7 research outputs found
Correlation in an intrusion detection process
International audienceGenerally, the intruder must perform several actions, organized in an intrusion scenario, to achieve his or her malicious objective. We argue that intrusion scenarios can be modelled as a planning process and we suggest modelling a malicious objective as an attempt to violate a given security requirement. Our proposal is then to extend the definition of attack correlation presented in "alert correlation in a cooperative intrusion detection network" to correlate attacks with intrusion objectives and to introduce the notion of anti correlation. These notions are useful to decide if a sequence of correlated actions can lead to an intrusion objective. This approach provides the security administrator with a global view of what happens in the system. In particular, it controls unobserved actions through hypothesis generation, clusters repeated actions in a single scenario, recognizes intruders that are changing their intrusion objectives and is efficient to detect variations of an intrusion scenario. This approach can also be used to eliminate a category of false positives that correspond to false attacks, that is actions that are not further correlated to an intrusion objective
Organization based access control
International audienceNone of the classical access control models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC or TMAC is fully satisfactory to model security policies that are not restricted to static permissions but also include contextual rules related to permissions, prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. This is typically the case of security policies that apply to the health care domain. We suggest a new model that provides solutions to specify such contextual security policies. This model, called organization based access control, is presented using a formal language based on first-order logic
ORBAC : un modÚle de contrÎle d'accÚs basé sur les organisations
International audienceNone of the classical access control models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC or TMAC is fully satisfactory to model security policies that are not restricted to static permissions but also include contextual rules related to permissions, prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. This is typically the case of security policies that apply to the health care domain. In this paper, we suggest a new model that provides solutions to specify such contextual security policies. This model, called Organization based access control, is presented using a formal language based on first-order logic.Les modĂšles de contrĂŽle dâaccĂšs comme DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC ou TMAC ne permettent demodĂ©liser que des politiques de sĂ©curitĂ© qui se restreignent Ă des permissions statiques. Ils nâoffrent pas lapossibilitĂ© dâexprimer des rĂšgles contextuelles relatives aux permissions, aux interdictions, aux obligations etaux recommandations. Ce type de rĂšgle est particuliĂšrement utile pour exprimer des politiques de sĂ©curitĂ© dans ledomaine mĂ©dical. Dans cet article, nous proposons un nouveau modĂšle qui permet de spĂ©cifier de tellespolitiques de sĂ©curitĂ© contextuelles. Ce modĂšle appelĂ© Organisation Based Access Control (ORBAC) sâappuiesur un langage formel basĂ© sur la logique du premier ordre
Organization based access control
International audienceNone of the classical access control models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC or TMAC is fully satisfactory to model security policies that are not restricted to static permissions but also include contextual rules related to permissions, prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. This is typically the case of security policies that apply to the health care domain. We suggest a new model that provides solutions to specify such contextual security policies. This model, called organization based access control, is presented using a formal language based on first-order logic
ORBAC : un modÚle de contrÎle d'accÚs basé sur les organisations
International audienceNone of the classical access control models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC or TMAC is fully satisfactory to model security policies that are not restricted to static permissions but also include contextual rules related to permissions, prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. This is typically the case of security policies that apply to the health care domain. In this paper, we suggest a new model that provides solutions to specify such contextual security policies. This model, called Organization based access control, is presented using a formal language based on first-order logic.Les modĂšles de contrĂŽle dâaccĂšs comme DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC ou TMAC ne permettent demodĂ©liser que des politiques de sĂ©curitĂ© qui se restreignent Ă des permissions statiques. Ils nâoffrent pas lapossibilitĂ© dâexprimer des rĂšgles contextuelles relatives aux permissions, aux interdictions, aux obligations etaux recommandations. Ce type de rĂšgle est particuliĂšrement utile pour exprimer des politiques de sĂ©curitĂ© dans ledomaine mĂ©dical. Dans cet article, nous proposons un nouveau modĂšle qui permet de spĂ©cifier de tellespolitiques de sĂ©curitĂ© contextuelles. Ce modĂšle appelĂ© Organisation Based Access Control (ORBAC) sâappuiesur un langage formel basĂ© sur la logique du premier ordre
Structure-Activity Relationship in the Leucettine Family of Kinase Inhibitors
International audienceThe protein kinase DYRK1A is involved in Alzheimer's disease, Down syndrome, diabetes, viral infections, and leukemia. Leucettines, a family of 2-aminoimidazolin-4-ones derived from the marine sponge alkaloid Leucettamine B, have been developed as pharmacological inhibitors of DYRKs (dual specificity, tyrosine phosphorylation regulated kinases) and CLKs (cdc2-like kinases). We report here on the synthesis and structure-activity relationship (SAR) of 68 Leucettines. Leucettines were tested on 11 purified kinases and in cellular assays: (1) CLK1 pre-mRNA splicing, (2) Threonine-212-Tau phosphorylation, (3) glutamate-induced cell death, (4) autophagy and (5) antagonism of ligand-activated cannabinoid receptor CB1. The Leucettine SAR observed for DYRK1A is essentially identical for CLK1, CLK4, DYRK1B, and DYRK2. DYRK3 and CLK3 are less sensitive to Leucettines. In contrast, the cellular SAR highlights correlations between inhibition of specific kinase targets and some but not all cellular effects. Leucettines deserve further development as potential therapeutics against various diseases on the basis of their molecular targets and cellular effects