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# Healing the Rift?

Social Networks and Reconciliation between  
Obama and Clinton Convention Delegates in 2008

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**Abstract:** Which factors allowed the Democratic Party to heal the rift created by the 2008 presidential nominating campaign? Using original data from surveys of 449 pledged delegates at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, this research examines the conditions under which the delegates for one candidate embrace the opposing candidate. Specifically, when do delegates for Barack Obama embrace Hillary Clinton, and vice versa? The results demonstrate that Clinton delegates' network centrality in the convention caucus network exacerbates, rather than heals, the rift in the party. Clinton delegates' friendship networks perpetuate the rift when they are homophilous, but contribute to healing when they are heterophilous. Network effects influence the attitudes of Clinton delegates toward Obama, but not the perspective of Obama delegates toward Clinton. Experience with party institutions and views on intra-party democracy contribute to healing the rift for both sets of delegates. Clinton's endorsement of Obama moved Obama's delegates in her direction, but failed to sway her own supporters. Hypotheses for overembeddedness and cross-cutting networks are supported in the data, but a strict social-capital view of networks is not supported.

**Keywords:** 2008 Democratic National Convention, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Party Unity, Social Networks, Party Institutions, Intra-party Democracy

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*Whether you voted for me, or voted for Barack, the time is now to unite as a single party with a single purpose. We are on the same team, and none of us can sit on the sidelines. This is a fight for the future. And it's a fight we must win.*

Hillary Rodham Clinton (2008)

The above words, spoken by Hillary Clinton on stage at the Democratic National Convention, aimed to fulfill the fundamental task faced by the Democratic Party in the 2008 election: to unite the party in the wake of an historic, yet divisive, nomination battle. The candidacies of Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama represented the first time that either a woman and or an African American, respectively, had come within striking distance of the presidential nomination of a major political party in the United States. Obama won a close, but decisive, victory, with approximately 2,158.5 delegates to approximately 1,920 delegates for Clinton (*New York Times* 2008). As the acrimonious battle for the nomination dragged on past Super Tuesday and into the spring, however, the emergence of hard feelings between the competing camps led to worries that the party might not be able to reconcile its differences during the general election campaign (Jacoby and Farnam 2008). If the party were to split into enduring factions led by its two largest constituencies – African Americans and women – overcoming collective action problems in future elections could prove to be especially difficult (Reiter 1980, 2004). A key question for Democrats, then, was how to heal the rift in the party? What factors would bring Clinton supporters into the Obama fold? What would allow Obama supporters to accept Clinton supporters' role within the party?

Social networks help to resolve conflicts, build trust, and establish social capital (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert 2004; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Putnam 2000; Siegel 2009). Networks are a critical part of a political party's structure that creates informal linkages between elements of its decentralized organization (Grossman and Dominguez 2009; Koger, Masket and Noel 2009; Heaney and Rojas 2007; Monroe 2001; Schwartz 1990). If networks are imbued with the capacity for conflict resolution, then parties should be able to draw upon networks in addressing internal factional disputes. Is it possible that networks could serve as mechanism to unite the warring factions of the Democratic Party?

Just as networks contain the elements needed to resolve conflicts, they have the potential to solidify cliques and exacerbate factionalism. If networks are drawn within a relatively close cluster of people, they may promote inter-group rivalry and conflict (Crossley 2008). Third-person connections in networks have the potential to stimulate the exchange of angry words, foster distrust, and lead to character assassination (Burt 2005). When individuals become overembedded in networks, the marginal effect of networks may prove negative, serving to crowd out information and limit contacts rather than expanding them (Hagedoorn and Frankort 2008; Uzzi 1997). Is it possible that this so-called "dark side" of networks may serve to perpetuate the rift within the party instead of healing it?

This research investigates the effects of social networks on the intra-party conflict within the Democratic Party in 2008. Drawing upon a sample of 449 pledged delegates at the 2008 Democratic National Convention (227 Obama delegates and 222 Clinton delegates), we ask two questions. First, under what conditions were Clinton delegates

satisfied with Obama and did they plan to give him their active support? Second, under what conditions did Obama delegates recognize and accept the role of Clinton delegates at the convention? In addressing these questions, we consider the role social networks, experience with party institutions, views on intra-party democracy, and the effect of Hillary Clinton's speech endorsing Obama. We control for demographic factors including race, sex, sexual identity, age, ideology, education, income, union membership, and religiosity.

This paper proceeds in five parts. First, we discuss the problem of divisive nomination contests and their implications for candidates in the general election. Second, we consider the alternative possibilities for social networks as sources of unity and division. Third, we outline the steps taken to collect and analyze data from delegates at the 2008 Democratic National Convention. Fourth, we present the results of our data analysis, including estimates of ordered probit and tobit regressions. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for social networks and the study of political parties.

### **Divisive Nominations and the General Election**

The contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton was the most recent in a long history of bitterly fought nomination campaigns. In 1968, the Democratic Party found itself immersed in crisis as it attempted to choose between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Eugene McCarthy in the midst of the Vietnam War, President Johnson's withdrawal from the race, and the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. In 1976, the Republicans suffered a crisis of confidence after Watergate, as they chose

between sitting President Gerald Ford and former California Governor Ronald Reagan. In 1980, the Democrats were again weakened by international conflict – this time in Iran – leading to a hard-fought battle between sitting President Jimmy Carter and Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy. Just four years later, the Democratic Party’s national convention was again marred by factionalism when a prolonged campaign by Colorado Senator Gary Hart threatened to derail the presumed nomination of former Vice President Walter Mondale. In each of these instances, a divisive nomination contest preceded a loss by the party in the general election.

The divisive nomination hypothesis, first advanced by Key (1958), maintains that a party achieves less success in a general election campaign if it has experienced a divisive campaign for the nomination. Herrera (1993, p. 76) explains that divisiveness makes it harder for a party to present “programmatically clear alternatives” to voters. Lingle, Owen, and Sooner (1995) demonstrate that divisiveness is more of a problem for the Democratic Party than for the Republicans, due to the party’s pluralistic base, cross-cutting factions, and comparatively heterogeneous ideological makeup. Their analysis of state-level elections from 1932 to 1992 shows that “Democrats *lose* 88% of divisive primary states, but *win* 69% of the nondivisive primary and 74% of caucus states” (Lingle et al., 1995, pp. 378-379, emphasis in original).

