176 research outputs found
Defense mechanisms: From the individual to the collective level
Abstract: In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as falling along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the relationship with other people and with oneâs own environment, to defend oneâs own self-describability and, indissolubly, the solidity of oneâs own self-conscious being. At a social and collective level, on the other hand, the individual self-protective structures are supported by cultural interventions that organize and intersubjectively âdomesticateâ our subjectivity and our feeling of being-there.Keywords: Autobiographical Reasoning; Defense Mechanisms; Grief; Narrative Identity; Ontological Insecurity Meccanismi di difesa: dallâindividuale al collettivoRiassunto: Lâarticolo si occupa di costruzione e difesa dellâidentitĂ soggettiva come tema allâintersezione di psicologia e antropologia. In questa prospettiva, i meccanismi di difesa si dispongono lungo uno spettro che dal livello individuale conduce a quello collettivo. La mente individuale Ăš la sfera delle difese intrapsichiche e delle manovre interpersonali a cui ognuno di noi fa ricorso, nella relazione con gli altri e col proprio ambiente, per difendere la propria autodescrivibilitĂ e, inscindibilmente, la soliditĂ del proprio essere autocosciente. Al livello sociale e collettivo, invece, le strutture autoprotettive dellâindividuo sono sorrette da interventi culturali che organizzano e âaddomesticanoâ intersoggettivamente la nostra soggettivitĂ e il nostro sentirci esistere.Parole chiave: Ragionamento autobiografico; Meccanismi di difesa; Cordoglio; IdentitĂ narrativa; Insicurezza ontologic
Self-Consciousness as a Construction All the Way Down
Contemporary mind and brain sciences provide theories and data that seem to confirm a hypothesis about human nature that we might formulate as follows. Human life is conditioned by a need that is no less important than elementary biological needs (such as survival and reproduction) or universal forms of social competition: the need to build and, indeed, defend a subjective identity whose solidity and clarity are the foundation of our intra- and inter-personal equilibrium and therefore of psychological well-being and mental health. In this article, distancing ourselves from a neo-Cartesian position still prevalent in the philosophy of mind and approaching instead the outcomes of contemporary cognitive sciences, we sketch the complex interweaving of the cognitive, emotional, and affective elements that are constitutive of subjective identity, with a focus on the role played in self-identity construction by Theory-of-Mind abilities. We will suggest that, at every stage of self-construction, individuals engage in processes of understanding others that have a largely innate basis. In this perspective, a mature self-awareness is somewhat secondary to the knowledge of others, an evolutionarily refined acquisition primarily serving as a defense mechanism
Bacon against Descartes. Emotions, Rationality, Defenses
Far from being a natural kind, âemotionâ turns out to be a conventional label that captures quite diverse phenomena; and such phenomena can no longer be relegated, as the ideology of passions suggested, to a âlowerâ and âprimitiveâ psychic sphere, which threatens the nobility of âthe thinking thingâ. They belong to the unlevelled universe to which all psychological events belong. In general, cognitive sciences have brought to light the heterogeneity not only of emotions, but also of what is traditionally meant by âreasonâ. The experimental investigation of rationality and reasoning by the cognitive sciences has shown that there is no unitary cognitive sphere. There is instead a toolbox of imperfect analytic and operative tools that is heterogeneous and scattered, and consequently lacks the hierarchical structure that, according to the Cartesian model, culminated in self-conscious rationality. Thus, a paradigm shift is underway. Some research areas in cognitive sciences adopt a Baconian logic, in which errors and self-deceptions are seen as intrinsic to the ordinary cognitive-affective processes. Therefore, whereas in Freud the naive subject normally deceives herself because she is unable to accept the presence, deep down, of âinadmissibleâ sexual and aggressive drives, in a dynamic psychology informed by the renewal of the traditional psychological categories outlined above, intrinsically defensive cognitive-affective mechanisms become the principles that rule over the construction of everyday reality
