New Terms of Envatment

The argument against skepticism relying on content externalism, which was made famous by Hilary Putnam, has been considered inconclusive by many philosophers. However, some believe that this argument has precluded the possibility of skeptical hypotheses. These hypotheses typically are fictional scenarios where a deceptive power makes your experiences indistinguishable from those you would have if you were not in such a scenario, making most of your justified belief false. Some philosophers, such as Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul, have taken this problem seriously and, in response to Putnam, have developed an alternative to the argument from ignorance: the piecemeal fashion strategy. I wish to defend, contra Brueckner and Altschul, the idea that some skeptical hypotheses remain untouched by content externalism, making the piecemeal fashion strategy obsolete

The Missing Hyperlink — An Empirical Study: Can Canadian Laws Effectively Protect Consumers Purchasing Online?

Canadian consumer protection legislation applicable to online transactions generally works by a two-pronged method: first, private international law rules ensure that in most cases, consumers can sue in their home province under that province’s law; and, second, a wide range of substantive obligations are imposed on merchants, and failure to comply with these obligations provides consumers with a right of cancellation. This study considers the private international law rules applicable to online consumer contracts, and discusses the unique jurisdictional challenges presented by online transactions. This study also provides an overview of Canadian legislation applicable to online consumer transactions, and examines the provisions of the Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template that were incorporated into the consumer protection legislation of several provinces. Given that there is little to no hard data on whether current consumer protection is actually effective in protecting consumers, an empirical study was designed to assess the limits of current legislation and offer recommendations to improve e-businesses and online consumers’ experience. The study’s main finding is that not a single business complied fully with its legal obligations. This suggests that in order for Canadian consumer protection law to have a significant impact on e-businesses’ practices, substantive obligations imposed by the legislation must be combined with a more effective coercive mechanism. State intervention is required to reshape legislation and ensure the protection of consumers’ basic rights

The maturity structure of household financial assets and liabilities

In this article, the author examines the maturity structure of the household sector's balance sheet and the degree of interest rate variability of household loans and financial assets. The bulk of households' interest-bearing assets and financial liabilities consists of medium- and long-term, fixed-rate instruments. The pattern of personal consumption is therefore influenced more by the wealth effects of interest rate changes than by their income effects, and the full impact of a permnent shift in interest rates on consumption will become apparent only after a lag.

Motor hyperactivity of the iron-deficient rat - an animal model of restless legs syndrome.

BackgroundAbnormal striatal dopamine transmission has been hypothesized to cause restless legs syndrome. Dopaminergic drugs are commonly used to treat restless legs syndrome. However, they cause adverse effects with long-term use. An animal model would allow the systematic testing of potential therapeutic drugs. A high prevalence of restless legs syndrome has been reported in iron-deficient anemic patients. We hypothesized that the iron-deficient animal would exhibit signs similar to those in restless legs syndrome patients.MethodsAfter baseline polysomnographic recordings, iron-deficient rats received pramipexole injection. Then, iron-deficient rats were fed a standard rodent diet, and polysomnographic recording were performed for 2 days each week for 4 weeks.ResultsIron-deficient rats have low hematocrit levels and show signs of restless legs syndrome: sleep fragmentation and periodic leg movements in wake and in slow-wave sleep. Iron-deficient rats had a positive response to pramipexole treatment. After the iron-deficient rats were fed the standard rodent diet, hematocrit returned to normal levels, and sleep quality improved, with increased average duration of wake and slow-wave sleep episodes. Periodic leg movements decreased during both waking and sleep. Hematocrit levels positively correlated with the average duration of episodes in wake and in slow-wave sleep and negatively correlated with periodic leg movements in wake and in sleep. Western blot analysis showed that striatal dopamine transporter levels were higher in iron-deficient rats.ConclusionsThe iron-deficient rat is a useful animal model of iron-deficient anemic restless legs syndrome. © 2017 International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society

Limen: Six Short Stories

The initial title of my thesis was Thresholds, but this brought to mind the idea of a door—perhaps too concrete a word for describing narratives about transition and inertia. I needed a word that would sit well both with the notion of change in the physical sense—spatial relocation and the altered body—and changes of a psychological—often private, more subtle—order. “Limen” is that word. It shares its meaning with “threshold” but is less familiar, and change is about encountering the unfamiliar, stepping on to foreign territory. Some changes are preceded by fireworks and a blaring fanfare. Others cannot be perceived by the most astute observers. “A Shy Man” may end with Jacques having an epiphany, but his living situation remains mostly the same. This is also true for the characters in “Wayside.” In “Desperately Searching for Coda,” on the other hand, Simon’s life is completely turned around—although it does ultimately come full circle. Invariably, the characters must reach a tipping point before any type of change can take place, but this limit is not always as conspicuous as a doorframe

Valeurs des acteurs organisationnels de proximité et pratiques de gestion de l'absence et du retour au travail des personnes à la suite d'un congé en raison d'un problème de santé mentale

Ce mémoire vise à relever les valeurs sous-jacentes aux pratiques des acteurs de proximité responsables de la gestion de l'absence et du retour d'un travailleur à la suite d'un problème de santé mentale, soit celles du personnel du service de santé, des supérieurs immédiats et des responsables du syndicat. En s'appuyant sur la théorie des valeurs de Schwartz (1992), un lien a pu être établi entre les valeurs collectivistes ou individualistes (Schwartz, 1992; Hofstede, 1980, 1981) des acteurs et leurs pratiques de gestion. La distinction entre les valeurs véhiculées et les valeurs souhaitées permet de comprendre les convergences et les divergences entre les groupes d'acteurs. L'analyse a démontré que la majorité des valeurs soulevées par les groupes d'acteurs sont divergentes. Enfin, cette étude rend compte de l'importance de la compatibilité des valeurs puisque celles-ci influencent les attitudes et les comportements des groupes d'acteurs qui guident les pratiques de gestion

