Greening the Common Agricultural Policy: a behavioral perspective and lab-in-the-field experiment in Germany

This study investigates the behavioral economic underpinnings of current policy approaches to integrate environmental objectives into the Common Agricultural Policy. We conduct an economic lab-in-the-field experiment with farmers in Germany. We analyze the impact of the following policy design features on farmers’ decisions to adopt sustainable agricultural practices: (i) framing of the policy: whether farmers perceive themselves as being part of the problem or the solution, (ii) degree of control: mandatory vs. voluntary policy (iii) framing of incentives as either losses or gains. All policy designs tested result in a significant increase in hectares conserved compared to a baseline scenario without policy. Also behavioral factors do significantly affect farmers’ behavior at the individual level. Only framing is found to significantly affect policy effectiveness

Modeling trade-offs across carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, and equity in the distribution of global REDD+ funds

The program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is one of the major attempts to tackle climate change mitigation in developing countries. REDD+ seeks to provide result-based incentives to promote emission reductions and increase carbon sinks in forest land while promoting other cobenefits, such as the conservation of biodiversity. We model different scenarios of international REDD+ funds distribution toward potential recipient countries using 2 carbon emission reduction targets (20% and 50% compared to the baseline scenario, i.e., deforestation and forest degradation without REDD+) by 2030. The model combines the prioritization of environmental outcomes in terms of carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation and social equity, accounting for the equitable distribution of international REDD+ funds. Results highlight the synergy between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation under alternative fund allocation criteria, especially for scenarios of low carbon emission reduction. Trade-offs increase when distributional equity is considered as an additional criterion, especially under higher equity requirements. The analysis helps to better understand the inherent trade-offs between enhancing distributional equity and meeting environmental targets under alternative REDD+ fund allocation options. (c) 2019 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.I.P. is supported by a grant by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (IJCI-2016–28475). I.P., U.P., and M.J.S. are supported under the Basque Centre for Climate Change “Unit of Excellence” (Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness; MDM-2017-0714)

Domestication of payments for ecosystem services: new evidence from the Andes.

The current project has sought to assess i) the potential of agricultural biodiversity-focused PES to serve as a cost-effective and socially equitable domesticated diversity conservation incentive scheme, as well as ii) how economic incentive mechanisms such as PES can be designed to build on and complement local institutions of collective action. Results are presented from pilot Payment for Agrobiodiversity Conservation (PACS) schemes and framed field experiments implemented in the Bolivian and Peruvian Andes aimed at sustaining diversity within quinoa, a traditional Andean grain. Findings indicate that opportunity costs of conservation vary widely not only between the two study sites, but also between community-based groups within each site. This creates opportunities to minimize intervention costs by selecting least-cost conserving farmers. However, as shown with respect to the role of wealth and cooperation in determining opportunity costs, this also has implications for the type of farmer to be included in the conservation programme. Promisingly, depending on the fairness principle deemed most important in the local context, there does not necessarily have to be a significant trade-off between the schemes’ potential cost-effectiveness and equity outcomes. The observed behavior in the farmer experimental games further supports such findings and suggests that understanding farmer perceptions of fairness can have important implications for the design of conservation incentive mechanisms, particularly given the important influence of such perceptions on the pro-social behavior that underlies much de facto conservation. Incentive mechanisms, such as PACS, that can support socially valued ends not only by harnessing selfish preferences to public ends but also by evoking public-spirited motives are also more likely to be sustainable over the long-term. The use of PACS incentives for the maintenance of traditional crop varieties and the improvement of smallholder farmer livelihoods thus appears promising for further development and up-scaling