The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray

Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars in the field of strategic studies with his belief that grand strategy is indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identifies key themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray’s statement that “all strategy is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the importance of agential context in military environments—a point often neglected in strategic practice

Grand Strategy is Attrition: The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict

In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block—combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent’s freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1376/thumbnail.jp

On “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray” and Author\u27s Response

This commentary responds to Lukas Milevski’s article, “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” published in the Winter 2021–22 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 4)

NATO’S DEFENCE POLICY DILEMMA IN THE BALTIC STATES

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the dilemma NATO has faced since February 2014 in its defence policy regarding the Baltic States. If NATO pursues a policy of deterrence, it might trigger war because Russia, the would-be deteree, may perceive actions taken by NATO as not intended to strengthen deterrence but rather to intimidate or coerce it. If it pursues an alternate policy of leaving the Baltic States visibly undefended, it might trigger war because Russia may see this as a sign of weakness and a gap to be exploited. This article investigates the logic of the dilemma, before considering whether NATO’s choice, made at the Warsaw Summit of July 2016, is working as intended. Ultimately, we cannot predict the answer and, therefore, we should consider all possible outcomes, including those which lead to a defensive war in the Baltic States

NATO’S defence policy dilemma in the Baltic States

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the dilemma NATO has faced since February 2014 in its defence policy regarding the Baltic States. If NATO pursues a policy of deterrence, it might trigger war because Russia, the would-be deteree, may perceive actions taken by NATO as not intended to strengthen deterrence but rather to intimidate or coerce it. If it pursues an alternate policy of leaving the Baltic States visibly undefended, it might trigger war because Russia may see this as a sign of weakness and a gap to be exploited. This article investigates the logic of the dilemma, before considering whether NATO’s choice, made at the Warsaw Summit of July 2016, is working as intended. Ultimately, we cannot predict the answer and, therefore, we should consider all possible outcomes, including those which lead to a defensive war in the Baltic States

The nature of strategy versus the character of war

History and International Relation

Baltijos šalių gynybos scenarijai: kam ruoštis

Šiame straipsnyje strateginiu požiūriu aptariama Baltijos šalių gynyba, pagrindinį dėmesį skiriant trims Rusijos agresijos prieš Baltijos šalis scenarijams: 1) užmaskuotai invazijai, kurią Vakarai pavadintų hibridiniu karu, 2) staigiai Rusijos karinių vienetų, jau esančių Baltijos regione arba aplink jį, invazijai ir 3) parengtai invazijai, kurią įvykdytų gausesnės Rusijos pajėgos, iš kitų Rusijos vietovių permestos į vietą, iš kurios Baltijos šalys joms lengvai pasiekiamos. Pagrindinis dėl kiekvieno scenarijaus kylantis klausimas: ar susiklosčius šiam konkrečiam scenarijui Rusija turėtų įgyvendinamą strategiją, ar jis galėtų tapti įtikinama Rusijos sėkmės teorija? Kiekvienas scenarijus analizuojamas karinės praktikos arba taktikos požiūriu, tuomet politikos požiūriu, o vėliau jie kartu aptariami strateginiu požiūriu. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad nei užmaskuota invazija, nei staigi invazija negali tapti tikroviškomis Rusijos sėkmės teorijomis, o parengta invazija iš tiesų gali būti laikoma įtikinama pergalės teorija