Editorial: The impact of alcohol and drugs on suspects', victims' and witnesses' cognition and memory

In many societies around the world, alcohol and other drug use and abuse pose major health and safety problems. There is a clear link between alcohol consumption and lack of impulse control and an increased risk of violence, which leads to a high prevalence of intoxicated victims, witnesses, and suspects—especially in relation to violent crimes. Although recent years have seen an increase in applied research on the acute effects of alcohol and other drugs on memory and cognition, especially on the topic of eyewitness memory, there are still many gaps in our knowledge. Indeed, more research is needed to further disentangle the often-complex effects of alcohol and other drugs, especially in applied forensic contexts, such as witness and suspect investigative interviewing

Boundary restriction for negative emotional images is an example of memory amplification

We investigated whether boundary restriction—misremembering proximity to traumatic stimuli—is a form of memory amplification and whether re-experiencing trauma plays a role in boundary restriction errors. In four experiments, subjects viewed a series of traumatic photographs. Later, subjects identified the photographs they originally saw among distracters that could be identical, close-up, or wide-angled versions of the same photographs. Subjects also completed measures of mood, analogue PTSD symptoms, phenomenological experience of intrusions, and processing style. Across experiments, subjects were more likely to incorrectly remember the photographs as having extended boundaries: boundary extension. Despite this tendency, the extent to which subjects re-experienced traumatic aspects of the photographs predicted how often they incorrectly remembered the photographs as having narrower boundaries: boundary restriction. Our data suggest that although boundary extension is more common, boundary restriction is related to individual differences in coping mechanisms post-trauma. These results have theoretical implications for understanding how people remember trauma.Australian Research Council ARC DP14010266

Metacognitive and metamemory beliefs in the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder

Can metacognition increase trauma sufferers’ risk for developing and maintaining posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)? We assessed the role of a range of cognitive and metacognitive belief domains—including metamemory—on PTSD symptoms. Adult participants reported their existing meta/cognitions and lifetime exposure to trauma, then 12 weeks later, they reported meta/cognitions and PTSD symptoms in relation to new trauma exposure since the initial assessment. Participants with more PTSD symptoms held more problematic metacognitions than participants with fewer distress symptoms. Moreover, people who endorsed maladaptive metacognitions before trauma exposure were more likely to experience symptoms of PTSD after exposure. Metacognition predicted the maintenance of elevated PTSD symptoms over the 12-week delay. Our findings support the metacognitive model of PTSD and highlight the importance of metamemory, an understudied factor in PTSD research

Meta-awareness and the involuntary memory spectrum: Reply to Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015)

© 2015 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In their commentary, Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) raise several important issues about the definitions, characteristics and applications of various involuntary cognitive phenomena. Here we respond to the comments of Meyer et al. in ways that we hope will advance understanding of these issues, and inform future research. In particular, we have focused on the characteristics of involuntary phenomena—particularly in relation to meta-awareness—and the clinical relevance of mind-wandering

Current PTSD symptomatology distorts memory for past symptoms

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 12 month embargo from date of publication (February 2019) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyClinicians often rely on clients’ retrospective reports of past symptoms to diagnose and treat Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). However, there is limited research investigating memory for past PTSD symptoms. We asked sexual assault survivors to report their PTSD symptoms and then recall them 6 months later. Overall, symptom recall was consistent with initial reports. However, after dividing participants into PTSD-positive and negative groups, we found that people who were PTSD-negative at follow-up underestimated past PTSD symptom severity while people who were PTSD-positive overestimated past symptoms. For example, 2.8% of PTSD-negative participants versus 15.9% of PTSD-positive participants recalled experiencing 20+ more points on the PCL-5 at follow-up than at initial assessment. Further, people who adjusted over time greatly underestimated past symptoms unlike those who remained PTSD-positive. Our findings have important theoretical and clinical implications because they show that current symptom severity may influence the memory reconstruction of prior levels of adjustment

Explaining Memory Amplification: Is It All About the Test Format?