Free Will and Retribution Today
The paper addresses two issues that have been recently debated in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, and the theory of punishment. The first issue concerns the descriptive project, the second both the substantive and the prescriptive project. On theoretical, historical and empirical grounds, we claim that there is no rationale for fearing that the spread of neurocognitive findings will undermine the ordinary practice of responsibility attributions. We hypothetically advocate two opposite views: (i) that such findings would cause the collapse of all punitive practices; (ii) that, on the contrary, such findings would open the way to more humane forms of punishment, which would be justified on purely utilitarian grounds. We argue that these views are both wrong, since whereas a sound punitive system can be justified without any reference to moral responsibility, it will certainly not improve the humaneness of punishment
Mindreading, introspezione e metacognizione: implicazioni per la neuropsichiatria cognitiva
Riassunto: In questo articolo ci proponiamo di portare alla luce i netti confini che separano i concetti di mindreading, introspezione e metacognizione con lâobiettivo di dissipare alcuni fraintendimenti presenti nella letteratura clinica. A tal fine, iniziamo identificando due posizioni principali nellâodierno dibattito filosofico cognitivo sullâintrospezione: da un lato le teorie che sostengono che âintrospezioneâ Ăš la denominazione impropria per un processo interpretativo; da un altro lato le teorie che continuano a ritenere che almeno in alcuni casi lâaccesso alla propria mente sia diretto e non interpretativo. DopodichĂ© prendiamo posizione contro le teorie dellâaccesso diretto e in favore di una certa versione dellâapproccio interpretativista. Infine, da questo approccio ricaviamo alcune linee guida per lâuso della Theory of Mind in neuropsichiatria cognitiva.Parole chiave: Introspezione; Mindreading; Confabulazione; Metacognizione; Psicopatologia.Mindreading, Introspection, and Metacognition: Implications for Cognitive Neuropsychiatry Abstract: The aim of this article is to draw sharp boundaries between the concepts of mindreading, introspection and metacognition in order to rectify some common misunderstandings in the clinical literature. To this aim, we begin with identifying two main approaches in the current philosophical and psychological debate on introspection: at one end of the spectrum, the view that âintrospectionâ is a misnomer for an interpretative activity; at the other end of the spectrum, the view that, at least in some cases, the access to oneâs own inner life is direct and non-interpretative. Thereafter, we side against âdirect accessâ theories and in favor of a particular version of the interpretativist approach to introspection. Finally, we propose some guidelines based on this approach for applying a Theory of Mind in cognitive neuropsychiatry.Keywords: Introspection; Mindreading; Confabulation; Metacognition; Psychopathology
Two open questions in the reformist agenda of the philosophy of cognitive science
Abstract: In this paper we carve out a reformist agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework. We are deeply sympathetic to this reformist program since we think that, despite strong criticism of the concept of computation and the related notion of representation, computational models should still be at the core of the study of mind. At the same time, we recognize the need for a liberalization of the computational and representational framework that can address deep dissatisfaction with the anti-biologism and radical internalism of classical cognitive science. However, reform is a difficult task, so in this article we focus on two open questions within the reformist agenda. The first concerns the possibility of combining mechanistic-computational and dynamical explanations. The second concerns related changes in the notion of representation and its use (with special attention to Andy Clarkâs radical predictive processing).Keywords:Â Continuum of Representational Genera; Enactivism; Predictive Processing; Radical Embodied Cognition Thesis; RepresentationalismDue problemi aperti nellâagenda riformista della filosofia della scienza cognitivaRiassunto: In questo lavoro identifichiamo unâagenda riformista nel dibattito sui fondamenti della scienza