73 research outputs found
Greening the Common Agricultural Policy: a behavioral perspective and lab-in-the-field experiment in Germany
This study investigates the behavioral economic underpinnings of current policy approaches to integrate environmental objectives into the Common Agricultural Policy. We conduct an economic lab-in-the-field experiment with farmers in Germany. We analyze the impact of the following policy design features on farmersβ decisions to adopt sustainable agricultural practices: (i) framing of the policy: whether farmers perceive themselves as being part of the problem or the solution, (ii) degree of control: mandatory vs. voluntary policy (iii) framing of incentives as either losses or gains. All policy designs tested result in a significant increase in hectares conserved compared to a baseline scenario without policy. Also behavioral factors do significantly affect farmersβ behavior at the individual level. Only framing is found to significantly affect policy effectiveness
Modeling trade-offs across carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, and equity in the distribution of global REDD+ funds
The program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is one of the major attempts to tackle climate change mitigation in developing countries. REDD+ seeks to provide result-based incentives to promote emission reductions and increase carbon sinks in forest land while promoting other cobenefits, such as the conservation of biodiversity. We model different scenarios of international REDD+ funds distribution toward potential recipient countries using 2 carbon emission reduction targets (20% and 50% compared to the baseline scenario, i.e., deforestation and forest degradation without REDD+) by 2030. The model combines the prioritization of environmental outcomes in terms of carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation and social equity, accounting for the equitable distribution of international REDD+ funds. Results highlight the synergy between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation under alternative fund allocation criteria, especially for scenarios of low carbon emission reduction. Trade-offs increase when distributional equity is considered as an additional criterion, especially under higher equity requirements. The analysis helps to better understand the inherent trade-offs between enhancing distributional equity and meeting environmental targets under alternative REDD+ fund allocation options. (c) 2019 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.I.P. is supported by a grant by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (IJCI-2016β28475). I.P., U.P., and M.J.S. are supported under the Basque Centre for Climate Change βUnit of Excellenceβ (Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness; MDM-2017-0714)
Domestication of payments for ecosystem services: new evidence from the Andes.
The current project has sought to assess i) the potential of agricultural biodiversity-focused PES to serve as a cost-effective and socially equitable domesticated diversity conservation incentive scheme, as well as ii) how economic incentive mechanisms such as PES can be designed to build on and complement local institutions of collective action. Results are presented from pilot Payment for Agrobiodiversity Conservation (PACS) schemes and framed field experiments implemented in the Bolivian and Peruvian Andes aimed at sustaining diversity within quinoa, a traditional Andean grain.
Findings indicate that opportunity costs of conservation vary widely not only between the two study sites, but also between community-based groups within each site. This creates opportunities to minimize intervention costs by selecting least-cost conserving farmers. However, as shown with respect to the role of wealth and cooperation in determining opportunity costs, this also has implications for the type of farmer to be included in the conservation programme. Promisingly, depending on the fairness principle deemed most important in the local context, there does not necessarily have to be a significant trade-off between the schemesβ potential cost-effectiveness and equity outcomes. The observed behavior in the farmer experimental games further supports such findings and suggests that understanding farmer perceptions of fairness can have important implications for the design of conservation incentive mechanisms, particularly given the important influence of such perceptions on the pro-social behavior that underlies much de facto conservation. Incentive mechanisms, such as PACS, that can support socially valued ends not only by harnessing selfish preferences to public ends but also by evoking public-spirited motives are also more likely to be sustainable over the long-term.