Part of the reason why divided nominations hurt the party may be a negative “carryover effect” from primaries and caucuses to the general election (Buell 1986; Stone 1984, 1986). Activists who supported a losing candidate are less likely to devote their energies to the victory of the party’s nominee in the fall. When nomination contests persist for a long time, as was true for the Obama-Clinton match-up, “the psychological

investment each delegate has in his/her candidate” increases, making it “more difficult for losers to accept the convention outcome and recommit their energies to the winner” (Sullivan 1977-1978, p. 637; see also Kenney and Rice 1987). Offering the vice presidency to the second-place candidate may be a way of assuaging her or his supporters and trying to mobilize them in the general election. The fact that Obama did not offer the vice presidency to Clinton, however, foreclosed one path toward factional healing in 2008.

Divisive nomination campaigns do not occur randomly. Campaigns may be divisive because the nominee is weak, which is potentially the ultimate source of demobilization and loss in the general election (Atkeson 1998; Stone, Atkeson, and Rapoport 1992). Thus, even if divisiveness does not directly undermine a party’s chances, it may do so indirectly by signaling to relevant observers – the media, the other party, and voters – that a candidate is vulnerable to challenge. A contest of symbolic interpretation naturally ensues (Edelman 1988). If Obama is such a strong presidential candidate, then why did he lose to Clinton in West Virginia, Kentucky, and South Dakota, even after he clinched the nomination? Perhaps there are lingering doubts about Obama’s leadership? His experience? Or, perhaps, this is strictly a case of two phenomenal candidates competing head to head. The truth is a matter of spin.

Regardless of whether the source of divisiveness is a weak frontrunner or two strong, equally-matched contenders, it is in the interests of the party to heal the rift in the party and bring the contending factions together for a common purpose. Party unity facilitates the efficient allocation of party resources (material and immaterial) and avoids distracting media attention. Obama and the Democrats ultimately won the 2008 election.

However, it is easy to see how they might not have. If a foreign policy crisis, rather than an economic crisis, had surfaced in September 2008, McCain might have gained a valence advantage over Obama in the presidential debates. If Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin had succeeded in reaching out to women on a bipartisan basis, then she might have been able to attract some of Clinton's supporters to the Republican ticket. Under these conditions, the 2008 election might have been as close at the 2000 and 2004 elections, leaving the Democrats searching for all the unity they could find. In the following section, we weigh whether social networks were likely to be a source of that unity, or a source of further division.

### **Social Networks, Unity, and Division**

American political parties are neither hierarchical nor centrally organized. Rather, as Sorauf (1968, pp. 11-12) explains, American party structures are “mixed, varied, and even contradictory” and operate according to the principles of an “open, inclusive, semi-public political organization.” These qualities lead parties to adopt networks as a convenient mode of organization (Monroe 2001; Schwartz 1990). Networks allow members of a party to work together informally across institutional boundaries on an event-by-event basis. These networks consist of elected officials, party staff members, campaign consultants, volunteers, convention delegates, representatives of interest groups, 527 organizations, major donors, and others who have a stake in the party's success.

Working through networks affords a wide range of advantages to members of a party. Networks ease the flow of timely, sensitive information (Coleman, Katz and



Menzel 1957). They foster the development of trust and speed problem solving (Burt and Knez 1995; Weller, McCubbins and Paturi 2009). Networks are at the heart of social capital formation and conflict resolution (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert 2004; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Putnam 2000; Sandefur and Laumann 1998; Siegel 2009). Consistent with this line of research, Koger, Masket and Noel (2009) find that networks facilitate cooperation among competing party factions, both within the Democratic and Republican parties.

Previous research has not specifically examined the negative effects of networks within parties. However, it is reasonable to expect that some of the negative effects of networks found within social and business settings – such as rivalry promotion, character assassination, and overembeddedness – may be present within political parties (Burt 2005; Crossley 2008; Hagedoorn and Frankort 2008; Uzzi 1997). For example, overembeddedness occurs when an individual is overburdened with redundant network ties, which are costly to maintain, but rarely furnish timely, new information. Along these lines, if party leaders build networks that are too insular, they may inadvertently exclude themselves from relevant information about changing political phenomena, such as shifting alliances at the grassroots. Or, clique formation within parties may solidify the presence of factions that undercut a party's appeal to undecided voters, as was generated by Pat Robertson's campaign for president in 1988 (Pastor, Stone and Rapoport 1999). Finally, a party's network structure may align with ideological cleavages in such a way as to make it vulnerable to major shifts in political alignments, as was the case for the Whig Party in the 1840s and 1850s (Reiter 1996).

The effects of networks on political behavior can be understood both at the network level and at individual level. At the network level, the key question is where is the individual positioned relative to the whole network? Centrality – or the individual’s proximity to the center of the network – is a frequent way of characterizing this position (Bonacich 1987; Freeman 1979). Individuals closer to the center of the network are influenced more acutely by network – whether the effect is positive or negative – because, in comparison with less central actors, they can more easily reach other actors in the network, they receive information through the network at a lower cost, and they are more closely embedded with the actions of others in the network. Two competing hypotheses can be stated at the network level:

H<sub>1</sub>: *Social Capital Hypothesis*. As an individual approaches the center of the party network, she or he gains social capital that promotes conflict resolution within the network.

H<sub>2</sub>: *Overembeddedness Hypothesis*. As an individual approaches the center of the party network, she or he becomes restricted by network position in a way that undermines conflict resolution within the network.

At the individual level, the key question is, what is the nature of the direct contacts the individual has with others (usually referred to as the “ego network”)? The degree of homophily (networks with similar alters) or heterophily (networks with dissimilar alters) is a common way of conceptualizing these contacts. Networks often tend strongly toward homophily, leading networks to reinforce, rather than contradict, individual predispositions (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Mutz 2002).

Heterophilous networks help to soften disagreements, familiarize participants with

rationales for positions other than their own, and encourage individuals to search for compromise positions (Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn 2004; Mutz 2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006). Two competing hypotheses can be stated at the individual level:

H<sub>3</sub>: *Social Capital Hypothesis*. The degree of homophily or heterophily in an individual's network does not alter the capacity of social ties to promote conflict resolution. Network ties have a uniform, positive effect on the individual.

