Brentano on Consciousness

Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour. How are these activities related to one’s awareness of them? I will use Brentano’s struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness. My starting point will be Brentano’s book Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1-2). Brentano’s early view is underexplored in the literature, but crucial for understanding the development of his thought on the matter. In his major work Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (1874) he rejected the existence of an inner sense: the exercises of our five senses yield awareness of the world (or at least of intentional objects) as well as awareness of these perceptions. This same-level view of consciousness has been explored and developed by contemporary philosophers of mind. I will discuss the arguments that moved Brentano to change his mind, outline the view and, finally, respond to Husserl’s influential criticism of Brentano’s view (§§3-5)

Robust causal inference using directed acyclic graphs: the R package ‘dagitty’

Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), which offer systematic representations of causal relationships, have become an established framework for the analysis of causal inference in epidemiology, often being used to determine covariate adjustment sets for minimizing confounding bias. DAGitty is a popular web application for drawing and analysing DAGs. Here we introduce the R package ‘dagitty’, which provides access to all of the capabilities of the DAGitty web application within the R platform for statistical computing, and also offers several new functions. We describe how the R package ‘dagitty’ can be used to: evaluate whether a DAG is consistent with the dataset it is intended to represent; enumerate ‘statistically equivalent’ but causally different DAGs; and identify exposure outcome adjustment sets that are valid for causally different but statistically equivalent DAGs. This functionality enables epidemiologists to detect causal misspecifications in DAGs and make robust inferences that remain valid for a range of different DAGs. The R package ‘dagitty’ is available through the comprehensive R archive network (CRAN) at [https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/dagitty/]. The source code is available on github at [https://github.com/jtextor/dagitty]. The web application ‘DAGitty’ is free software, licensed under the GNU general public licence (GPL) version 2 and is available at [http:// dagitty.net/]

Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity

Most discussions of Kripke's Naming and Necessity focus either on Kripke's so-called "historical theory of reference" or his thesis that names are rigid designators. But in response to problems of the rigidity thesis Kripke later points out that his thesis about proper names is a stronger one: proper names are de jure rigid. This sets the agenda for my paper. Certain problems raised for Kripke's view show that the notion of de jure rigidity is in need of clarification. I will try to clarify the notion of de jure rigidity by analyzing characterizations of it given in the literature. I will argue in particular that Kripke can count descriptive names as de jure rigid and that the concept of de jure rigidity should not be explained with recourse to the concept of a semantical rule. The second part of the paper is a critical discussion of arguments intended to show that proper names are not de jure rigid. I will show that these arguments are unconvincing by using Dummett's distinction between assertoric content and ingredient sense

Enjoy yourself:Lotze on Self-consciousness and Self-Concern

Current work on first-person thought takes its distinctive feature to be epistemological. First-person thinking is non-observational and immune to errors to which other varieties of thought about us are open. In contrast, the nineteenth century philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-81) put the distinctive concern we have for the object of first-person thought at the center of his account. His arguments suggest that first-person thought is essentially evaluative. In this paper I will reconstruct and defend the core of Lotze’s view of self-consciousness

'The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’:Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force

Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intractable. I will argue that Frege’s version of the content/force distinction is immune to these objections. In order to do so I will reconstruct his argument that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction between force and content. I will answer the concern about the unity of the proposition by outlining how the distinction can be combined with a Fregean account of the unity of thought

Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception

Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl’s work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role.</p

From mental holism to the soul and back

In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. Later he changed his mind: There is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano's change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano's argument and it is superior to its predecessor.</p

Frege’s Recognition Criterion for Thoughts and its Problems

According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different sentences express the same thought to make progress in logic. He himself hedged his own Equipollence Criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege, little attention has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I will argue that Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without these provisos, Frege’s criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, it is of no use for Frege’s purposes. This is connected to what Frege took to be the ‘greatest difficulty for philosophy’: natural language sentences don’t just express thoughts; they convey evaluations and communicative hints. Because of this, Frege’s recognition criterion for thoughts cannot be applied to them and we cannot make logical progress by ‘recognising a thought in different linguistic guises’

Hope as a Primitive Mental State

We criticize attempts to define hope in terms of other psychological states and argue that hope is a primitive mental state whose nature can be illuminated by specifying key aspects of its functional profile.</p