The use of PACS incentives for the maintenance of traditional crop varieties and the improvement of smallholder farmer livelihoods thus appears promising for further development and up-scaling
Π Π΅ΠΉΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΠΈ ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½Ρ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ ΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Ρ Π Π€
Purpose: of this article is to develop a methodology for assessing the degree of achievement of sustainable development by Russian regions based on a combination of basic universal indicators in a given time interval.Methods: the article is based on the use of statistical methods to build a sustainable development rating of the regions of the Russian Federation in the context of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the period 2018β2020, based on three blocks β economic, social and environmental.Results: the authors of the article proposed and applied the universal methodology for compiling a rating of sustainable development of Russian regions within the economic, social and environmental blocks. For each subject of the Federation, the dynamics of the rating for the period under review was calculated and analyzed.Conclusions and Relevance: the approach proposed in the article makes it possible to identify regions-leaders and regions that systematically lag behind in terms of achieving the SDGs, as well as to identify regions that show a steady increase (decrease) in ratings for SDG indicators. The proposed algorithm for assessing the degree of achievement of sustainable development parameters can be used to identify trends in the development of Russian regions, identify factors and mechanisms that determine the opportunities and conditions for achieving the SDGs by Russian regions, and is an effective tool for regional policy in the field of achieving sustainable development. The results of the study make it possible to develop and improve the system for managing the socio-economic development of Russian regions, develop strategies and guidelines for their development in various time frames, and therefore may be of interest to managers at the federal, regional and municipal levels.Π¦Π΅Π»Ρ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΊΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅ΠΏΠ΅Π½ΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈ Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π±Π°Π·ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ Π² Π·Π°Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΌ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Π΅.ΠΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π° Π½Π° ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅ΠΉΡΠΈΠ½Π³Π° ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ Π€Π΅Π΄Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π² ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ (Π¦Π£Π ) Π·Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΎΠ΄ 2018β2020 Π³Π³., ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΡΠΈ Π±Π»ΠΎΠΊΠ° β ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ, ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ ΠΈ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ.Π Π΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΡ. ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π° ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½Π° ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠΎΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅ΠΉΡΠΈΠ½Π³Π° ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ, ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π±Π»ΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ². ΠΠ»Ρ ΠΊΠ°ΠΆΠ΄ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ° Π€Π΅Π΄Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠΈΡΠ°Π½Π° ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π° Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΠΊΠ° ΡΠ΅ΠΉΡΠΈΠ½Π³Π° Π·Π° ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΠΌΡΠΉ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΎΠ΄.ΠΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄Ρ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π² ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ Π°Π²ΡΠΎΡΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ Π²ΡΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Ρ-Π»ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Ρ, ΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ΅ ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΠΎΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»ΡΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Ρ, Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΡΠΉ ΡΠΎΡΡ (ΡΠ½ΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅) ΡΠ΅ΠΉΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠΌ Π¦Π£Π . ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅ΠΏΠ΅Π½ΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ Π±ΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ Π΄Π»Ρ Π²ΡΡΠ²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅Π½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ², ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅Ρ
Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠ², ΠΎΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»ΡΡΡΠΈΡ
Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π¦Π£Π ΡΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈ, ΠΈ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ Π² ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ. Π Π΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ Π€Π΅Π΄Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΡ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±Π°ΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΈΡ
ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
, ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»ΡΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΡΠ΅Π² ΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ, ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈ ΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΡΠΈΠΏΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ΠΉ
Farmers' decisions to cultivate either a traditional or a commercial variety of quinoa. (CAPRi Project)
The dataset includes data about a field experiment conducted in Peru in september 2012 (project CAPRi). The game was framed around farmers βdecisions to cultivate either a traditional or a commercial variety of quinoa. The objective of the experiment was to analyze the effectiveness of two types of payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services (PACS) as well as of the effect of allowing farmers to communicate. In the game, the rewards were introduced to conserve a safe minimal population of traditional variety. Nine sessions were organized in different communities of the Province of Puno (close to lake Titicaca). The data were collected during a framed field experiment. Subjects participated in a game (experimental economics) where they were assigned 4 units of land and they had to decide whether to grow a traditional or a commercial variety of quinoa on each of these plots. Each participant was randomly assigned to a group of 4 players. At the end, they received money according to their decisions and the ones of their group peers. This was done to encourage them to act as in real-life situations where their decisions impact their income. They also received money for their participation. Each session was organized with 16 or 20 farm household participants (most of them producing quinoa) originating from the same community. In total, 176 farmers took part to the experiment. Finally a brief survey was completed, including questions about household demographics, farming, as well as organizational affiliation and social distance between participants. There are therefore three types of data in this dataset: 1) identification number (player's number, group's number, session's number, etc...) 2) the decisions of the players during the game (contrib, contrib_group, threshold, etc...) and 3) socio-demographic data from the survey (age, sex, ...)
Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action
Pre-print of author's paper will be available after embargo period of 12 months (Dec 2016)
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