H<sub>4</sub>: *Cross-Cutting Networks Hypothesis*. As an individual's networks become more heterophilous, she or he becomes more likely to resolve conflicts within a network. As an individual's networks become more homophilous, she or he becomes less likely to resolve conflicts within a network.

These hypotheses are not intended to be universal. Indeed, it is possible that in some places and contexts, party networks serve to enhance social capital, while in other contexts they suffer from overembeddedness or the composition of contacts in ego networks. In the following section, we outline how these hypotheses are tested using data collected at the 2008 Democratic National Convention.

### **Surveys at the 2008 Democratic National Convention**

Presidential nominating conventions no longer function as mechanisms to select a nominee, who is known in advance of the convention, but largely as a television showcase for the party (Pangaopoulos 2007). Nonetheless, conventions still serve as the largest arena in which the party can gather – from the highest elected officials to mid-level grassroots volunteers (Shafer 2009). They are unique opportunities for party activists to network and talk about the future of the party.

Surveying delegates at the Democratic National Convention allowed us to solicit their viewpoints at a vital time of transition for the party. The grueling primary and caucus season had only recently concluded, with Obama's victory and Clinton's concession fresh in mind. The fall campaign had not yet launched. The Republicans had not held their convention and the world had not been introduced to Sarah Palin. Surveying delegates earlier would have been impossible, as they had only recently been selected. Surveying delegates later would have been tainted by the influence of the fall campaign.

We assembled a team of 19 surveyors to administer pencil-and-paper surveys of participants at the convention.<sup>1</sup> While a purely random and representative sample of participants at such an event is impossible, we took aggressive steps to approximate randomness, consistent with similar studies undertaken in recent years (cf. Fisher, Stanley, Berman, and Neff 2005; Goss 2006; Heaney and Rojas 2007). We distributed the team proportionately across places at which delegates were expected to gather, including the lobbies of official convention hotels, the Colorado Convention Center (where caucus meetings were held), and the Pepsi Center (the main convention hall). The surveyors were instructed to approach persons wearing convention credentials and invite them to participate in a 15-minute survey of the participants at the convention. A total of 534 people agreed to take the survey, giving us a response rate of 72 percent. Pledged delegates made up 84 percent of the sample (449 pledged delegates; 227 for Obama; 222 for Clinton), with the remaining group including uncommitted superdelegates and other party activists.

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<sup>1</sup> The team consisted of 16 graduate and undergraduate students from local universities, plus three of the principal investigators on the study.

The survey was six pages in length and included 47 questions that covered respondents' political backgrounds, attitudes, and demographic information.<sup>2</sup> It provided data on three dependent variables. First, it asked, "How satisfied are you with Barack Obama as the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party?", with potential answers ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied" on a five-point Likert scale (with five indicating "very satisfied"). When asked of Clinton delegates, answers to this question indicate the degree to which delegates have made their peace with Obama's candidacy. Second, the survey asked a battery of questions on likelihood that delegates would make concrete contributions to the Obama campaign, including volunteering time, giving money, helping to raise money, and trying to persuade others to vote for Obama, with potential answers ranging from "extremely likely" to "not at all likely" on a five-point Likert scale (with five indicating "extremely likely"). When asked of Clinton delegates, this question assesses the potential carryover effect into the general election. Third, the survey asked, "What do you think about the role played by Hillary Clinton's supporters during this convention?", with potential answers ranging from "too much of a role" to "not played enough of a role" on a three-point scale (with three indicating "not played enough of a role"). When asked of Obama delegates, this question measures the extent to which delegates are prepared to embrace Clinton delegates as part of the party faithful.

The survey assessed delegates' networks using two measures. First, it asked them whether they were participating in any caucuses at the convention and, if so, to name the caucuses. The caucus meeting structure is a distinctive feature of the Democratic Convention (Freeman 1986). Thirteen caucuses (including the Black Caucus, the Women's Caucus, and the Disability Caucus) are organized officially, while a number of

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<sup>2</sup> A list of all questions used in this paper is provided in Appendix A.

other caucuses (such as the Labor Caucus, the Health Care Caucus, and the Education Caucus) are organized unofficially. Almost any group can organize and meet in conjunction with the convention, as long as it is not perceived as openly hostile to the party or its nominee. These meetings prove to be essential to networking across the constituency groups most important to the Democrats. We use the overlapping memberships of individuals in caucuses to measure delegate-level position relative to the overall party network.<sup>3</sup>

The second network-oriented question assessed the composition of the respondent's ego network. It asked, "How would you describe the political preferences of your close friends during the primaries and caucuses?", with options ranging from "Almost all of my close friends supported Obama" to "Almost all of my close friends supported candidates other than Obama" on a five-point Likert scale (with five indicating friends' universal support for Obama). For Clinton delegates, a high score on this question reflects heterophilous networks, while a lower score reflects more homophilous networks. For Obama delegates, a high score on this question reflects homophilous networks, while a lower score reflects heterophilous networks.

The survey gathered data on several other indicators of respondents' political backgrounds, attitudes, and social-economic status. First, experience with party institutions, which encourages delegates to place their loyalty with party unity rather than a specific candidate's aspirations (Stone 1984, 1986), is indicated by questions about membership on party committees (such as the platform committee); having served as an officer in national, state, or local party organizations; history of attending past

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<sup>3</sup> The two-mode individual-caucus network is converted to a one-mode network of individuals (Breiger 1974). After constructing the one-mode network, centrality is computed using the eigenvector method proposed by Bonacich (1987).

conventions; and plans for attending meetings at the 2008 convention. Second, the belief in intra-party democracy, which suggests an amateur rather than professional orientation to party politics (Soule and Clarke 1970; Wilson 1962), is measured with a question about majority rule. It asks, “In your opinion, should all decisions at the convention be determined by a simple majority of delegates, or should losing candidates’ supporters be given special consideration?” Third, we assessed the effect of Clinton’s endorsement of Obama using date the survey was administered, creating a dummy variable that takes the value of one if it was given after her speech. Finally, the survey included a series of standard questions on race, sex, sexual identity, age, ideology, education, income, union status, and religiosity.

