Rezension: Graycar, Adam (Ed.) (2020): Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration

Das Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration wird ein zentrales neues Nachschlagewerk sein für Wissenschaftler*innen, die öffentliche Verwaltungsforschung und Korruptionsstudien zu verbinden suchen. Der Band befasst sich mit dem Kontext der öffentlichen Verwaltung, seinem Wandel und den jeweiligen Auswirkungen auf Korruptionsrisiken; er untersucht Korruptionsfragen nach Politikfeldern und bietet damit einen neuartigen, von der Politik- und Verwaltungsforschung inspirierten Ansatz für Korruptionsstudien; er bietet eine internationale Übersicht von Anti-Korruptionsreformen aus zwölf Ländern; und er endet mit innovativen Diskussionen zu Erfahrungswerten und Erfolgsfaktoren der Korruptionsbekämpfung sowie mit Schlüsselkonzepten wie "Interessenkonflikten" und "Integrität" in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Das Handbuch entwickelt abschließend Vorschläge, wie die Korruptions- und öffentliche Verwaltungsforschung sich gegenseitig weiter inspirieren und informieren können, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Messung von Korruption und die Auswirkungen von institutionellen Arrangements und Managementpraktiken in der öffentlichen Verwaltung

Governance by discretion: Civil service reform in post-communist Hungary.

This thesis analyses civil service reform and policy developments in Hungary since 1990 as an extreme case of the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de-politicised civil services and the persisting politicisation of personnel policy in post-communist central executives. At the theoretical level, it applies the insights of new institutionalist approaches to executive politics, in particular the body of so-called 'delegation studies' rooted in the new economics of organisations. The thesis develops four ideal types of personnel policy regimes that are distinguished on the basis of the concept of formal political discretion, which is defined as the extent to which the government of the day, or its ministers, has the possibility to exercise personnel policy authority and the extent to which the exercise of this authority is subject to specific procedural constraints. The thesis argues that a low degree of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation can enhance the informational role of ministerial bureaucracies in policy-making. However, governments do only have an incentive to establish or maintain a low degree of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation, if they have no problems of political trust towards the bureaucracy. The empirical analysis of civil service reform outcomes in Hungary reveals that three reforms since 1990 have led to the emergence of a personnel policy regime that allows governments to exercise a considerable degree of political discretion over personnel policy, in particular, the allocation of civil servants in managerial ranks. The analysis of civil service reform processes shows that the communist legacy of over-politicised personnel policy, the radical anti-communism of centre-right parties and four wholesale changes of government since 1990 have tended to reproduce severe problems of political trust in the relation between governments and the ministerial bureaucracy. The thesis shows that incoming governments have therefore continuously exercised political discretion over personnel policy, in particular, by recruiting (often politically affiliated) senior personnel from outside public administration. At the same time, successive governments have been unwilling to make a commitment to a de-politicised civil service system because of their distrust in the loyalty of bureaucrats associated with previous governments. Moreover, as the group of senior bureaucrats who seek a career in public administration has shrunk, the de-politicisation of the civil service has increasingly come to contradict the career interest of senior bureaucrats whose tenure is bound to that of the government and who commute between public administration, politics and the private sector. Setting Hungarian civil service reform and policy developments into a comparative post-communist perspective, the thesis concludes that the context of post-communist transformation tends to lock in a pattern of civil service governance characterised by high levels of political discretion

The Europeanisation of national political systems : Parliaments and executives

This article reviews the by now extensive literature on the Europeanisation of the political systems of the EU-15, with an emphasis on parliaments and executives (i.e., governments and ministerial administrations). The Living Review highlights apparently contradictory effects of integration: de-parlamentarisation vs. re-parlamentarisation; bureaucratisation vs. politicisation; and centralisation vs. diffusion. These diverging assessments of the effects of integration do, in part, reflect diversity in the EU-15; in part, they are, however, also a result of differences in the specification of variables, research designs and theoretical approaches. Work that inquires into patterns of Europeanisation – across institutional domains, countries, regions and time – and which seeks to tackle the ‘methodological nationalism’ of the Europeanisation literature promises a clearer picture of the institutional consequences of European integration than we possess at present

