the 1970s Ontario saw the emergence and consolidation of two different conceptual paradigms for regulating work at common law. The common law of employment contracts was framed and reframed over different eras of the 20th century through what the courts understood of the nature of the exchange between the parties, the property interests involved and the legal tools necessary to manage that exchange. Contrary to the traditional narrative in the field, the courts of Ontario first conceptualized employment as an exchange as of the turn of the 20th century. This first paradigm emerged in tandem with the province’s second industrial revolution, and sought to regulate the discretionary nature of white collar professional work. The second paradigm was entrenched in the 1960s and 1970s. It is over these years that workers in Standard Employment Relationships (SER) first began to bring employment-related claims to the common law courts, a few decades after it emerged as the paradigmatic form of work around which Ontario’s labour market and employment laws were fashioned over the mid-century. The basic premises of the SER, of long-term employment, job security and internal career advancement, fundamentally changed the psychosical and economic terms of employment. But faced with workers’ claims for recognition of these new terms in law, the courts instead chose to entrench a limited legal framework which denied job security as an enforceable contract term

Questions, Questions: Has Weber Had an Impact on Unions’ Representational Responsibilities in Workplace Human Rights Disputes?

This essay attempts to put forward a research agenda for properly evaluating the changing nature of unions’ human rights representational obligations since Weber. I begin by investigating two legal questions: first, whether unions are held to a more stringent duty of fair representation (DFR) standard in regards to members’ discrimination grievances than prior to Weber and Parry Sound, and second, whether there has been a broadening of the concept of union discrimination under human rights codes, such that unions may be held liable for failing to bring forward discrimination grievances. With the legal picture in place, I then set out a series of empirical questions that need further research to properly assess whether, and to what extent, Weber and Parry Sound have altered unions’ human rights obligations in the administration of collective agreements, and more generally, their approaches to dealing with human rights issues in the workplace. The essay intentionally raises more questions than it answers, with the objective of provoking further research on important issues regarding labour law in action

The role of law in global value chains: a research manifesto

Most scholars attribute the development and ubiquity of global value chains to economic forces, treating law as an exogenous factor, if at all. By contrast, we assert the centrality of legal regimes and private ordering mechanisms to the creation, structure, geography, distributive effects and governance of Global Value Chains (GVCs), and thereby seek to establish the study of law and GVCs as rich and important terrain for research in its own righ

The role of law in global value chains: a research manifesto

Most scholars attribute the development and ubiquity of global value chains to economic forces, treating law as an exogenous factor, if at all. By contrast, we assert the centrality of legal regimes and private ordering mechanisms to the creation, structure, geography, distributive effects and governance of Global Value Chains (GVCs), and thereby seek to establish the study of law and GVCs as rich and important terrain for research in its own righ

The role of law in global value chains: a research manifesto

Most scholars attribute the development and ubiquity of global value chains to economic forces, treating law as an exogenous factor, if at all. By contrast, we assert the centrality of legal regimes and private ordering mechanisms to the creation, structure, geography, distributive effects and governance of Global Value Chains (GVCs), and thereby seek to establish the study of law and GVCs as rich and important terrain for research in its own right. </div

From Control through Command to the Control of Discretion: Labour Time, Labour Property and the Tools of Managerial Control in Early Twentieth Century Ontario

The common law contract of employment is often described as the ‘original’ form of modern work regulation, and tales of its origins feature in many historical narratives about the development of modern labour law. But despite its reputed pedigree and normative centrality, the historical development of the common law of employment contracts has not received significant attention. This paper begins to address this gap by investigating the evolution of the common law of employment contracts in the early twentieth century in one common law jurisdiction, the Canadian province of Ontario. Between the 1890s and 1930s the courts of Ontario applied a newly emerging legal paradigm from England, constructed around changing notions of property in employment, employment duration and the tools of managerial control. These ideas served to reorganise the common law of employments by simultaneously placing limits on the content of the exchange in an employment contract, while expanding employers’ rights of control so as to permit them to regulate workers’ exercise of discretion. Together these developments solidified Ontario’s first modern common law paradigm regarding work, ideas that would remain more or less in place until the early 1960s