### **Statistical Results**

*Obama and Clinton Delegates Compared.* The survey yielded significantly different results for Obama and Clinton delegates. Descriptive statistics by candidate pledged and difference-of-means tests are reported in Table 1. Obama delegates espouse significantly higher satisfaction with and support for Obama, and think less of a role played by Clinton delegates, than do Clinton delegates. Obama delegates are more likely to have close friends who support Obama, and to support majority rule within the convention, than do Clinton delegates. Obama delegates are more likely to be African American, and less likely to be women or from union households, than are Clinton delegates.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The stark differences in attitudes toward Obama and Clinton can be understood more clearly by graphing their distributions. Figure 1 compares differences between Obama and Clinton delegates in satisfaction with Obama. Most Obama delegates report that they are “very satisfied” with him as the nominee, with a few reporting that they are “somewhat satisfied.” In contrast, Clinton delegates express a wider range of satisfaction levels. While most claim that they are very or somewhat satisfied, a fair number of responses range from indifferent to “very unsatisfied.” A similar pattern is observed in Figure 2, which presents differences in levels of support for Obama. The support measure is tabulated by adding the Likert scores on each of four questions (volunteerism, giving money, raising money, and persuading others) that refer to activities that would enhance the fall campaign.<sup>4</sup> While many of Clinton’s delegates plan to be supportive of Obama, a nontrivial percentage displays a marked lack of enthusiasm, if not outright hostility, to the nominee.

[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]

Capturing the attitudes of Obama delegates toward Clinton is not as straightforward as documenting the views of Clinton delegates toward Obama. Since Clinton was not the nominee, it would not have made sense to ask delegates about their satisfaction with her or their plans to support her. Instead, we opted to inquire about the role of Clinton’s delegates. Were they appropriate players at the convention? Were they overreaching? Should they be more involved? The results, reported in Figure 3, show that most respondents thought that Clinton delegates operated appropriately at the convention. Obama delegates, however, are more likely to report that they play too much

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<sup>4</sup> Four points are subtracted from each score in order to normalize support on the [0,16] interval, rather than the [4, 20] interval created by simple addition.



of a role, while Clinton delegates are more likely to report that they play not enough of a role.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

These results collectively suggest that the Democrats faced a rift in the party at the time of the Democratic National Convention. Yes, many supporters of each candidate were ready to recognize and respect the other candidate. But there was still much work to be done. If a sizeable portion of Clinton delegates – and activists like them – rejected Obama, this could have spelled trouble for the fall election. If Obama supporters pushed Clinton people away from the party, then the Democrats would only be weaker for it.

*Mapping the Party Network.* Differences between Obama and Clinton supporters can also be appreciated by visualizing the party network. A representation of the two-mode individual-caucus network is presented in Figure 4. In this network, green circles represent Obama delegates, yellow circles represent Clinton delegates, and blue circles represent unpledged delegates.<sup>5</sup> Black squares (labeled) stand for official caucuses and black triangles (unlabeled) stand for unofficial caucuses. A line from a circle to a square or a triangle implies that an individual is a member of that caucus. The position of nodes in the network is determined using the Kamada and Kawai (1989) spring-embedding algorithm. This algorithm positions the nodes so as to minimize the “energy” in the system caused by connecting the nodes to one another.

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

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<sup>5</sup> Centrality estimates are computed using observations both from pledged delegates and other respondents to the survey. The regression analyses below, however, dawn individual observations only from the set of pledged delegates.

The graph in Figure 4 clearly identifies both insiders and outsiders within the party network. Some delegates are positioned toward the center of the network, between several of the official caucuses. Other delegates are confined to the periphery, isolated in their connections with marginal caucuses. Variations between Obama and Clinton delegates are apparent. Obama delegates dominate the Youth Caucus and the Black Caucus, while Clinton delegates are more closely connected to the Women's and LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered) Caucus. This graph suggests that delegates' positions in the party network vary in meaningful ways that translate into opportunities and challenges for delegates.

*Assessing Satisfaction and Support for Obama.* A central question of this project is what factors allow Obama to attract support from Clinton delegates? We answer this question using regression analyses on Clinton delegates' satisfaction with and support for Obama. A satisfaction equation is estimated using an ordered probit model to account for five levels of satisfaction, from one to five. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 2.

[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

In assessing the individual's position in the whole network, the coefficient on *Network Centrality* is negative and significant. The marginal effect – calculated as the probability of switching from somewhat to very satisfied – is 2.5 percent, implying that a one unit increase in network centrality decreases the chances of being very satisfied with Obama by 2.5 percent. This result supports the *Overembeddedness Hypothesis* ( $H_2$ ) at the expense of the *Social Capital Hypothesis* ( $H_1$ ). Thus, Clinton delegates become less receptive of Obama's candidacy as they move closer to the center of the caucus network.

The marginal effect of network centrality on satisfaction can be understood more clearly by examining the predicted probabilities for each of the five categories, reported in Figure 5. This graph is especially revealing of differences among the categories. The effect of network centrality on satisfaction appears to be nonnegative, and possibly positive, in moving from very unsatisfied to somewhat satisfied. The negative effect of network centrality appears precisely in the move from somewhat to very satisfied. Thus, the talk in the caucus network does not convert Obama lovers into adamant foes. Rather, it turns potentially strong supporters into doubters. This result is consistent with the effects gossip and character assassination identified in other networks (cf. Burt 2005).

[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

The composition of ego networks matter significantly in for the level of satisfaction with Obama. The results in Table 2 demonstrate a positive and significant effect of *Obama Support Among Friends*, consistent with the *Cross-Cutting Networks Hypothesis* (H<sub>4</sub>), at the expense of the *Social Capital Hypothesis* (H<sub>3</sub>). The marginal effect – calculated as the probability of switching from somewhat to very satisfied – is 7.4 percent, implying that a one-step increase in the Likert scale of friends’ political preferences increases by 7.4 percent the chances of being very satisfied with Obama. This result reveals that when Clinton delegates have ego networks rich in Obama supporters, then they are likely to embrace the nominee. However, when they are flanked mostly by other Clinton supporters or partisans of other candidates, their preexisting views are reinforced and they refuse to allow the rift to heal.

The influence of close friends’ political views is illustrated in Figure 6. The effect of friendship on Obama satisfaction is neutral or possibly negative in moving from

very unsatisfied to somewhat satisfied. However, having friends who support Obama dramatically enhances the probability of moving from somewhat to very satisfied. While friends' views are insufficient to persuade ardent opponents to become backers, they have a good chance of turning lukewarm party regulars into enthusiasts for the candidate.