cognitiva che incorpora alcune idee centrali provenienti dalla letteratura sulla cognizione 4E allâinterno di una cornice computazionalista e rappresentazionalista. Tale agenda considera il quadro computazionalista e rappresentazionalista ancora imprescindibile ai fini dello studio integrato della mente e del cervello, ma ne persegue una liberalizzazione nellâintento di renderlo idoneo ad accogliere alcuni importanti spunti emersi dalla letteratura sulla cognizione delle 4E. Tuttavia, riformare Ăš un compito difficile. In questo articolo ci concentriamo su due problemi aperti nellâagenda riformista. Il primo riguarda la possibilitĂ di mettere assieme le spiegazioni meccaniciste e computazionaliste con quelle dinamiche. Il secondo riguarda i cambiamenti relativi alla nozione di rappresentazione e al suo impiego (con particolare attenzione allâelaborazione predittiva radicale di Andy Clark).Parole chiave:Â Continuum dei generi rappresentazionali; Elaborazione predittiva; Enattivismo; Tesi della cognizione incarnata radicale; Rappresentazionalism
Real Selves? Subjectivity and the Subpersonal Mind
The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naive account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other. In order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science) together with a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental
Moral Realism and Political Decisions. Practical Rationality in Contemporary Public Contexts
The challenge of realism is one of the common features of current philosophical debates, across different cultural traditions, and in many areas of investigation (epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, theory of action, etc.). The implications of realism for political philosophy and political practice, though, are just starting to become an object of systematic discussions. Such implications, however, are significant, since the area of politics is contiguous with that of ethics and action, for example. This volume intends to contribute to debates on the relevance of realism â especially moral realism â for politics. The essays included in the collection address a number of related issues, ranging from foundational problems of realism in ethics, action theory and politics, to questions about pragmatics, to difficulties in political theory, and to political hindrances related to economics and legal theory. The common focus of all essays is the relevance of realism for a conception of practical rationality in political contexts.Die Herausforderungen, vor die uns der Realismus stellt, sind in aktuellen philosophischen Debatten gegenwĂ€rtig und sie machen sich durch unterschiedliche kulturelle Traditionen und viele Untersuchungsbereiche (Erkenntnistheorie, Metaphysik, Ethik, Ăsthetik, Handlungstheorie, etc.) hindurch bemerkbar. Die Auswirkungen des Realismus auf die Politische Philosophie und die politische Praxis sind jedoch erst seit kurzem Gegenstand systematischer Diskussionen, obwohl sie von Bedeutung sind, denn letztlich steht der Bereich der Politik immer in einem Zusammenhang mit Fragen der Ethik und der Handlung. Dieser Band möchte einen Beitrag zu den Debatten ĂŒber die Relevanz des Realismus fĂŒr die Politik leisten und hat dabei insbesondere den moralischen Realismus im Blick. Die hier versammelten AufsĂ€tze enthalten eine Reihe von Auseinandersetzungen mit damit zusammenhĂ€ngenden Problemstellungen, die von grundlegenden Problemen des Realismus in der Ethik, Handlungstheorie und Politik, Fragen zur Pragmatik, ĂŒber die Schwierigkeiten der Politischen Theorie, bis hin zu politischen Hindernissen fĂŒr Wirtschaft und Recht reichen. Der gemeinsame Fokus aller AufsĂ€tze liegt dabei in der Betrachtung der Relevanz eines Realismusâ fĂŒr eine Konzeption einer praktischen Vernunft im politischen Kontext
Ancora sui fondamenti della scienza cognitiva (risposte ai commenti)
Nellâarticolo bersaglio Mutamenti nei fondamenti della scienza cognitiva:
una prospettiva riformista (GIP 2/2002) ho sostenuto â sviluppando alcune idee di Andy Clark e William Bechtel â che uno dei compiti principali che attende la scienza cognitiva teorica nei prossimi anni Ăš lâinnesto degli strumenti dalla teoria dei sistemi dinamici su
una versione neurobiologicamente plausibile del modularismo computazionale e rappresentazionale. Nelle pagine che seguono rispondo ad
alcune critiche che i commentatori dellâarticolo hanno rivolto a questa
tesi
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