Public policy and future mineral supplies

A widespread and pessimistic view of the availability of mineral commodities calls for strong government initiatives to ensure adequate future supplies. This article provides a more market oriented and optimistic perspective, one that focuses on production costs and prices rather than physical availability. It sees short-run shortages continuing to plague commodity markets in the future as in the past. Though painful while they last, these shortages are temporary and do not pose a serious long-run threat to human welfare. Moreover, even without government intervention, they self-correct. The sharply higher prices that they evoke create strong incentives that foster supply and curb demand. Potentially more serious are long-run shortages due to mineral depletion. Such shortages are often thought to be inevitable, a conclusion that flows directly from the physical view of depletion. For various reasons, we reject this view of depletion in favor of an economic view. The latter recognizes that depletion may create long-run shortages, but stresses that this need not be the case if new technology can continue to offset the cost-increasing effects of depletion in the future as it has in the past. The economic view also suggests that a list of mineral commodities most threatened by depletion can best be compiled using cumulative availability curves rather than the more common practice of calculating commodity life expectancies based on estimates of available stocks.<p>Validerad;2018;Nivå 2;2018-08-08 (rokbeg)</p

Private arrangements to cover large-scale liabilities caused by nuclear and other industrial catastrophes

Nuclear and other industrial activities create rare likelihoods for very large catastrophes. Available insurance, intra-industry pooling of risk and the net worth of those who cause the risk, provide an inadequate coverage for compensation of third-party damage. In OECD countries, the top layer of damage compensation after such catastrophes is regularly transferred, explicitly or implicitly, to governments. This constitutes a subsidy of the riskcreating industries. For a variety of reasons, traditional insurers are unwilling to assume full liability for the potentially colossal damage of industrial catastrophes. Such risks could be of¯oaded to the immensely larger capital market through the issue of catastrophe bonds. This would obviate the need for public subsidy, and provide a means for market pricing of the risks, but considerable needs for public intervention would nevertheless remain

Private Arrangements to Cover Large-scale Liabilities Caused by Nuclear and Other Industrial Catastrophes

Nuclear and other industrial activities create rare likelihoods for very large catastrophes. Available insurance, intra-industry pooling of risk and the net worth of those who cause the risk, provide an inadequate coverage for compensation of third-party damage. In OECD countries, the top layer of damage compensation after such catastrophes is regularly transferred, explicitly or implicitly, to governments. This constitutes a subsidy of the risk-creating industries. For a variety of reasons, traditional insurers are unwilling to assume full liability for the potentially colossal damage of industrial catastrophes. Such risks could be offloaded to the immensely larger capital market through the issue of catastrophe bonds. This would obviate the need for public subsidy, and provide a means for market pricing of the risks, but considerable needs for public intervention would nevertheless remain. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2000) 25, 180–195. doi:10.1111/1468-0440.00058

Ansvar och ersättning för industriella katastrofer : kärnkraften och andra riskindustrier

I likhet med andra s k ”riskindustrier”, saknar kärnkraftsindustrin i OECD-länderna förutsättningar för att ersätta sällsynta katastrofskador av stor omfattning. Försäkringsindustrin är obenägen till mer än mycket begränsade engagemang för att skydda mot konsekvenserna av sådana händelser. I frånvaro av privata marknader för att hantera uppkommande ersättningsanspråk har staten implicit tagit på sig ansvaret för industriella ”topprisker”. Riskindustrierna åtnjuter därmed en subvention. Detaljerade analyser av kärnkraftens risker pekar på att subventionen till kärnkraftsindustrin är liten. För andra riskindustrier saknas motsvarande beräkningar. S k ”katastrof-obligationer” erbjuder en potentiell möjlighet att komma ifrån deoffentliga subventionerna, och att överföra de industriella toppriskerna till en privat marknad. Problemen med att lansera en sådan marknad är dock betydande

Politiska förvecklingar - inte OPEC:s marknadskontroll - förklarar oljepirsets fenomenala utveckling

Snittpriset på olja år 2008−10 var åtta gånger högre än 1970−72, mätt i reala termer. Ett realt prisindex för metaller och mineraler, vilka liksom oljan är uttömbara resurser, hade samtidigt stigit med blott 45 procent. Jag hävdar att varken OPEC:s interventioner eller kostnaderna för att producera olja kan förklara denna väldiga skillnad. Det mest trovärdiga skälet till oljeprishöjningen är bristande produktionskapacitet, orsakad av ineffektivitet bland de statsägda företag som dominerar oljeindustrin, men också av att företagens ägare har mjölkat vinsterna så till den grad att industrin inte har mäktat expandera. Förekomsten av en kapacitetsförstörande ”resursförbannelse” har också bidragit till prisuppgången.Validerad; 2013; 20131119 (marianr