Hidden costs of cuts: austerity, civil service management and the motivation of public officials in Central and Eastern Europe after the crisis

The implementation of austerity measures presents a dilemma for governments. While austerity measures such as cutbacks aim to reduce costs and enhance public sector efficiency, the same measures might undermine the motivation of employees and, consequently, the prospects of effectively implementing austerity programmes. Based on a survey of ministerial officials in Poland and Latvia, this article finds that the scale of cutbacks explains a larger decline of staff motivation in Latvia than in Poland. The article further shows that motivation was more likely to decrease after the crisis if austerity measures involved cutbacks such as staff reductions, recruitment freezes, and a reduction of training opportunities

Interpreting Survey Findings:Can Survey Results Be Compared across Organizations and Countries?

With the rise in worldwide efforts to understand public administration by surveying civil servants, issues of survey question comparability become paramount Surveys can rarely be understood in a void but rather require benchmarks and points of reference However, it is not clear whether survey questions, even when phrased and structured in the same manner, measure the same concepts in the same way and, therefore, can be compared For multiple reasons, including work environment, adaptive expectations, and cultural factors, different people might understand the same question in differentways and adjust their answers accordingly This might make survey results incomparable, not only across countries but also across different groups of civil servants within a national public administration This chapter uses results from seven public service surveys from across Europe, Latin America, and South Asia to investigate the extent to which the same survey questions measure the same concepts similarly—that is, are measurement invariant—using as an example questions related to transformational leadership To ascertain measurement invariance, models of a hypothesized relationship between questions measuring transformational leadership are compared across countries, as well as alonggender, educational, and organizational lines within countries Solid evidence of metric invariance and tentative evidence of scalar invariance is found in cross-country comparisons Moreover, factor loadings can be judged equal (metric invariance) across gender, education level, and organization in most countries, as can latent factor means (scalar invariance) Our results suggest that groups of public servants within countries delineated, for instance, by gender, education, or organization—can typically be benchmarked without invariance concerns Across countries, evidence for valid benchmarking that is, scalar invariance is strongest for countries in similar regions and at similar income levels It isweaker—though still suggestive—when comparing all countries in the sample Our chapter concludes that less culturally contingent concepts may be plausibly benchmarked with care across countries

Exit, Voice, and Sabotage:Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals

Democratic backsliding has multiplied “unprincipled” political principals: governments with weak commitment to the public interest. Why do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guerrilla sabotage to thwart policies against the public interest under “unprincipled principals,” yet others do not? Despite its centrality in contemporary governance, this conundrum has not seen quantitative research. We address this gap with survey evidence from 1,700 Brazilian public servants during the Temer Presidency, widely perceived to lack democratic legitimacy and integrity. We focus on one key explanator: public service motivation (PSM). We argue that bureaucrats with greater PSM are more likely to engage in voice and sabotage of “unprincipled policies,” and exit to avoid implementing “unprincipled policies.” Structural equation models support these hypotheses. Public service-motivated bureaucracies are thus short-run stalwarts against “unprincipled” political principals. Over time, they look to depart, however, leaving “unprincipled” principals a freer hand to pursue policies against the public interest

Civil service managament and corruption: what we know and what we don't

Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies – 36 in total – that do address civil service management and anti-corruption. It finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption relates to other established public personnel management areas – such as distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability practices – is largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper understanding of corruption, and how to curb it

Civil service management in developing countries: what works?: evidence from a survey with 23,000 civil servants in Africa, Asia, Eastn Europe and Latin America

Civil servants are central to effective governance in developing countries. They deliver essential services to citizens, commission infrastructure, regulate economic activity and engage in diplomacy with foreign countries – to name just a few tasks. This puts a premium on understanding how to manage civil servants in developing countries effectively. Yet, to-date, there are scarcely any quantitative studies which deliver robust findings across developing countries – let alone regions – on what works in civil service management. To address this gap, this report draws on data from an original survey of 23,000 civil servants in ten countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America – the, to our knowledge, largest original cross-country survey of civil servants ever conducted in the developing world