78 research outputs found

    VC-Dimension of Hyperplanes over Finite Fields

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    Let Fqd\mathbb{F}_q^d be the dd-dimensional vector space over the finite field with qq elements. For a subset E⊆FqdE\subseteq \mathbb{F}_q^d and a fixed nonzero t∈Fqt\in \mathbb{F}_q, let Ht(E)={hy:y∈E}\mathcal{H}_t(E)=\{h_y: y\in E\}, where hyh_y is the indicator function of the set {x∈E:x⋅y=t}\{x\in E: x\cdot y=t\}. Two of the authors, with Maxwell Sun, showed in the case d=3d=3 that if ∣EâˆŁâ‰„Cq114|E|\geq Cq^{\frac{11}{4}} and qq is sufficiently large, then the VC-dimension of Ht(E)\mathcal{H}_t(E) is 3. In this paper, we generalize the result to arbitrary dimension and improve the exponent in the case d=3d=3.Comment: 9 pages, 1 figur

    Inside-Out Corporate Governance

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    Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance. Using the inside-out model as our lens, and drawing on comparisons to Italian and E.U. governance, we explore three areas of corporate governance that have been pervasively restructured by the Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent regulation: proxy access, credit rating agencies, and derivatives. We begin, in Part I, with proxy access, arguing that the new scheme for minority shareholder access excludes the very outsiders it ostensibly integrates into corporate governance. In Part II, which focuses on auditing and credit rating agencies, we argue that the inside-out relationship—in which the corporation itself chooses its gatekeeper—is deeply problematic but cannot be “cured.” The most realistic strategy is to create more flexibility in the audit relationship, and diminish the importance of credit ratings. Part III analyzes the new derivatives regulation. Here, we argue that Congress’s effort to sharply separate the inside and outside uses of derivatives is incoherent from a corporate governance perspective. We conclude by briefly speculating about the future implications of inside-out governance

    Inside-Out Corporate Governance

    Get PDF
    Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance. Using the inside-out model as our lens, and drawing on comparisons to Italian and E.U. governance, we explore three areas of corporate governance that have been pervasively restructured by the Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent regulation: proxy access, credit rating agencies, and derivatives. We begin, in Part I, with proxy access, arguing that the new scheme for minority shareholder access excludes the very outsiders it ostensibly integrates into corporate governance. In Part II, which focuses on auditing and credit rating agencies, we argue that the inside-out relationship—in which the corporation itself chooses its gatekeeper—is deeply problematic but cannot be “cured.” The most realistic strategy is to create more flexibility in the audit relationship, and diminish the importance of credit ratings. Part III analyzes the new derivatives regulation. Here, we argue that Congress’s effort to sharply separate the inside and outside uses of derivatives is incoherent from a corporate governance perspective. We conclude by briefly speculating about the future implications of inside-out governance

    Contemporary issues in rhinosinusitis and HIV infection

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    An overlooked problem in Turkish-Russian relations : the 1878 War indemnity

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    Donated by Klaus KreiserReprinted from in : International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol: 9, No: 4, 1978

    Body Talk

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    The primary focus of this research is to enrich my perspective as a playwright by gathering data on the topic of body-shame. Dr. Mello and I are conducting interviews with people of varying genders, ages, and walks of life in order to discover how each person experiences body-shame and body-ease. I will write a draft of a play which will prove to be richer and more truthful with the aid of this new data. That will then be workshopped and performed with a company in Helsinki, a city with a lasting tradition of theater that strongly impacts public discourse

    Charlene Milgrim interview

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    Charlene Milgrim talks about the beauty of the Oakland campus and how her education at CCAC was the foundation for all her future work
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