Métaéthique de la croyance : une défense pragmatiste de la responsabilité et de l’autonomie mentale

Cette thèse s’inscrit dans les débats philosophiques contemporains que l’on nomme « éthique de la croyance », un champ de recherche à l’intersection de l’épistémologie, l’éthique et la psychologie empirique. Plus spécifiquement, je cherche à répondre à la question « que devrions-nous croire? » en opposant les raisons épistémiques et pratiques de croire. Les raisons épistémiques portent sur la vérité des propositions crues alors que les raisons pratiques portent sur l’utilité, ou le caractère moral, de la croyance de l’agent. Il est conséquemment aisé de concevoir des situations où ces deux types de raisons entrent en conflit. La question donc est de déterminer ce que nous devrions croire, entre les raisons épistémiques et pratiques, et si certaines circonstances exigent de privilégier exceptionnellement un type de raison sur l’autre. Cette question ne peut pas faire l’économie d’une autre question propre au champ de l’éthique de la croyance, à savoir, comment nous devons concevoir l’autonomie et la responsabilité de l’agent quant à ses croyances. Les croyances ont ceci de remarquable qu’elles sont quotidiennement l’objet de réactions normatives telles que le blâme ou l’éloge, malgré le fait qu’elles ne semblent pas sous le contrôle volontaire direct de l’agent (du moins, comme le sont les actions). Ceci permet d’introduire au sein de notre objet d’étude des considérations proprement métaéthiques, pour la plupart inspirées des débats portant sur le libre arbitre. Cet aspect de notre recherche est crucial pour notre propos puisqu’il invite à une attentive évaluation de notre question de recherche initiale. La position défendue dans cette thèse consiste à soutenir que, du moment que la question « que devrions-nous croire? » est à entendre en un sens normatif, ce sont les raisons pratiques qui déterminent ce que l’agent devrait croire. En ce sens, ma position au sein de l’éthique de la croyance se situe dans le camp dit « pragmatiste ». A contrario, si la question « que devrions-nous croire? » est à entendre en un sens purement prédictif, les raisons épistémiques seront appelées à faire partie de l’explication quant à ce que l’agent devrait croire. Cette position, qui évite les écueils des théories traditionnelles en éthique de la croyance, prend appui sur une analyse de la notion de raison épistémique soutenant que les raisons épistémiques ne sont pas des raisons normatives. Cette préséance accordée aux raisons pratiques quant à la normativité de la croyance exige de porter une attention toute particulière à une éthique des conséquences appliquée au cas de la croyance. Ceci nous permet non seulement d’expliquer de nombreuses intuitions quant au langage normatif à l’endroit des croyances, mais offre un terreau fertile pour déployer une théorie adéquate de la responsabilité et de l’autonomie des agents, non seulement à l’endroit de leurs croyances, mais également concernant d’autres états mentaux.This thesis is part of a larger debate within contemporary philosophy called “The Ethics of Belief”, which stands at the intersection of epistemology, ethics and empirical psychology. Specifically, the aim of this thesis is to offer an answer to the question “what should we believe?” by opposing two distinct kinds of reasons for belief: epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons for belief. While epistemic reasons concern the truth of the proposition that is believed, pragmatic reasons concern the utility, or the moral standing, of the belief itself. Because of the two distinct objects to which these kinds of reasons apply, conflicts between epistemic and pragmatic reasons are common. However, since they are both reasons for believing propositions, we are faced with a riddle concerning what kind of reason we should comply with. Should we believe for epistemic reasons, or for pragmatic ones? In what circumstances are we allowed to follow one kind of reason rather than the other? This cluster of questions is closely linked to a topic specific to the Ethics of Belief, namely, how to understand the agent’s autonomy and responsibility with respect to his or her beliefs. Beliefs are peculiar things: they are the proper object of blame, praise and other normative reactions deeply imbedded within our everyday language. However, we do not have direct voluntary control over them (at least, not like we have direct, voluntary control over our actions). This lack of direct voluntary control allows us to introduce an analysis of the normativity of belief inspired by metaethical debates, notably the possibility of exercising our free will. These metaethical concerns bring us to a close analysis of our initial question “what should we believe?”. The position I defend in this thesis is the following: as long as we consider the question “what should we believe?” as a normative question, the reasons bearing on this question are only pragmatic reasons, reasons bearing on the utility or value of the said belief. However, if we understand this question as a question about what we should predict with respect to belief formation, then epistemic reasons will be allowed in our answer as explanatory reasons for the expected belief formation. This way of answering our initial query rests upon an analysis of epistemic reasons leading us to consider that epistemic reasons are not normative reasons. This reverence to pragmatic reasons invites us to see the ethics of belief as an ethic focusing on the doxastic consequences of our actions. This allows us to explain conflicting intuitions with respect to normative reactions concerning belief while evading the usual problems to which the more traditional theories in the ethics of belief fall prey. Finally, this pragmatic approach to the normativity of belief allows us to set the groundwork for a theory of responsibility and autonomy concerning beliefs, as well as other mental states