IL MARX DI FINELLI - una presentazione

The following text is a part of an article that Vittorio Morfino has dedicated to Marx’s in-terpretations in Italy in the beginning of this century. It focuses on the originality of Fi-nelli’s reading

Temporalità plurale e contingenza: l’interpretazione spinoziana di Machiavelli

Spinoza dedicates two remarkable, though brief, paragraphs of his Political Treatise to Machiavelli’s thought: in the first one he investigates the political meaning of the writings of the Florentine secretary, whereas in the second one he summarizes and discusses more closely the different political theories. Spinoza’s interest in Machiavelli is clearly centred on the latter’s political views, however another relevant issue can be traced in Spinoza’s work, an issue that legitimates the theoretical frame of Machiavelli’s political philosophy: plural temporality and contingency. In this sense Machiavelli’s concept of chance becomes central to Spinoza’s interpretation, however distant from the Dutch philosopher’s ontology this concept may appear, an ontology which has been defined (especially in the German ambit) as governed by a “logical”, “blind”, “absolute” necessity

Immaginazione e ontologia della relazione: note per una ricerca

This article studies the question of imagination in Spinoza, starting from a reading of his thought as an ontology of relation. The first part analyses Lorenzo Vinciguerra’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of sign, an interpretation premised upon a reading of the body as constitutively relational. The second part examines Laurent Boves’ reading of the history of Jewish people, and the role played in it by the concept of constituent power. The final part of the essay attempts to draw some provisional conclusions about the concept of imagination: Spinoza’s rejection of a cogito understood as an inner space closely related to a personal body forbid to think of imagination as an individual power, and at the same time stresses the limits of a conception that attributes it directly to a collective subject. Only the category of transindividuality allows us to think psychic and collective individuation in their unity, and to correctly understand the complexity of Spinoza’s imagination, its layers and different temporalities

Teodicee: una nota su S. Nadler, Il migliore dei mondi possibili

The book of Steven Nadler, The Best of all possible World. A Story of Philosophers, God and Evil gives an account of the philosophical discussions among Leibniz, Malebranche and Arnauld about the freedom of God and the problem of evil. Starting from an imaginary encounter of the three philosopher in Paris, Nadler reconstructs the complex web of intellectual relations between Leibniz and Malebranche about the Theodicy, between Malebranche and Arnauld about the Treatise on the nature and grace, and between Leibniz and Arnauld about the Discourse of metaphysics. From this reconstruction emerges a sketch of the controversy in which Leibniz’s and Malebranche’s conceptions of God are characterized by the primacy of the intellect over will, whereas Arnauld’s conception of God, according to Descartes’ perspective, states the absolute freedom of God’s will. According to Nadler, Arnauld’s battle against Malebranch’s and Leibniz’s rationalist conception of God is subterraneously guided by his feeling of great proximity between these conceptions and the position about God expressed by Spinoza in the Ethics: a God without will and understanding, a power that simply produces the world in a necessary, meaningless way

O Jogo das Trevas: Heidegger, Schelling e Espinosa

This article aims to analyze, first, the problem of pantheism concerning determinism and freedom, treated by Schelling when he takes a position on the "Spinoza's error". Secondly, we will seek to understand, both in Schellingian thought and in his Heideggerian interpretation, Heidegger's statement that there would be in Schelling a "treatise that shakes Hegel's Logic even before it appears". Thirdly, following the path of the Descartes-Kant-Hegel lineage in the history of metaphysics, we will seek to elaborate the trajectory of the problem of “freedom and intelligible character”, confronting the latter one with the Schellingian solution, in order to analyze it through the conflict of the origin of evil and the impossibility of freedom. Finally, we will endeavor to respond to the accusation of “Spinoza's error” and thereby propose the opening for further interpretations of Spinoza, especially with regard to the problem of human freedom.Este artigo visa analisar, em primeiro lugar, a problemática do panteísmo relativa ao determinismo e à liberdade, tratada por Schelling quando este se posiciona sobre o "erro de Espinosa". Em segundo lugar, procuraremos entender, tanto no pensamento schellinguiano, quanto na sua interpretação heideggeriana, a afirmação de Heidegger de que haveria em Schelling um “tratado que abala a Lógica de Hegel, antes mesmo de ela aparecer!”. Em terceiro lugar, seguindo o percurso da linhagem Descartes-Kant-Hegel na história da metafísica, procuraremos elaborar a trajetória do problema da “liberdade e do caráter inteligível”, confrontando-a com a solução schellinguiana, a fim de analisa-la mediante o conflito da origem do mal e a impossibilidade da liberdade. Finalmente, procuraremos responder à acusação de “erro de Espinosa” e com isso propor a abertura para interpretações ulteriores de Espinosa, principalmente no que diz respeito ao problema de liberdade humana

