Cache-aware static scheduling for hard real-time multicore systems based on communication affinities

The growing need for continuous processing capabilities has led to the development of multicore systems with a complex cache hierarchy. Such multicore systems are generally designed for improving the performance in average case, while hard real-time systems must consider worst-case scenarios. An open challenge is therefore to efficiently schedule hard real-time tasks on a multicore architecture. In this work, we propose a mathematical formulation for computing a static scheduling that minimize L1 data cache misses between hard real-time tasks on a multicore architecture using communication affinities

Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data

Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont soit monétaires (amendes, primes d'assurance), soit non monétaires (permis à points). Nous utilisons des données québécoises couvrant une période allant de 1983 à 1996 pour analyser l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous analysons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement. Nous comparons l'efficacité globale des différents mécanismes incitatifs et nous relions les résultats obtenus avec les propriétés de la relation entre l'effort de conduite prudente et le risque d'infractions. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions.

A Reduced Form Model of Default Spreads with Markov-Switching Macroeconomic Factors

An important research area of the corporate yield spread literature seeks to measure the proportion of the spread that can be explained by factors such as the possibility of default, liquidity, tax differentials and market risk. We contribute to this literature by assessing the ability of observed macroeconomic factors and the possibility of changes in regime to explain the proportion of yield spreads caused by the risk of default in the context of a reduced form model. For this purpose, we extend the Markov Switching risk-free term structure model of Bansal and Zhou (2002) to the corporate bond setting and develop recursive formulas for default probabilities, risk-free and risky zero-coupon bond yields as well as credit default swap premia. The model is calibrated with consumption, inflation, risk-free yields and default data for Aa, A and Baa bonds from the 1987-2008 period. We find that our macroeconomic factors are linked with two out of three sharp increases in the spreads during this sample period, indicating that the variations can be related to macroeconomic undiversifiable risk. The estimated default spreads can explain almost half of the 10 years to maturity industrial Baa zero-coupon yields in some regime. Much smaller proportions are found for Aa and A bonds with numbers around 10%. The proportions of default estimated with credit default swaps are higher, in many cases doubling those found with corporate yield spreads.Credit spread, default spread, Markov switching, macroeconomic factors, reduced form model of default, random subjective discount factor, credit default swap, CDS

Default Risk in Corporate Yield Spreads

An important research question examined in the recent credit risk literature focuses on the proportion of corporate yield spreads which can be attributed to default risk. Past studies have verified that only a small fraction of the spreads can be explained by default risk. In this paper, we reexamine this topic in the light of the different issues associated with the computation of transition and default probabilities obained with historical rating transition data. One significant finding of our research is that the estimated default-risk proportion of corporate yield spreads in highly sensitive to the term structure of the default probabilities estimated for each rating class. Moreover, this proportion can become a large fraction of the yield spread when sensitivity analyses are made with respect to recovery rates, default cycles in the economy, and information considered in the historical rating transition data.Credit risk, default risk, corporate yield spread, transition matrix, default probability, Moody's, Standard and Poor's, recovery rate, data filtration, default cycle

A Reduced Form Model of Default Spreads with Markov Switching Macroeconomic Factors

An important research area of the corporate yield spread literature seeks to measure the proportion of the spread explained by factors such as the possibility of default, liquidity or tax differentials. We contribute to this literature by assessing the ability of observed macroeconomic factors and the possibility of changes in regime to explain the proportion in yield spreads caused by the risk of default in the context of a reduced form model. For this purpose, we extend the Markov Switching risk-free term structure model of Bansal ad Zhou (2002) to the corporate bond setting and develop recursive formulas for default probabilities, risk-free and risky zero-coupon bond yields. The model is calibrated out of sample with consumption, inflation, risk-free yield and default data over the 1987-1996 period. Our results indicate that inflation is a key factor to consider for explaining default spreads during our sample period. We also find that the estimated default spreads can explain up to half of the 10 year to maturity Baa zero-coupon yield in certain regime with different sensitivities to consumption and inflation through time.Credit spread, default spread, Markov Switching, macroeconomic factors, reduced form model of default

Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data (revised version)

Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving. These mechanisms are both monetary (fines, insurance premiums) and nonmonetary (point-record driving licenses). We analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are then tested empirically in a model which separates moral hazard from unobserved heterogeneity. We do not reject the presence of moral hazard in the Quebec public insurance regime. Moreover, we verify that the experience rating introduced in 1992 did reduce the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. Lastly, we compare the effectiveness of the different incentive schemes and we derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions.Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont, soit monétaires (amendes, primes d'assurance), soit non monétaires (permis à points). Nous analysons l'efficacité de ces mécanismes dans l'incitation à une conduite prudente. Nous déterminons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement dans un modèle qui sépare l'aléa moral de l'hétérogénéité inobservée. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Enfin, nous comparons l'efficacité globale de ces différents mécanismes incitatifs et nous calculons des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les suspensions de permis

Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data

International audienceRoad safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving. Examples of mechanisms are fines, experience rating and point-record driving licenses. We analyse the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful because they are at threat of losing their license. The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use this result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions.Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont par exemple des amendes, des primes d'assurance ou des permis à points. Nous analysons l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous obtenons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement avec des données issues du système public d'assurance au Québec. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données, qui traduit le fait que les conducteurs qui accumulent les points deviennent plus prudents car ils sont plus sous risque de perdre leur permis. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Nous utilisons ce résultat pour calculer des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les retraits de permis

Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data

Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving. Examples of mechanisms are fines, experience rating and point-record driving licenses. We analyse the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful because they are at threat of losing their license. The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use this result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions.Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont par exemple des amendes, des primes d'assurance ou des permis à points. Nous analysons l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous obtenons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement avec des données issues du système public d'assurance au Québec. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données, qui traduit le fait que les conducteurs qui accumulent les points deviennent plus prudents car ils sont plus sous risque de perdre leur permis. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Nous utilisons ce résultat pour calculer des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les retraits de permis