Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market

This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and its outcome. Specifically, we analyze two aspects. First, we investigate how marital status (i.e., marriage with an only child, that with a non-only child and remaining single) differs between only children and non-only children. This analysis allows us to know whether people choose mates in a positive or a negative assortative manner regarding only-child status, and to predict whether only-child individuals benefit from marriage matching premiums or are subject to penalties regarding partner attractiveness. Second, we measure the premium/penalty by the size of the gap in partner's socio economic status (SES, here, years of schooling) between only-child and non--only-child individuals. The conventional economic theory and the observed marriage patterns of positive assortative mating on only-child status predict that only-child individuals are subject to a matching penalty in the marriage market, especially when their partner is also an only child. Furthermore, our estimation confirms that among especially women marrying an only-child husband, only children are penalized in terms of 0.57-years-lower educational attainment on the part of the partner

The Gender Division of Labor : A Joint Marriage and Job Search Model

This paper develops a model combining marriage and the job search, including marital bargaining and wage posting. It considers two types of jobs, full-time and part-time, and workers, male and female. After job-worker matching, male and female individuals find one another in the marriage market. This model has multiple equilibria in terms of gender divisions of labor, and the equilibrium market tightness is socially inefficient because of externalities arising from the expected gains from marriage