Althusser lector de Gramsci

Este trabajo examina las lecturas de Gramsci realizadas por Althusser, desde sus primeras notas críticas y anotaciones hasta sus escritos sobre la crisis del marxismo. Subraya la profunda ambivalencia de las interpretaciones de Althusser. Por una parte, Gramsci es presentado como un precursor, como la única figura dentro de la tradición marxista que intentó pensar la superestructura y en particular lo político. Por otra parte, el corpus gramsciano es criticado como la instancia paradigmática de un concepto de la temporalidad y de la política con el que Althusser disiente. Considerando la crítica althusseriana, identificamos dos fases distintas, comenzando por una crítica al desconocimiento del status específico de la ciencia en general, y en particular de la ciencia de la historia, que caracteriza al período de la segunda mitad de los sesentas, Althusser formuló, hacia el final de los setentas, una crítica del concepto gramsciano de hegemonía que, en su opinión, borra el problema de la dominación de claseThis paper examines Althusser's readings of Gramsci, from the first critical notes and annotations to his writings on the crisis of Marxism. It highlights the profound ambivalence of Althusser's interpretations. On the one hand, Gramsci is presented as a ;precursor, as the only figure within the Marxist tradition deemed to have attempted to think the superstructure, and in particular the political. On the other side, the Gramscian corpus is criticized as the paradigmatic instance of a concept of temporality and ;politics with which Althusser is in disagreement. Regarding the Althusserian critique, we here identify two distinct phases starting ;out from a critique of the lack of knowledge of the specific status of the science in general, especially of the science of history, characteristic of the second half of the sixties, Althusser would, in the late seventies, formulate a critique of the Gramscian concept of hegemony which, in his view, erases the question of class dominationFacultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educació

Althusser lector de Gramsci

Este trabajo examina las lecturas de Gramsci realizadas por Althusser, desde sus primeras notas críticas y anotaciones hasta sus escritos sobre la crisis del marxismo. Subraya la profunda ambivalencia de las interpretaciones de Althusser. Por una parte, Gramsci es presentado como un precursor, como la única figura dentro de la tradición marxista que intentó pensar la superestructura y en particular lo político. Por otra parte, el corpus gramsciano es criticado como la instancia paradigmática de un concepto de la temporalidad y de la política con el que Althusser disiente. Considerando la crítica althusseriana, identificamos dos fases distintas, comenzando por una crítica al desconocimiento del status específico de la ciencia en general, y en particular de la ciencia de la historia, que caracteriza al período de la segunda mitad de los sesentas, Althusser formuló, hacia el final de los setentas, una crítica del concepto gramsciano de hegemonía que, en su opinión, borra el problema de la dominación de claseThis paper examines Althusser's readings of Gramsci, from the first critical notes and annotations to his writings on the crisis of Marxism. It highlights the profound ambivalence of Althusser's interpretations. On the one hand, Gramsci is presented as a ;precursor, as the only figure within the Marxist tradition deemed to have attempted to think the superstructure, and in particular the political. On the other side, the Gramscian corpus is criticized as the paradigmatic instance of a concept of temporality and ;politics with which Althusser is in disagreement. Regarding the Althusserian critique, we here identify two distinct phases starting ;out from a critique of the lack of knowledge of the specific status of the science in general, especially of the science of history, characteristic of the second half of the sixties, Althusser would, in the late seventies, formulate a critique of the Gramscian concept of hegemony which, in his view, erases the question of class dominationFacultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educació

Introduzione al transindividuale

Il testo che qui presentiamo riproduce l’Introduzione al volume miscellaneo Il transindividuale. Soggetti, relazioni, mutazioni, a cura di E. Balibar e V. Morfino, Mimesis, Milano 2014 (pp. 9-48)