Kingmakers or Cheerleaders? Party Power and the Causal Effects of Endorsements

When parties make endorsements in primary elections, does the favored candidate receive a real boost in his or her vote share, or do parties simply pick the favorites who are already destined to win? To answer this question, we draw on two research designs aimed at isolating the causal effect of Democratic Party endorsements in California’s 2012 primary election. First, we conduct a survey experiment in which we randomly assign a party endorsement, holding all other aspects of a candidate’s background and policy positions constant. Second, we use a unique dataset to implement a regression discontinuity analysis of electoral trends by comparing the vote shares captured by candidates who barely won or barely lost the internal party endorsement contest. We find a constellation of evidence suggesting that endorsements do indeed matter, although this effect appears to be contingent upon the type of candidate and voter: endorsements matter most for candidates in their party’s mainstream, and for voters who identify with that party and for independents. The magnitude of their impact is dramatically smaller than might be estimated from research designs less attuned to recent advances in causal inference

Analytical calculation of the solid angle subtended by a circular disc detector at a point cosine source

We derive analytical expressions for the solid angle subtended by a circular disc at a point source with cosine angular distribution ($f(\mu)=\mu/\pi$)under the sole condition that the disc lies in the half-space illuminated by the source ($\mu \geq 0$). The expressions are given with reference to two alternative coordinate systems (S and S'), S being such that the z axis is parallel to the symmetry axis of the disc and S' such that the $z'$ axis is aligned with the source direction. Sample plots of the expressions are presented.Comment: 12 pages, 10 figures, LaTex12 pages, 10 figures, LaTex. Minor changes from previous version: references added, english reshaping, the phrase "If beta=0.." (pag. 5 near eq. 20 in the old version) was corrected to "If beta=pi/2..

Solid angle subtended by a cylindrical detector at a point source in terms of elliptic integrals

The solid angle subtended by a right circular cylinder at a point source located at an arbitrary position generally consists of a sum of two terms: that defined by the cylindrical surface ($\Omega_{cyl}$) and the other by either of the end circles ($\Omega_{circ}$). We derive an expression for $\Omega_{cyl}$ in terms of elliptic integrals of the first and third kinds and give similar expressions for $\Omega_{circ}$ using integrals of the first and second kinds. These latter can be used alternatively to an expression also in terms of elliptic integrals, due to Philip A. Macklin and included as a footnote in Masket (Rev. Sci. Instr., 28 (3), 191-197, 1957). The solid angle subtended by the whole cylinder when the source is located at an arbitrary location can then be calculated using elliptic integrals.Comment: 10 pages, 3 figures, LaTex. Typos corrected. References added. Accepted in Rad. Phys. Che

Analytical calculation of the solid angle defined by a cylindrical detector and a point cosine source with orthogonal axes

We derive analytical expressions for the solid angle subtended by a right circular cylinder at a point source with cosine angular distribution in the case where the source and the cylinder axes are mutually orthogonal.Comment: 19 pages, 13 figures, Latex. Typos corrected. Accepted in Rad. Phys. Che

The Populist Paradox: A Critical Framework Proposal

Donald Trump’s presidency has undeniably reignited academic interest in understanding the populist phenomenon and its political implications. Trumpian politics are frequently considered to be a stark departure from status quo politics, in favor of a radical right populism. Yet, the Trump presidency and populist theory itself poses a key contradiction, namely a populist paradox. I will propose a critical framework to understand populism as a mechanism of political power by the liberal state. In What is Populism?, Jan-Werner Müller identifies a contradictory nature to populism, as it often perpetuates the same political problems that the populist politics sought to replace. How could populist ideology, which is lauded as recognizing the systematic failures of the liberal state, also be a mechanism for its continued control? This paradox requires a theoretical framework to explain and unpack its implications. The seminal work of political philosopher Michel Foucault has immense explanatory power for this paradox when utilized as a conceptual framework. Populism ideology functions as a democratic justification for the maintenance of status-quo politics, which ultimately reproduces state power. I intend to develop a theoretical contribution to radical right populism studies, especially in regard to Trumpism in the United States. Interpreting Foucault’s state power theories, this article applies the key concepts of power-knowledge, domination, and governmentality to populism studies

PARTISAN WEBS: INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND PARTY NETWORKS

What is a party? We argue that the formal party apparatus is only one part of an extended network of interest groups, media, 527s, and candidates. We systematically measure a portion of this network by tracking transfers of names between political organizations. Our analysis reveals two distinct and polarized networks corresponding to a more liberal Democratic group and a more conservative Republican group. Formal party organizations, like the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee, tend to receive information within their respective networks, which suggests that other groups serve to funnel information toward the formal party

527 Committees and the Political Party Network

We investigate the links between 527s and other political organizations through the employment histories of 527 staff. We find that 527s are highly central to modern political party networks and are in positions to facilitate coordination within a party and to employ key party personnel. Further, we find important differences between the networks charted out by the two major parties. The Republican Party, the majority party during the period under study, had a more hierarchical network than the Democratic Party did

Healing the Rift? Social Networks and Reconciliation between Obama and Clinton Delegates in 2008

Which factors allowed the Democratic Party to heal the rift created by the 2008 presidential nominating campaign? Using original data from surveys of 449 pledged delegates at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, this research examines the conditions under which the delegates for one candidate embrace the opposing candidate. Specifically, when do delegates for Barack Obama embrace Hillary Clinton, and vice versa? The results demonstrate that Clinton delegates’ network centrality in the convention caucus network exacerbates, rather than heals, the rift in the party. Clinton delegates’ friendship networks perpetuate the rift when they are homophilous, but contribute to healing when they are heterophilous. Network effects influence the attitudes of Clinton delegates toward Obama, but not the perspective of Obama delegates toward Clinton. Experience with party institutions and views on intra-party democracy contribute to healing the rift for both sets of delegates. Clinton’s endorsement of Obama moved Obama’s delegates in her direction, but failed to sway her own supporters. Hypotheses for overembeddedness and cross-cutting networks are supported in the data, but a strict social-capital view of networks is not supported

Networking the Parties: A Comparative Study of Democratic and Republican Convention Delegates in 2008

Parties‐as‐networks is an emerging approach to understanding American political parties as decentralized, nonhierarchical, fluid systems with porous boundaries of a wide array of actors. Parties‐asnetworks include interest groups, social movements, political consultants, and advocacy organizations, in additional to the usual suspects of elected officials, party officials, and citizen‐activists. This approach ameliorates several deficits of the traditional, tripartite view of parties in government, in elections, and as organizations. The authors apply the parties‐as‐networks approach using data from surveys of delegates at the 2008 Democratic and Republican national conventions. Analysis of delegates’ memberships in a wide variety of organizations demonstrates that Democrats have larger networks than do Republicans; Republican networks tend more toward hierarchy than do Democratic networks; and the content of Democratic networks is tilted toward labor and identity organizations, while Republican networks are more populated by civic, religious, ideological, and professional organizations. The parties‐as‐networks view is a potentially revealing source of insight on the dynamic evolution of party coalitions. Theoretically, approaching parties as networks deepens the understanding of how intermediary institutions matter to the functioning of democratic politics