Differentiation theory and the ontologies of regionalism in Latin America

Abstract In this article, we argue that conventional understandings of regional integration based on neo-functionalism, hitherto often used to describe the diverse projects of Latin American regionalism, are of limited utility in that context. Rather than representing processes of economic or political unification, the various regionalisms could be understood more productively as a reaction to the crisis in legitimacy that social orders in the region have experienced under the conditions of globalized modernity. We then deploy an understanding of regionalism derived from sociological differentiation theory in order to advance this argument

Patrons against clients: Electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic tenure in politicized states

Why would incumbents undertake institutional reforms that constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. They argue that incumbents who risk exit from office undertake reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing that it confounds two potential implications of electoral competition – potential and certain electoral losses – which yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has so far neglected: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross-country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis-incentivizes tenure reform. Electoral competition may thus be a double-edged sword for institutional reform

Latin America’s new regional architecture : a cooperative or segmented regional governance complex?

In Latin America the repercussions of the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations are discussed widely. This article examines the opposing views on this process. Some authors postulate that an exhaustion of integration in Latin America will end up in segmented regionalism and hemispheric disintegration. Others endorse a variable geometry of integration that facilitates intraregional cooperation and minimizes the risk of veto players and zero-sum politics. The article takes Latin America as a vantage point to analyse the topic of interacting and overlapping regional organizations from a more general perspective. It asks about the conditions under which the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations might have positive or negative effects (on regional integration and cooperation). Additionally, it advocates broadening the analytical focus and replacing the analytical concepts of regional integration and cooperation with the analytical concept of regional governance. Regional governance more adequately captures and integrates different patterns of regional cooperation and different regional projects that result in overlapping regional organizations. Instead of looking at the proliferation of regional organizations from a perspective of fragmentation, this article contends that the focus should be redirected to analysing how different regional organizations interact. Regional interaction patterns can vary between synergistic, cooperative, conflictive, or segmented regional governance (complexes). In an initial application of this analytical scheme, the article summarizes the changing regional cooperation patterns in South America since 1990. In the conclusions it outlines some preliminary ideas for a future research agenda on regional governance (complexes)

Institutional Overlap and Responses to Political Crises in South America

The current regional security architecture in South America is characterized by a proliferation of institutions. Most regional organizations have by now adopted mechanisms to respond to domestic political crises and unconstitutional changes of government. This chapter studies whether overlapping mandates and activities in the management of political crises are harmful or beneficial for regional cooperation. The first part theorizes the effects of overlap on member states’ strategies, regional organizations’ interaction patterns, and the policy outcome. The second part explores overlapping democracy clauses in South America and analyzes six episodes where OAS, MERCOSUR, and/or UNASUR have simultaneously taken action in defense of democracy. The results show that, in the face of power shifts and competitive inter-organizational dynamics, overlapping actions by regional organizations might jeopardize the norms they set out to protect

Cláusula Democrática do Mercosul: indefinição conceitual e uso estratégico

O artigo explora o uso estratégico da Cláusula Democrática do Mercosul, instituída pelo Protocolo de Ushuaia, em 1998. Embora a cláusula exija a vigência de instituições democráticas para a participação no Mercosul, ela não explicita qual é a definição de democracia a ser observada. Sendo assim, o artigo propõe-se a responder a seguinte indagação: a inexistência de uma definição de democracia na Cláusula Democrática possibilita o seu uso estratégico pelos membros do bloco e afeta os padrões de interação entre eles e seus resultados? Se sim, como? A hipótese central da investigação afirma que a Cláusula Democrática é mobilizada estrategicamente pelos membros do bloco: interesses políticos e econômicos dos diferentes atores, sob determinadas condições do contexto institucional e político, traduzem-se estrategicamente em preferências por diferentes definições de democracia. Pretende-se analisar como os diferentes interesses dos atores se traduzem em preferências políticas para verificar se, e como, a Cláusula Democrática tem sido mobilizada para a ação estratégica, ora via definição procedimental, ora via definição substancial de democracia. Dois eventos são observados em dois níveis de análise - doméstico e regional. Primeiramente, aborda-se o processo decisório, desenvolvido no Senado brasileiro, relativo à entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul. Posteriormente, analisa-se a suspensão do Paraguai do bloco, após a destituição do presidente Fernando Lugo, em 2012. Os dois eventos fazem parte de um mesmo caso, já que a entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul só foi efetivada após a suspensão do Paraguai, único veto point no nível regional. Demonstrou-se que atores que se valeram da definição substancial de democracia para apoiar, no nível doméstico, a entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul, realizaram um turnover estratégico no nível regional, para a definição procedimental, com vistas a informar a decisão de suspender o Paraguai do Bloco e, assim, inviabilizar a ação do único veto player à adesão venezuelana ao Mercosul