Does the Swiss Car Market Reward Fuel Efficient Cars?

To correct market failures due to the presence of negative externalities associated with energy consumption, governments have adopted a variety of policies, including taxes, subsidies, regulations and standards, and information-based policies. For example, labels that clearly convey energy consumption rates, associated costs, and emissions of conventional pollutants and CO2, have been devised and used in the last two decades in several countries. In 2003, Switzerland introduced a system of fuel economy labels, based on grades ranging from A to G, where is A best and G is worst, to assist consumers in making decisions that improve the fleet’s fuel economy and lower emissions. We use a dataset documenting all passenger cars approved for sale in Switzerland each year from 2000 to 2011 to answer three key research questions. First, what is the willingness to pay for fuel economy? Second, do Swiss drivers—or Swiss auto importers on their behalf—appear to do a one-to-one tradeoff between car purchase price and savings on fuel costs over the lifetime of the car? Third, does the label have an additional effect on price, all else the same, above and beyond that of fuel efficiency alone? Hedonic pricing regressions that exploit the variation in fuel economy across make-models, and over time within make-models, suggest that there is a (modest) capitalization of fuel economy into car prices. The diesel premium, however, exceeds the future fuel cost savings made possible by diesel cars, even at zero discount rates. An alternate calculation suggests that the fuel economy premium is consistent with a very low discount rate (2.5%). We use a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on the mechanism used by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy to assign cars to the fuel economy label to see if the label has an independent effect on price, above and beyond that of the fuel economy. The RDD approach estimates the effect to be 6-11%. To broaden the fuel economy range over which we assess the effect of the A label, we also deploy matching estimators, and find that the effect of an A label on car price is approximately 5%

Does the Swiss car market reward fuel efficient cars? Evidence from hedonic pricing regressions, matching and a regression discontinuity design

To correct market failures due to the presence of negative externalities associated with energy consumption, governments have adopted a variety of policies, including taxes, subsidies, regulations and standards, and information-based policies. For example, labels that clearly convey energy consumption rates, associated costs, and emissions of conventional pollutants and CO2, have been devised and used in the last two decades to promote rational decisions, but it is unclear whether labeling schemes have realigned consumer and producer behaviors. In 2003, Switzerland introduced a system of fuel economy labels, based on grades ranging from A to G, where is A best and G is worst, to assist consumers in making decisions that improve the fleet’s fuel economy and lower emissions. We use a dataset documenting all passenger cars approved for sale in Switzerland each year from 2000 to 2011 to answer three key research questions. First, what is the willingness to pay for fuel economy? Second, do Swiss drivers—or Swiss auto importers—appear to do a one-to-one tradeoff between car purchase price and savings on fuel costs over the lifetime of the car? Third, does the label have an additional effect on price, all else the same, above and beyond that of fuel efficiency alone? Hedonic pricing regressions that exploit the variation in fuel economy across make-models, and over time within make-models, suggest that there is a (modest) capitalization of fuel economy into car prices. The Diesel premium, however, exceeds the future fuel cost savings made possible by Diesel cars, even at zero discount rates. An alternate calculation suggests that the fuel economy premium is consistent with a very low discount rate (2.5%). We use matching estimators and a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on the mechanism used by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy to assign cars to the fuel economy label to see if the label has an independent effect on price, above and beyond that of the fuel economy. The matching estimator indicates that the A-label effect on car price is approximately 5%. The RDD approach estimates the effect to be 6-11%

The impact of emission-based taxes on the retirement of used and inefficient vehicles: The case of Switzerland

Many countries have adopted policies designed to reduce CO2 emissions from road vehicles. Taxes linked to the CO2 emissions rate or the fuel economy of a vehicle (which is inversely related to its CO2 emissions rate) are examples of such policies. These taxes are usually imposed on new vehicles, and previous evaluations have estimated the increases in the shares or sales of new and fuel-efficient vehicles associated with such taxes. In contrast, we ask whether taxes on new cars that penalize high emitters induce changes in the retirement of used and inefficient vehicles. We exploit natural experiment conditions in Switzerland to analyze the impact of two different “bonus”/“malus” schemes implemented at the cantonal level. In both schemes, the bonus rewards new efficient vehicles. The malus is retroactive in canton Obwalden, in the sense that it is charged on both new and existing high-emitting cars, but it is only applied prospectively to new cars in Geneva. We use a difference-in-difference design within a survival analysis setting. We find that a bonus/malus accelerates the retirement of existing high-emitting vehicles in Obwalden, shortening the expected lifetime of the three most popular make-models by 7 to 11 months. The effect is the opposite in Geneva, where we estimate that the expected lifetime of these three popular models is extended by 5 to 8 months. These findings have important implications about the desirability of bonus/malus schemes and on their design, as well as on old car scrappage programs