We’re All the Same: Collective Narcissists’ Cross-National Support for Putin and Russian Military Attacks

National narcissism is associated with support for nationalist and anti-democratic leaders and decisions in one’s own country. We hypothesize that it might also relate to more favorable judgments of outgroup nationalist leaders and actions, even if the latter may pose a threat to the ingroup. Using the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we hypothesize that people with a higher level of national narcissism would be more supportive of Russian attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian people. This may be due to a higher perception of belief similarity to Putin and Russians. We also considered the moderating role of the explicit target of the attack (Ukraine vs. ingroup). We tested our hypotheses in two studies (Study 1: N = 339 French; Study 2: N = 400 Americans). In both studies, national narcissism was related to a judgment of the attack (on Ukraine or the ingroup) as less immoral and to a better opinion of Putin. These effects were mediated by perceived belief similarity. In both studies however, these less negative judgments of the attack and of Putin did not extend to Russian people. Our results highlight that national narcissists are inclined to support a nationalist outgroup leader and their violent actions, although these may ultimately harm the ingroup

“The Chinese virus”: How COVID-19’s transmission context and fear affect negative attitudes toward Chinese people.

This research examines the impact of COVID-19 fear on attitudes toward Chinese depending on the context of propagation of COVID-19. We predicted that COVID-19 fear was linked to negative attitudes toward Chinese people, especially when the spread of the virus was external (in China; vs. when the spread was internal with transmission within the French ingroup). We collected data online (N = 403) when COVID-19 was being transmitted externally, outside of France (Phase 1) and after transmission between French people had begun (Phase 2). We measured COVID-19 fear and attitudes toward Chinese people. Our hypothesis was supported. COVID-19 fear was linked to more negative attitudes toward Chinese people only in Phase 1. This study highlights individuals’ adoption of defence strategies is dependent on the societal context surrounding the threat. We also discuss the potential to promote peace and reduce conflict by focusing on internal crises versus external threats

Mobilising IDEAS in the COVID-19 pandemic: Anti-lockdown actions and the Identity-Deprivation-Efficacy-Action-Subjective well-being model

We tested how well the Identity-Deprivation-Efficacy-Action-Subjective-wellbeing (IDEAS) model predicts citizens’ intentions to engage in collective action opposing their government, and their subjective well-being. Representative samples from Scotland, Wales, and the county of Kent in England were surveyed during the COVID-19 pandemic in October 2020 (N = 1,536). Results largely support our preregistered hypotheses, confirming that the IDEAS model offers a valid explanatory framework for how relative deprivation predicts both collective action opposing one’s government and levels of subjective well-being. In the case of collective action, there were significant effects of collective relative deprivation (cognitive and affective) and collective efficacy on social change beliefs, which in turn positively predicted collective action intentions. The role of national identification was more nuanced, revealing both negative indirect effects via collective efficacy and relative deprivation, and a positive indirect effect via political orientation. Findings also suggest interesting directions for future research on national identification

Defensive national identity relates to support for collective violence, in contrast to secure national identity, in a sample of displaced Syrian diaspora members

This paper examines national identities and collective violence beliefs in a sample of Syrian diaspora members (N = 521). Most of the Syria diaspora fled the ongoing civil war and are therefore opposed to President Assad and his regime, which still control most of their homeland. It is therefore a compelling question if national identities, which remain strong in the diaspora despite displacement, shape attitudes towards the regime at home. To this end, we contrast national narcissism (i.e., defensive national identity), an exaggerated belief in one’s national ingroup’s greatness, and national identification (i.e., secure national identity), a feeling of belonging to the nation and evaluating it positively, as differential predictors of collective violence beliefs. We find that a defensive national identity was related to support for both upward (i.e., violence targeted at regime leaders) and diffuse (i.e., violence targeted at regime supporters) collective violence. Meanwhile, secure national identity was linked to opposition to diffuse collective violence and was unrelated to upward collective violence. Thus, in a sample of displaced, non-WEIRD people, a pattern often found in similar research in the West is replicated, in that secure national identity can relate to benevolent and peaceful group processes. Meanwhile, national narcissism seems to be a driver of hostile intergroup attitudes. National sentiments should therefore be central in any discussion on diasporic attitudes towards the Syrian homeland’s regime and fellow citizens. The results could be utilised in designing interventions to promote harmony in diaspora communities around the world, and ultimately reconciliation once peace is finally restored