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Networks are not the only factor that matters to healing the rift between Obama and Clinton supporters. As anticipated, *Experience with Party Institutions* contributes positively and significantly to the willingness of Clinton supporters to accept Obama. Similarly, *Support for Majority Rule* – a characteristic of typical professionals rather than amateurs within the party – has a positive, significant effect on satisfaction. Clinton's speech at the convention made no difference in her supporters' willingness to embrace Obama. Surprisingly, none of the demographic controls made a difference in Obama satisfaction. At a minimum, we expected that Clinton supporters who are African Americans would readily make the switch to Obama, while women would strenuously resist doing so. However, any appearances of racial and gender disparities in support can actually be accounted for using variables that measure networks, institutions, and views on intra-party democracy.

The results in Table 2 convey the determinants of satisfaction with Obama among Clinton delegates. An identical equation is estimated in Table 3 to uncover the determinants of support for Obama. Satisfaction and support are conceptualized differently, in that satisfaction may reflect passive acceptance – satisfaction with Obama need not require one to act on this sentiment – whereas support implies that the respondent intends to take affirmative actions – such as volunteering – on behalf of the

candidate. Since the dependent variable is constructed by summing four Likert scales (normalized to the [0,16] interval), it approximates a normal distribution, with truncation at the lower bound of zero and the upper bound of 16. A tobit estimator is appropriate under these conditions, recognizing both the approximate normal distribution of the data and the two truncation points.

[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The results of tobit estimation on Obama support reported in Table 3 approximately mirror those presented for Obama satisfaction in Table 2. *Network Centrality* exhibits a negative effect and *Obama Support Among Friends* yields a positive effect. *Experience with party institutions* and *Support for Majority Rule*, help to heal the rift, while *Survey After Clinton Speech* makes no difference. The only substantive difference between the equations is that a higher *Frequency of Religious Attendance* undermines active support for Obama, while it makes no difference in levels of satisfaction.

The similarity of the results presented in Table 3 with those in Table 2 is quite striking. Though the construction of the two dependent variables is conceptually distinct, their correlation measures 0.76. The similarity of coefficients in their explanatory equations, despite different estimation techniques and dependent variables, gives further credence to the validity of the conclusions drawn here.

*Assessing Clinton Delegates' Convention Role.* How to reintegrate Clinton supporters into the new Obama-dominated Democratic Party is a second central question of this research. Given the eight-year presidency of Bill Clinton, and the presumptive-nominee status enjoyed by Hillary Clinton for some time, it is logical that Clinton's

supporters considered themselves the party “establishment” for most of the 1992-2008 period. Unlike the Republican Party, which has a tradition of vanquishing losing factions from the party, the Democratic Party displays a culture of embracing the adherents of losing candidates (Freeman 1986). Which are the factors that would allow the new guard – dominated by Obama’s confidants – to accept the former rulers back into the party fold?

The results of ordered probit analysis of Obama delegates’ answers to the three-category indicator of acceptance are reported in Table 4. Unlike the findings from the analyses of Clinton delegates, Obama delegates are not influenced significantly by social networks in their acceptance of Clinton’s supporters. The nonsignificant coefficient on *Network Centrality* lends support neither to the *Social Capital Hypothesis* (H<sub>1</sub>) nor the *Overembeddedness Hypothesis* (H<sub>2</sub>). Similarly, the nonsignificant coefficient on *Obama Support Among Friends* is consistent with – but not supportive of – the *Social Capital Hypothesis* (H<sub>3</sub>), since it suggests that social ties are valuable regardless of their composition. Nonetheless, this finding demands rejection of the *Cross-Cutting Networks Hypothesis* in this case. Consistent with the findings reported in Tables 2 and 3, *Experience with Party Institutions* contributes positively and significantly to healing the rift.

[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Obama delegates who embrace *Support for Majority Rule* – rather than minority rights – are less likely to see the role of Clinton’s supporters in a positive light. Although this coefficient is negative – unlike the positive coefficient in equations for Obama satisfaction and support – the logic is consistent. Obama supporters (who are in the

majority) reject their role of the Clinton delegates when they adopt a majority-rule view, but accept their role if they are sympathetic to minority rights. Clinton supporters (who are in the minority) express dissatisfaction with and unwillingness to support Obama when they adopt a minority-rights view, but accept the nominee if they have a sympathy with a majority-rule posture. These findings underscore the continued relevance of the Wilson's (1962) distinction between party professionals (who rely on majority rule to enforce essential party unity) and party amateurs (who may demand minority rights to retain attachments to a losing candidate).

A major difference between the Obama satisfaction-support equations and the Clinton delegates'-role equation pertains to the effect of Clinton's convention speech. The results in Table 4 reveal a significant, positive effect of Clinton's speech on Obama's delegates' willingness to accept the role Clinton's supporters. The marginal effect implies that Clinton's endorsement of Obama increased by ten percent the probability that an Obama delegate labels the role of Clinton delegates as "appropriate", rather than "too much." It is striking that Clinton's speech had a statistically discernable effect on the attitudes of Obama's delegates, but not on her own delegates. While further research would be required to establish the sources of this difference, we speculate that an explanation may be found in semi-public communications within the Clinton network. To the extent that Clinton was able to sway her own supporters toward Obama, she may have already achieved that effect in multiple, small convention venues, rather than in the convention floor speech.

*Robustness Analysis.* The conclusions presented above were reached only after careful consideration of how variations in the specification of statistical models could

influence the results (Leamer 1978). First, the choice of statistical estimation methods was evaluated as a source of bias. Ordered probit regressions were estimated instead as ordered logits, yielding no difference in the pattern of statistically significant coefficients. The tobit regression was re-estimated as an ordinary least squares model, producing similar results. Second, the potential effects of sampling bias were considered. The delegate sample collected differed from the population of delegates according to several demographics, as reflected in the sampling analysis documented in Appendix B. To evaluate the potential for sampling bias, weighted regressions were estimated to account for population differences in race and sex identity. The weighted regressions did not reveal any alteration in the pattern of statistically significant results obtained. Third, the possibility that individual surveyors influenced the results by deviating from the sampling design, or by prompting certain answers from the respondents, was evaluated. Equations containing dummy variables for each interviewer did not uncover any significant interviewer effects. The lack of an interviewer effect in this case, despite its documentation in previous research (Schaeffer 1980), is most likely due to the pencil-and-pencil nature of the survey, which requires relatively minimal interaction between the surveyor and the respondent.<sup>6</sup>

## **Discussion**

An implicitly functionalist bias inheres in much political analysis of social networks. The positive externalities of networks – their efficiency in information transmission and potential to circumvent the rigidities of formal organizations – make

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<sup>6</sup> These results are available from the authors upon request, but are not reported here due to space constraints.



them an appealing organizational form. Yet a considerable body of research points to a dark side of networks; to their interference with information dissemination; to their quelling of ideas. This research warns that networks may lead to undesirable effects for the organizations that they inhabit. A party may benefit from networking across decentralized institutions, but it may sometimes be paralyzed by this posture as well.

