What determines the suspension of budget support?

Although Budget Support (BS) was not designed to push political reform in recipient countries, donors have nonetheless used it to sanction democratic regress. An econometric analysis of all BS suspensions by bilateral donors in the period 2000–11 finds that suspensions effectively do reflect downward tendencies in voice and accountability, and in level of democratic functioning. The larger the in-country BS donor group, the more suspensions. Interestingly, ideological alignment between donor and recipient and aid dependence decrease the likelihood for suspensions, while domestic donor economic growth increases it; and multilateral suspensions have the largest positive effect of all

The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid

Motivation: Budget support is the form of aid most commonly associated with recipient‐country ownership. However, a number of scholars and practitioners have criticized the approach as masking new forms of conditionality. Was budget support simply a guise for increasing donor influence in recipient countries? How can we explain the rapid shift towards budget support, as well as the rapid decline in its popularity after only a few years? Purpose: We use a bargaining framework to explain the rise and fall of budget support. Contrary to explanations that suggest that budget support was a normative decision by donors designed to increase aid effectiveness by fostering ownership, a bargaining framework emphasizes that aid policy is the result of sustained negotiations between donors and recipients. These negotiations, however, are constrained by donors' inability to deliver aid as promised. Approach: We use a Nash bargaining framework to formalize the predictions of a bargaining model. From the model, two testable predictions emerge: (1) in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments are willing to selectively offer donor agencies greater access to and influence over domestic policy decision-making; and (2) in exchange for such influence, donor agencies are willing to exert less pressure on recipients to be politically inclusive. We then test the implications of the model using case‐study evidence from Rwanda and Tanzania. Findings: The empirical data, based on over 80 interviews with practitioners over several periods of research in both countries, provide substantial evidence in support of the model's core assumptions and predictions. Contrary to claims that budget support increased recipient‐country ownership, interviews (identified as personal communications) suggest that, in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments were willing to grant donors greater access and influence. In return, donor agencies reduced demands on the recipient government regarding political inclusivity, tacitly accepting arrangements that centralized decision‐making and excluded civil society. When donor agencies could no longer provide budget support as promised, these negotiated arrangements broke down. Policy Implications: The findings challenge a common narrative that donors embraced budget support because of a normative commitment to ownership. They also demonstrate the value of a bargaining framework. To understand why particular forms of aid, like budget support, rise in popularity only to quickly fall by the wayside, we need to understand what donor agencies and recipient governments bargain over and why

Moving into the new aid approach, dilemmas for NGOs : the Belgian case

Under the new aid approach, nongovernmental development organizations (NGOs) are expected to move from “delivery” (service delivery projects) to “leverage” (lobbying and advocacy). In line with this international tendency, the Belgian government has signed a pact with the NGO sector in which a move away from delivery and toward leverage is being proposed. Given that Belgian NGOs are heavily dependent on government funding and strongly oriented toward the “delivery” model, this pact implies that a number of NGOs will have to undergo organizational changes. This article shows that there is a major cleavage in the NGO landscape in Belgium. Some organizations clearly favor the leverage, whereas others prefer the delivery roles. Those that are more dependent on government funding tend to incline toward the leverage orientation. The attitudinal orientation toward the leverage model however does not imply that organizations are effectively willing and able to change. A number of identity and legitimacy concerns are perceived by NGOs to be important sources of organizational inertia

P 148 - Synergy complexity during maximal voluntary isometric contractions.

status: publishe

O 038 – The association of selective motor control, muscle size and composition with the overall gait deviations of children with cerebral palsy

SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Randomized controlled trial combining constraint-induced movement therapy and action-observation training in unilateral cerebral palsy: clinical effects and influencing factors of treatment response

Introduction: Constraint-induced movement therapy (CIMT) improves upper limb (UL) motor execution in unilateral cerebral palsy (uCP). As these children also show motor planning deficits, action-observation training (AOT) might be of additional value. Here, we investigated the combined effect of AOT to CIMT and identified factors influencing treatment response. Methods: A total of 44 children with uCP (mean 9 years 6 months, SD 1 year 10 months) participated in a 9-day camp wearing a splint for 6 h/day and were allocated to the CIMT + AOT (n = 22) and the CIMT + placebo group (n = 22). The CIMT + AOT group received 15 h of AOT (i.e. video-observation) and executed the observed tasks, whilst the CIMT + AOT group watched videos free of biological motion and executed the same tasks. The primary outcome measure was bimanual performance. Secondary outcomes included measures of body function and activity level assessed before (T1), after the intervention (T2), and at 6 months follow-up (T3). Influencing factors included behavioural and neurological characteristics. Results: Although no between-groups differences were found (p > 0.05; η2 = 0–16), the addition of AOT led to higher gains in children with initially poorer bimanual performance (p = 0.02; η2 = 0.14). Both groups improved in all outcome measures after the intervention and retained the gains at follow up (p < 0.01; η2 = 0.02–0.71). Poor sensory function resulted in larger improvements in the total group (p = 0.03; η2 = 0.25) and high amounts of mirror movements tended to result in a better response to the additional AOT training (p = 0.06; η2 = 0.18). Improvements were similar irrespective of the type of brain lesion or corticospinal tract wiring pattern. Conclusions: Adding AOT to CIMT, resulted in a better outcome for children with poor motor function and high amounts of mirror movements. CIMT with or without AOT seems to be more beneficial for children with poor sensory function. Trial registration: Registered at ClinicalTrials.gov on 22nd August 2017 (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT03256357)