Government‒business relations in multilevel systems: the effect of conflict perception on venue choice

In multilevel systems, organised interests, including business firms, can pursue their political goals at different levels. At the same time, national systems of interest representation provide important incentive structures for corporate political behaviour. In this context, corporate political strategy is guided by firms’ perceptions of their relationship with policy-makers. If this relationship is under strain in one venue, firms shift their lobbying effort to alternative venues, subject to constraints reflecting national institutional legacies. Using survey data on 56 large German and British firms, the article investigates empirically how perceptions of government‒business relations and national systems of interest representation interact to shape the political behaviour of large firms in multilevel systems. The analysis shows that perceived conflict with public authorities at the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. Furthermore, national types of interest representation shape relative business engagement at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue

Government‒business relations in multilevel systems: the effect of conflict perception on venue choice

In multilevel systems, organised interests, including business firms, can pursue their political goals at different levels. At the same time, national systems of interest representation provide important incentive structures for corporate political behaviour. In this context, corporate political strategy is guided by firms’ perceptions of their relationship with policy-makers. If this relationship is under strain in one venue, firms shift their lobbying effort to alternative venues, subject to constraints reflecting national institutional legacies. Using survey data on 56 large German and British firms, the article investigates empirically how perceptions of government‒business relations and national systems of interest representation interact to shape the political behaviour of large firms in multilevel systems. The analysis shows that perceived conflict with public authorities at the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. Furthermore, national types of interest representation shape relative business engagement at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue

When East Meets West: International Change and Its Effects on Domestic Cultural Institutions

Domestic governments increasingly face the pressure to follow policy developments occurring at the international or supranational level. Yet international laws and policies need to be “translated” to suit domestic political institutions and newly adopted policies may challenge or contradict preexisting domestic policies, institutions, and interests. To explore the domestic impact of international institutional developments, we studied the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and its adoption in four countries (Japan, China, France, and Germany). Using historical institutionalism, this comparative case study sheds light on the effects of the Convention on cultural governance systems in two supposedly different “camps” within the UNESCO: the East and the West. The study argues that it is the interaction and entangled relationship of exogenous and endogenous factors over time, particularly the timing and sequence in which they constrain and facilitate change, which shape actors’ preferences and institutional development at both levels

Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity and its collapse in the euro crisis

This essay re-examines the dual – republican and liberal – foundations of democratic legitimacy in the Western traditions of normative political theory. Considered in isolation, the European Union conforms to liberal standards but cannot satisfy republican criteria. Given these conflicting standards, debates on the alleged European democratic deficit have remained inconclusive. Moreover, they have failed to pay sufficient attention to the multilevel character of the European polity and to the normative potential of legitimacy intermediation in its two-step compliance and legitimating relationships. I argue, however, that the capacity of democratic member states to legitimate the exercise of European governing functions is being destroyed in the present euro crisis, and I briefly discuss the implications of this new constellation.In der westlichen Tradition der normativen politischen Theorie beruht demokratische Legitimität auf der doppelten Grundlage republikanischer und liberaler Prinzipien. Für sich betrachtet entspricht die Europäische Union zwar liberalen Kriterien, aber eben nicht den republikanischen Anforderungen. Angesichts so unterschiedlicher Kriterien konnte es auch im Streit über das angebliche europäische Demokratiedefizit keine Einigung geben. Überdies ignorierte diese Diskussion den Mehrebenen-Charakter der europäischen Politik und das normative Potenzial der Legitimationsvermittlung zwischen Union und Bürgern durch die demokratisch verfassten Mitgliedstaaten. Die gegenwärtige Eurokrise allerdings zerstört die Fähigkeit demokratischer Mitgliedstaaten, die Ausübung europäischer Herrschaftsfunktionen zu legitimieren. Der Aufsatz erörtert die Implikationen dieser neuen Konstellation.1 Introduction 2 Legitimacy discourses The republican discourse The liberal discourse Differences 3 Constitutional democracies – and the European Union? 4 Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity 5 The end of legitimacy intermediation in the euro crisis Monetary Union and the failure of output legitimacy Rescuing the euro through supranational intervention 6 Legitimate supranational government? Input-oriented European legitimacy? 7 Reducing the burden on European legitimacy Reference

"Big Business and Two Level Games: Conceptualizing the Role of Large Firms in EU Affairs"

The political role and activities of European big business have changed dramatically since the inception of the European Union (EU). In the early years, Jean Monnet viewed large European companies as too nationalistic to support the European project, and excluded their leaders from the roster of his Action Committee for Europe. For their part, the firms were largely uninterested in Monnet's plans. As a result, the Common Market was laid and developed without the input or support of big business. The situation began to change by the mid-1970s when a handful of these large companies -primarily British and American -- started to pay attention to Community legislation directed at multinational enterprises (MNEs). The turning point occurred in the early 1980s when members of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) developed a new relationship with the European Commission, met directly government leaders, and conducted private campaigns to relaunch Europe with an industrial initiative, the Single Market program. Today, with the development of the Single Market program and the qualified majority voting system created by the Single European Act, the political-legal reality for these firms has been altered significantly. Business groups recognize that over 60 percent of all legislation directed at industry is now made in Brussels -not Bonn, Paris or London. The focus of European big business, therefore, is not merely on what the European Union will be, but on what it is. In short, large European companies have become political actors in their own right. Understanding the power of big business has proven to be a difficult task for academics. Comparative politics scholars talk of "lobbying" of firms but give little guide to the constrain.ts, opportunities and relationships involved. International relations scholars discuss the "attitudes" but not the power of big business. Or they ignore the influence of the large firms at the European/international level altogether. This paper suggests that one must acknowledge the larger state/society institutions of the EU to recognize the role of big business in EU two-level games. In doing so, one acknowledges not only the areas in which large firms exert their power in EU policymaking, but also the manner in which European big business itself helps to "structure" the European Union itself

"The 'Business' of Agenda-Setting in the European Union"

Despite growing interest in large firms' activities, the agenda-setting power of European big business has been largely ignored or misunderstood by EU scholars. For example, some scholars discuss lobbying strategies, collective action and legislative issues but stop short of outlining the specific powers and resulting actions of large multinational enterprises (MNEs). Other scholars focus so intently on formal bodies, government side payments and decisionmaking rules that they completely omit the considerable power of big business in their analysis. In this paper, I attempt to address this situation by identifying the obstacles to understanding the agenda-setting role of big business, by highlighting how scholars might better comprehend the power of large European firms, and by providing several empirical examples of big business agenda-setting in the EU today. While numerous business organizations are capable of setting the EU agenda in a number of policy areas, this paper will focus primarily on the two major trans-sectoral big business organizations in the EU today: the European Round Table of industrialists and the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce

"US lobbying and influence on the internal market"

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