This study finds that network centrality within the party caucus network subverts, at the margin, the Democratic Party's success in healing the rifts of a contentious nomination season. This finding must be placed in its proper context. It does not imply that all party networks undermine the collective goals of a party. It does not mean that convention caucuses uniformly hurt the Democratic Party. Rather, it reveals that, in 2008, caucus networks tended to perpetuate the old-guard Clinton establishment, rather than opening the way to the party's new leadership under Obama. Party networks have considerable potential to undermine the party's goals. This finding hints at paths toward network reengineering. Perhaps the party could find ways to highlight the place of currently informal caucuses (for health care or progressive policy) by subsidizing their activities or granting parity with long-standing caucuses? Perhaps existing caucuses linked to race and sex could be deemphasized? Greater emphasis could be placed on enhancing the expertise communicated through caucus networks, thus muting their potentially demobilizing effects (McClurg 2006).

While we would not venture to suggest that the Democrats should abandon their long-standing caucus tradition, the evidence in this paper validates the Republicans' reluctance to adopt this approach themselves. Caucuses enliven the democratic nature of a party, but also stimulate resistance to center-down mandates. Especially in the

comparatively hierarchical culture in the Republican Party, a caucus-style organization would cut against the grain.

Beyond the pressures of caucus networks on party politics, this study points to the relevance of ego networks in interpreting partisan attitudes and behavior. To a large extent, the findings reported here demonstrate the implications of the cross-cutting network perspective of Mutz (2006) for political parties. The question arises, however, as to whether respondents' estimates of their friends' political affiliations are reliable indicators of their friends' actual political views? As was the case in Finifter's (1974) study of Detroit-area auto workers, political minorities may attempt to hide their proclivities from their discussion partners, or may avoid political discussions entirely with those with whom they disagree.

We think that the biases of friendship misperception or selection are minimal in the current study. First, even if respondents do deceive themselves about the political views of their discussion partners, the *perception* of network composition may be more important theoretically than the *actual* composition of the network (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004). If respondents *believe* that their network has a certain political composition, that belief may have a greater influence on behavior than the true, but hidden, preferences of their friends. Second, the ego network question in the present study focuses on "close" friends, who are naturally more intimate than the co-workers analyzed in Finifter's work. Third, people choose friendships on many bases other than politics – even if politics are a consideration. Fourth, the relatively short-term nature of the dispute between Obama and Clinton was probably too short-lived to determine many long-term friendships. If preferences between the major parties are usually a limited

factor influencing friendship choice, then a factional dispute between two Democrats is unlikely to reconfigure a person's basic friendship structure. These considerations imply that feedback between friendship choice and political attitudes is small relative to the broader imperative of this relationship.

Finally, what is to be made of the difference in network effect for Clinton delegates – who are significantly influenced by their access to networks – and Obama delegates who are not? It may be that networks are critical to determining the basic assessment of the nominee and decisions to allocate resources and effort to him – as the Clinton delegates were forced to undertake – but less than essential to establishing views about various factions in the party – as was the case for the Obama delegates. That is, the status of Clinton delegates within the party may not have been important enough to activate extensive discussion networks on this question among Obama delegates.

### **Conclusion**

This research is not about whether or not the Democrats healed the rift in their party in 2008, but about the mechanisms which enabled them, or prevented them from doing so. The evidence presented here reveals that party networks may play as or more important a role in perpetuating the rift as they do in healing it. The overembeddness and cross-cutting networks views of networks are supported empirically here, though a strict social-capital perspective is not. These findings suggest a more complex role for social networks within parties than has been envisioned previously within this domain.

Network effects depend on network structure (Siegel 2009) and composition (Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn 2004). Healing the rift caused by a divisive nomination contest may

require parties to turn strategically – rather than blindly and bluntly – to informal networks.

This research identifies an arena in which networks matter to party performance beyond ostensible links to interest groups, social movements, 527 organizations, financial donors, and legislators. It illuminates the operation of networks among activists, who must ultimately lead the party's efforts at the local level in fundraising, candidate selection, and grassroots organizing. More research is needed to deconstruct the evolving relevance of these networks to activists. How do party activists' networks change over time with the emergence of new technologies, such as Blackberries and Facebook? What are the divergent forces – educational institutions, social movements, critical elections – that shape the structure of these networks? What is the nature and extent of differences between the major parties in activists' networks? To what extent are significant minor parties, such as the Libertarian Party and the Green Party, integrated informally into the major parties through networks? Systematic investigation of these questions would likely portend a social turn in the study of parties and stimulate greater integration of this research tradition with allied communities that probe the behavior of interest groups, social movements, and activism generally.

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**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Obama and Clinton Delegates**