Takarangi, M. K. T., Oulton, J. M., & Strange, D. (2017). Explaining Memory Amplification: Is It All About the Test Format? Clinical Psychological Science, 6(3), 394–406. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617744326 which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617744326 Copyright © 2018 The Authors. DOI: 10.1177/2167702617744326Trauma-exposed people commonly exhibit a “memory amplification” effect, endorsing exposure to more traumatic events over time. Studies reporting this phenomenon have typically relied on checklists, where participants read event descriptions and indicate (yes/no) their exposure. We examined whether that approach is vulnerable to response biases and memory errors. In two experiments, participants viewed negative photos and completed an Old-New recognition test. In Experiment 1, participants completed either a photo recognition test or description test—composed of written descriptions of negative photos. In Experiment 2, we measured analogue PTSD symptoms and participants completed the description test twice, 24 hr apart. Those in the description test condition performed worse on the memory test and were more biased to endorse negative photos compared with the photo test condition. Furthermore, this bias to endorse negative photos increased over time and was related to analogue PTSD symptoms. Overall, our findings suggest that test format plays a role in memory amplification

An experimental examination of the effects of alcohol consumption and exposure to misleading post event information on remembering a hypothetical rape scenario

We experimentally examined the effects of alcohol consumption and exposure to misleading post event information on memory for a hypothetical interactive rape scenario. We used a 2 beverage (alcohol versus tonic water) x 2 expectancy (told alcohol versus told tonic) factorial design. Participants (N = 80) were randomly assigned to conditions. They consumed alcohol (mean BAC = .06%) or tonic water before engaging in the scenario. Alcohol expectancy was controlled by telling participants they were consuming alcohol or tonic water alone, irrespective of the actual beverage they were consuming. Approximately a week later, participants were exposed to a misleading post event narrative and then recalled the scenario and took a recognition test. Participants who were told that they had consumed alcohol rather than tonic reported fewer correct details; but, they were no more likely to report incorrect or misleading information. The confidence-accuracy relationship for control and misled items was similar across groups, and there was some evidence that metacognitive discrimination was better for participants who were told that they had consumed alcohol compared to those told they had tonic water. Implications for interviewing rape victims are discussed

Do meta-cognitive beliefs affect meta-awareness of intrusive thoughts about trauma?

© 2016 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Background and Objectives People exposed to trauma often experience intrusive thoughts and memories about that event. Research examining people's responses to trauma assumes that people can accurately notice the occurrence of symptoms. However, we know from the broader cognitive literature on ‘mind-wandering’ that people are not always aware of their current focus of attention. That lack of awareness has implications for our theoretical and practical understanding of how trauma survivors recover from their experience. In the current study we investigated whether people's meta-cognitive beliefs about controlling trauma-related intrusions influenced the occurrence and meta-awareness of those intrusions. Methods We recruited participants who scored high (strong beliefs) or low (weak beliefs) on beliefs regarding the importance of controlling intrusive thoughts. Participants viewed a trauma film then—during a subsequent reading task—reported any film-related intrusions they noticed. We also intermittently asked half the participants to report what they were thinking at that particular moment, to “catch” intrusions without meta-awareness. Results People are not always aware of their trauma intrusions, and importantly, people with strong beliefs are more likely to notice trauma related intrusions both with and without meta-awareness than people with weak beliefs. Limitations We used an analogue trauma, and focused on a particular metacognitive belief, both of which somewhat limit generalizability. We also cannot definitively rule out demand effects. Conclusions Our data add to existing research showing people may lack meta-awareness of trauma-related thoughts, and suggest that survivors with particular metacognitive characteristics may be more vulnerable to ‘mind-wandering’ about trauma without awareness

Trauma-related versus positive involuntary thoughts with and without meta-awareness

© 2016 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In earlier work, we asked subjects to report involuntary thoughts relating to a trauma film and also probed subjects periodically. Subjects often reported involuntary thoughts in response to probes, suggesting they lacked meta-awareness of those thoughts. But it is possible that some or all probe-detected thoughts were continuations of thoughts subjects had spontaneously reported, leading us to overestimate involuntary thoughts lacking meta-awareness. It is also unclear whether failures in meta-awareness occur for other emotional events. We exposed subjects to a negative or positive film. Subsequently, they reported involuntary film-related thoughts and responded to probes that distinguished new from continuing thoughts. Many (54%) but not all probe-caught thoughts were thought continuations. This result supports our earlier finding that people can lack meta-awareness for trauma-related thoughts, but suggests caution in how meta-awareness is assessed. We also found that self-caught negative and positive involuntary thoughts occurred at a similar frequency, with different characteristics