Necessarily the old riddle necessary connections and the problem of induction

In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F-ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences

Better Best Systems – Too Good To Be True

Craig Callender, Jonathan Cohen and Markus Schrenk have recently argued for an amended version of the best system account of laws – the better best system account (BBSA). This account of lawhood is supposed to account for laws in the special sciences, among other desiderata. Unlike David Lewis’s original best system account of laws, the BBSA does not rely on a privileged class of natural predicates, in terms of which the best system is formulated. According to the BBSA, a contingently true generalization is a law of a special science S iff the generalization is an axiom (or a theorem) of the best system relative to the set of predicates used by special science S. We argue that the BBSA is, at best, an incomplete theory of special science laws, as it does not account for typical features of special science laws, such as attached ceteris paribus conditions and the idealized character of law statements in these disciplines

I Tensed the Laws and the Laws Won : Non-Eternalist Humeanism

In this paper, I propose a variant of a Humean account of laws called "Open Future Humeanism" (OFH), which holds that since the laws supervene partly on future events, there are at any instant infinitely many possible future courses of events. I argue that if one wants to take the openness of the future that OFH proposes ontologically serious, then OFH is best represented within a growing block view of time. I further discuss some of OFH's problems which stem from the fact that in this view, there are no laws as long as time progresses. These problems can be solved by adding a temporal operator to the laws, so that at any instant, we get a set of tensed laws which held up to and including that instant.publishe

No time for powers

In this paper, I will investigate the compatibility of different metaphysics of time with the powers view. At first sight, it seems natural to combine some sort of powers ontology with a dynamical view of time, since the dynamic character of powers appears to account for the progression of time. Accordingly, it has been argued that a powers ontology, which is supposed to be inherently dynamic and productive, is incompatible with eternalism, which does not allow for any sort of real productivity. After having reviewed these arguments, I will argue that the powers view is not only incompatible with eternalism but also with the moving spotlight view and growing block theory. I will go on to argue that the specific notion of activity that the powers ontology provides is not straightforwardly compatible with presentism either.publishe

I Tensed the Laws and the Laws Won: Non-Eternalist Humeanism

ABSTRACT In this paper, I propose a variant of a Humean account of laws called "Open Future Humeanism" (OFH), which holds that since the laws supervene partly on future events, there are at any instant infinitely many possible future courses of events. I argue that if one wants to take the openness of the future that OFH proposes ontologically serious, then OFH is best represented within a growing block view of time. I further discuss some of OFH's problems which stem from the fact that in this view, there are no laws as long as time progresses. These problems can be solved by adding a temporal operator to the laws, so that at any instant, we get a set of tensed laws which held up to and including that instant

Introduction

In this introductory chapter, we discuss some of the challenges raised by the project of pluralization in the discipline of philosophy. We look at a few theoretical approaches to pluralization that this volume takes up—namely, the figure-based approach, the global approach, and the genre-based approach—and we consider what the pluralization project might also mean for philosophical pedagogy. Finally, we give a brief summary of the contributions in this volume and provide possible cross-references for each chapter

Introduction

In this introductory chapter, we discuss some of the challenges raised by the project of pluralization in the discipline of philosophy. We look at a few theoretical approaches to pluralization that this volume takes up-namely, the figure-based approach, the global approach, and the genre-based approach-and we consider what the pluralization project might also mean for philosophical pedagogy. Finally, we give a brief summary of the contributions in this volume and provide possible cross-references for each chapter

‚Physisches’ und Multi-Realisierbarkeit, oder: zwei Probleme für den Physikalismus gelöst

Nimtz C. ‚Physisches’ und Multi-Realisierbarkeit, oder: zwei Probleme für den Physikalismus gelöst. In: Backmann M, Michel JG, eds. Physikalismus – Willensfreiheit – Künstliche Intelligenz. Paderborn: mentis; 2009: 23–42

Pragmatism, Realism, and Science. From Argument to Propaganda

Backmann M, Berg-Hildebrand A, Kaiser MI, et al. Pragmatism, Realism, and Science. From Argument to Propaganda. In: Vieth A, ed. Richard Rorty. His philosophy under discussion. Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie. Vol 8. Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter; 2005: 65-78