	Obama Delegates					Clinton Delegates					Difference of Means
	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>P-value</i>
<b>Dependent Variables</b>											
<i>Satisfaction with Obama</i>	225	4.960	0.196	4	5	214	4.000	1.241	1	5	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Support for Obama</i>	217	14.323	2.392	3	16	200	10.345	5.152	0	16	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Role of Clinton Supporters</i>	218	1.817	0.493	1	3	215	2.209	0.545	1	3	<b>0.000</b>
<b>Focal Independent Variables</b>											
<i>Network Centrality</i>	227	4.312	4.302	0	13.579	222	4.640	4.644	0	13.724	0.438
<i>Obama Support Among Friends</i>	221	4.068	0.939	1	5	205	2.902	1.138	1	5	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Experience with Party Institutions</i>	227	1.604	0.913	0	4	222	1.777	0.976	0	4	0.053
<i>Support for Majority Rule</i>	227	0.749	0.435	0	1	222	0.599	0.491	0	1	<b>0.001</b>
<i>Survey After Clinton Speech</i>	227	0.330	0.471	0	1	222	0.396	0.490	0	1	0.147
<b>Control Variables</b>											
<i>African American</i>	209	0.215	0.412	0	1	203	0.099	0.299	0	1	<b>0.001</b>
<i>Female</i>	210	0.443	0.498	0	1	205	0.551	0.499	0	1	<b>0.027</b>
<i>LGBT Identity</i>	205	0.132	0.339	0	1	197	0.203	0.403	0	1	0.055
<i>Age in Years</i>	205	45.361	15.178	18	79	199	47.420	16.178	18	87	0.188
<i>Ideology (liberal to conservative)</i>	214	2.949	1.388	1	6	200	3.120	1.391	1	6	0.211
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	203	4.685	1.338	1	6	202	4.535	1.411	2	6	0.273
<i>Personal Income</i>	199	4.578	2.232	1	9	192	4.766	2.065	1	9	0.389
<i>From Union Household</i>	207	0.295	0.457	0	1	199	0.432	0.497	0	1	<b>0.004</b>
<i>Frequency of Religious Attendance</i>	207	3.193	1.485	1	5	198	3.020	1.463	1	5	0.239

Notes: Significant p-values are in **bold**.

All tabulations performed on original data (imputations not used).

**Table 2. Satisfaction with Obama by Clinton Delegates: Ordered Probit Analysis**

<b>Dependent Variable</b> <i>Satisfaction with Obama</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
<b>Focal Independent Variables</b>				
<i>Network Centrality</i>	-0.025	-0.062	0.022	<b>0.004</b>
<i>Obama Support Among Friends</i>	0.074	0.185	0.077	<b>0.016</b>
<i>Experience with Party Institutions</i>	0.096	0.241	0.092	<b>0.008</b>
<i>Support for Majority Rule</i>	0.247	0.637	0.167	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Survey After Clinton Speech</i>	0.063	0.158	0.168	0.346
<b>Control Variables</b>				
<i>African American</i>	0.155	0.391	0.320	0.221
<i>Female</i>	0.045	0.114	0.197	0.564
<i>LGBT Identity</i>	0.015	0.038	0.228	0.869
<i>Age in Years</i>	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	0.816
<i>Ideology (liberal to conservative)</i>	-0.043	-0.108	0.067	0.106
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	0.021	0.054	0.065	0.411
<i>Personal Income</i>	-0.022	-0.055	0.043	0.208
<i>From Union Household</i>	0.143	0.359	0.184	0.051
<i>Frequency of Religious Attendance</i>	-0.045	-0.113	0.062	0.067
<b>Cut Points</b>				
<i>First Cut Point</i>		-1.104	0.613	
<i>Second Cut Point</i>		-0.542	0.605	
<i>Third Cut Point</i>		-0.136	0.604	
<i>Fourth Cut Point</i>		0.738	0.606	
<b>Overall Regression Statistics</b>				
N = 214				
Log likelihood = -257.346				
LR $\chi^2(14)=53.250$ , p= <b>0.000</b>				

*Notes:* Significant p-values are in **bold**.  
 Marginal effects are calculated as the probability of switching from a satisfaction level of 4 to a satisfaction of 5 due to a one unit change in the independent variable, holding all other variables at their means.  
 Missing values imputed using complete case imputation.

**Table 3. Support for Obama by Clinton Delegates: Tobit Analysis**

	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
<b>Focal Independent Variables</b>			
<i>Network Centrality</i>	-0.371	0.129	<b>0.005</b>
<i>Obama Support Among Friends</i>	0.961	0.459	<b>0.038</b>
<i>Experience with Party Institutions</i>	2.054	0.543	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Support for Majority Rule</i>	2.366	1.001	<b>0.019</b>
<i>Survey After Clinton Speech</i>	-0.417	1.018	0.682
<b>Control Variables</b>			
<i>African American</i>	0.753	1.868	0.687
<i>Female</i>	0.562	1.179	0.634
<i>LGBT Identity</i>	0.410	1.349	0.762
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.060	0.034	0.080
<i>Ideology (liberal to conservative)</i>	-0.096	0.384	0.804
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	0.329	0.393	0.405
<i>Personal Income</i>	-0.056	0.256	0.827
<i>From Union Household</i>	0.569	1.084	0.600
<i>Frequency of Religious Attendance</i>	-0.823	0.361	<b>0.024</b>
<i>Constant</i>	3.123	3.487	0.372
<b>Overall Regression Statistics</b>			
Log Likelihood = -495.853			
N=200			
Left-Censored Observations (Y≤0) = 17			
Uncensored Observations (0≤Y<16) = 132			
Right-Censored Observations (Y≥16) = 51			
LR $\chi^2(14) = 48.960$ , p = <b>0.000</b>			
$\sigma = 6.36$ , Std. Err. of $\sigma = 0.428$			

Notes: Significant p-values are in **bold**.  
 Marginal effects are identical to the coefficient in the Tobit model.  
 Missing values imputed using complete case imputation.

**Table 4. Acceptance of Role of Clinton Supporters among Obama Delegates:  
Ordered Probit Analysis**


<b>Dependent Variable:</b>				
<i>Acceptance of Role of Clinton Supporters</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
<b>Focal Independent Variables</b>				
<i>Network Centrality</i>	-0.005	-0.022	0.024	0.358
<i>Obama Support Among Friends</i>	0.024	0.110	0.102	0.279
<i>Experience with Party Institutions</i>	0.062	0.287	0.110	<b>0.009</b>
<i>Support for Majority Rule</i>	-0.085	-0.524	0.220	<b>0.017</b>
<i>Survey After Clinton Speech</i>	0.100	0.568	0.200	<b>0.005</b>
<b>Control Variables</b>				
<i>African American</i>	-0.017	-0.081	0.248	0.744
<i>Female</i>	-0.099	-0.463	0.204	<b>0.023</b>
<i>LGBT Identity</i>	-0.052	-0.244	0.285	0.393
<i>Age in Years</i>	-0.001	-0.005	0.007	0.469
<i>Ideology (liberal to conservative)</i>	-0.020	-0.091	0.070	0.193
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.006	-0.029	0.084	0.732
<i>Personal Income</i>	0.015	0.070	0.053	0.183
<i>From Union Household</i>	0.048	0.223	0.208	0.284
<i>Frequency of Religious Attendance</i>	0.021	0.098	0.067	0.143
<b>Cut Points</b>				
<i>First Cut Point</i>		-0.498	0.635	
<i>Second Cut Point</i>		2.262	0.664	
<b>Overall Regression Statistics</b>				
N = 218				
Log likelihood = -138.341				
LR $\chi^2(14)$ = 33.920, p = <b>0.002</b>				

Notes: Significant p-values are in **bold**.