When less is more: defensive national identity predicts sacrifice of ingroup profit to maximize the difference between groups

We propose that defensive forms of identity (i.e., nationalism and national narcissism) can harm the nation through a tendency to maximize the difference between own and other groups in resource allocation. We test this hypothesis by adopting a classic social psychological paradigm, the Tajfel’s matrices, to real-life scenarios designed in the COVID-19 context. We captured maximizing the difference as a preference for one’s nation being allocated more medical resources relative to other countries, but at the expense of absolute ingroup profit. In Studies 1 and 2, defensiveness in national identity predicted this counterproductive strategy that ultimately benefits neither ingroup nor outgroup. In experimental Study 3, inducing ingroup disadvantage led to a greater tendency to maximize the difference. The results provide evidence that defensive national identity might be liked to support for policies that offer a positive intergroup comparison, but simultaneously harm one’s own ingroup

Looking out for myself: Exploring the relationship between conspiracy mentality, perceived personal risk, and COVID-19 prevention measures

Objectives This research examined how conspiracy mentality may affect compliance with preventive health measures necessary to fight the COVID‐19 pandemic, and the underlying motivations to comply. Design and Method We conducted two cross‐sectional studies (Study 1 N = 762, Study 2 N = 229) on a French population, measuring conspiracy mentality, compliance with preventive health measures, and perceived risks related to COVID‐19. We also measured motivations to comply with preventive measures in Study 2. Results We show that people high in conspiracy mentality are likely to engage in non‐normative prevention behaviours (Study 1), but are less willing to comply with extreme preventive behaviours that are government‐driven (Study 2). However, we demonstrate that a perceived risk to oneself (risk of death) and a motivation to protect oneself can act as a suppressor: Conspiracy mentality is linked with an increase in the perception of risk to oneself, which, in turn, is associated with normative compliance. We also find that perceived risk of death explains the relationship between conspiracy mentality and non‐normative prevention behaviours. Conclusions Our studies showcase how people high in conspiracy theorizing may (dis)engage with prevention behaviours, but that perceived risk and motivation to protect oneself could increase these individuals’ compliance

Understanding identity processes in support for reactionary and progressive social movements among advantaged and disadvantaged groups: The role of collective narcissism and secure ingroup identity

Across five studies (two representative, one pre-registered, total N = 4962), we examined the role of collective narcissism and secure identity in support for reactionary (Alt-Right and nationalist) and progressive (Black Lives Matter and Women's Strike) social movements among advantaged (White Americans and Polish national majority) versus disadvantaged (Black Americans) groups. Among advantaged groups, collective narcissism, more so than secure identity, was related to more support for reactionary movements (Studies 1–4) and less support for progressive movements (Studies 1–3). Studies 3a, 3b and 4 directly compared members of advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups in the US and suggested that both collective narcissism and secure identity were positively associated with support for progressive movements among disadvantaged groups. This research contributes to understanding the identity processes involved in reactionary and progressive movements. It highlights the importance of distinguishing secure and defensive (i.e., narcissistic) identities, particularly when investigating support for reactionary movements among advantaged groups

We’re all the Same: Collective Narcissists’s Cross-National Support for Putin and Russian Military Attacks

National narcissism is associated with support for nationalist and anti-democratic leaders and decisions in one's own country. We hypothesize that it might also relate to more favorable judgments of outgroup nationalism leaders and actions, even if the latter may pose a threat to the ingroup. Using the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we hypothesize that people with a higher level of national narcissism would be more supportive of Russian attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian people. This may be due to a higher perception of belief similarity to Putin and Russians. We also considered the moderating role of the explicit target of the attack (Ukraine vs. ingroup). We tested our hypotheses in two studies (Study 1: N = 339 French; Study 2: N = 400 Americans). In both studies, national narcissism was related to a judgment of the attack (on Ukraine or the ingroup) as less immoral and, in France, to a better opinion of Putin. These effects were mediated by perceived belief similarity. In both studies however, these less negative judgment of the attack and of Putin did not extend to Russians people. Our results highlight that national narcissists are inclined to support a nationalist outgroup leader and his violent actions, although these may ultimately harm the ingroup

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