Marginal effects are calculated as the probability of switching from an acceptance level of 1 to an acceptance level of 2 due to a one unit change in the independent variable, holding all other variables at their means.

Missing values imputed using complete case imputation.


**Figure 1. Histogram of Satisfaction with Obama by Candidate Pledged**



**Figure 2. Histogram of Support for Obama by Candidate Pledged**




**Figure 3. Histogram of Acceptance of Role of Clinton Supporters by Candidate Pledged**





**Figure 4. Caucus Network at 2008 Democratic National Convention**




**Legend**


- Official Caucus
- ▲ Unofficial Caucus
- Obama Delegate
- Clinton Delegate
- Unpledged Delegate

*Notes:* This figure is produced using a two-mode network of delegates' participation in caucuses at the 2008 Democratic National Convention. The figure is generated in UCINET 6.59 / NetDraw 2.046 with the spring-embedding algorithm to determine nodal position.

**Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of Clinton Delegates' Satisfaction with Obama by Network Centrality**



**Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities of Clinton Delegates' Satisfaction with Obama by Friends' Support of Obama**



## Appendix A. Survey Questions Used in Data Analysis

The following questions were used in the data analysis performed herein. Questions are listed according to their original numbers in the survey. Questions not used in the data analysis have been omitted from the list but are available from the authors upon request.

2. Are you officially pledged to a particular candidate, or are you unaffiliated? **Please circle one.** [Pledged, Unaffiliated] If pledged, to which candidate?
3. Are you a member of any of the party's standing committees (rules & bylaws, credentials, platform, etc.)? [Yes, No]
4. Are you participating in any of the caucuses being held by the party at this convention? [Yes, No] If yes, which ones?
5. Have you ever been an officer in a state or local political party (including county party chair, treasurer, precinct captain, etc.)? [Yes, No]
6. Have you ever attended a Democratic National Convention in an official capacity in the past? [Yes, No]
11. How satisfied are you with Barack Obama as the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party? **Please circle one.** [Very Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied, Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied, Somewhat Dissatisfied, Very Dissatisfied]
13. What do you think about the role played by Hillary Clinton's supporters during this convention? **Please circle one.** [Clinton's supporters have played too much of a role, Clinton's supporters have been involved appropriately, Clinton's supporters have not played enough of a role]
19. In your opinion, should all decisions at the convention be determined by a simple majority of delegates, or should losing candidates' supporters be given special consideration? **Please circle one.** [All decisions should be made by majority rule, Losing candidates' supporters should be given special consideration for some decisions, Don't know]
25. How would you describe the political preferences of your close friends during the primaries and caucuses? **Please circle one.** [Almost all of my close friends supported Obama, Most of my close friends supported Obama, My close friends were split about evenly between Obama and other candidates, Most of my close friends supported candidates other than Obama, Almost all of my close friends supported candidates other than Obama]
26. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as: **Please circle one.** [To the "left" of strong liberal, A Strong Liberal, A Not very strong Liberal, A Moderate who leans Liberal, A Moderate, A Moderate who leans Conservative, A Not Very Strong]

Conservative, A Strong Conservative, To the “right” of strong conservative, Other (please specify)]

30. How likely is it that you will volunteer your time to support Obama’s campaign between now and election day? [Extremely likely, Very Likely, Somewhat Likely, Not too Likely, Not at all Likely]

31. How likely is it that you will give money to support Obama’s campaign between now and election day? [Extremely Likely to Not at all Likely (same as above)]

32. How likely is it that you will help raise money for Obama’s campaign between now and election day? [Extremely Likely to Not at all Likely (same as above)]

33. How likely is it that you will try to persuade others to vote for Obama between now and election day? [Extremely Likely to Not at all Likely (same as above)]

36. How often do you attend religious services? **Please circle one.** [Every week, Almost every week, Once or twice a month, A few times a year, Never]

38. What is your sex/gender?

39. How old are you? [\_\_\_\_\_ years]

40. What is your race/ethnicity? **Circle as many as apply:** [Native American/American-Indian, White / Caucasian, Black / African American, Latino / Hispanic, Asian / Asian American / Pacific Islander, Other ]

41. Do you think of yourself as: **Please circle one.** [Straight / heterosexual, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Other (please specify), Prefer not to say]

43. Do you or anyone in your household belong to a labor union? [Yes, No]

45. Could you please tell us the highest level of formal education you have completed? **Circle only one.** [Less than high school diploma, High School diploma, Some college / Associate’s or technical degree, College degree, Some graduate education, Graduate or professional degree]

46. Could you please tell us your level of annual income in 2007? **Please circle only one.** [less than \$15,000, \$15,001 - \$25,000, \$25,001 to \$50,000, \$50,001 to \$75,000, \$75,001 to \$100,000, \$100,001 to \$125,000, \$125,001 to \$150,000, \$150,001 to \$350,000, More than \$350,000]

Please note that the date of the interview and the identity of the surveyor were recorded administratively.

## Appendix B. Democratic National Convention Pledged Delegates Sample

Sampling Category	Our Sample	Population of Delegates
<b>Race / Ethnicity</b>		
<i>African American</i>	15.80%	24.50%
<i>Asian American</i>	4.10%	4.60%
<i>Caucasian</i>	59.80%	56.70%
<i>Latino / Hispanic</i>	13.60%	11.80%
<i>Native American</i>	6.10%	2.50%
<b>Sex / Gender Identity</b>		
<i>Female</i>	49.60%	50.10%
<i>LGBT</i>	16.70%	5.80%
<b>Pledged Status</b>		
<i>Clinton Delegates</i>	49.44%	48.94%
<i>Obama Delegates</i>	50.06%	51.06%

Notes: Overall survey response rate = 72%  
 Data on the population of delegates were obtained from Democratic National Committee (2008).