Improving corporate governance in state-owned corporations in China: which way forward?

This article discusses corporate governance in China. It outlines the basic agency problem in Chinese listed companies and questions the effectiveness of the current mechanisms employed to improve their standards of governance. Importantly, it considers alternative means through which corporate practice in China can be brought into line with international expectations and stresses the urgency with which this task must be tackled. It concludes that regulators in China must construct a corporate governance model which is compatible with its domestic setting and not rush to adopt governance initiatives modelled on those in cultures which are fundamentally different in the hope of also reproducing their success

Governance tools for board members : adapting strategy maps and balanced scorecards for directorial action

The accountability of members of the board of directors of publicly traded companies has increased over years. Corresponding to these developments, there has been an inadequate advancement of tools and frameworks to help directorial functioning. This paper provides an argument for design of the Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps made available to the directors as a means of influencing, monitoring, controlling and assisting managerial action. This paper examines how the Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps could be modified and used for this purpose. The paper suggests incorporating Balanced Scorecards in the Internal Process perspective, ‘internal’ implying here not just ‘internal to the firm’, but also ‘internal to the inter-organizational system’. We recommend that other such factors be introduced separately under a new ‘perspective’ depending upon what the board wants to emphasize without creating any unwieldy proliferation of measures. Tracking the Strategy Map over time by the board of directors is a way for the board to take responsibility for the firm’s performance. The paper makes a distinction between action variables and monitoring variables. Monitoring variables are further divided on the basis of two considerations: a) whether results have been met or not and b) whether causative factors have met the expected levels of performance or not. Based on directorial responsibilities and accountability, we take another look at how the variables could be specified more completely and accurately with directorial recommendations for executives

The impact of corporate social responsibility disclosure on financial performance : evidence from the GCC Islamic banking sector.

This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial performance for Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region over the period 2000–2014 by generating CSR-related data through disclosure analysis of the annual reports of the sampled banks. The findings of this study indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between CSR disclosure and the financial performance of Islamic banks in the GCC countries. The results also show a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and the future financial performance of GCC Islamic banks, potentially indicating that current CSR activities carried out by Islamic banks in the GCC could have a long-term impact on their financial performance. Furthermore, despite demonstrating a significant positive relationship between the composite measure of the CSR disclosure index and financial performance, the findings show no statistically significant relationship between the individual dimensions of the CSR disclosure index and the current financial performance measure except for ‘mission and vision’ and ‘products and services’. Similarly, the empirical results detect a positive significant association only between ‘mission and vision’ dimension and future financial performance of the examined banks

Sources of stakeholder salience in the responsible investment movement: why do investors sign the Principles for Responsible Investment?

Since its inception in 2006, the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) have grown to over 1300 signatories representing over $45 trillion. This growth is not slowing down. In this paper, we argue that there is a set of attributes which make the PRI salient as a stakeholder and its claim to sign the six PRI important to institutional investors. We use Mitchell et al.’s (Acad Manag Rev 22:853–886, 1997) theoretical framework of stakeholder salience, as extended by Gifford (J Bus Eth 92:79–97, 2010). We use as evidence confidential data from the annual survey of signatories carried out by the PRI in a 5-year period between 2007 and 2011. The findings highlight pragmatic and organizational legitimacy, normative and utilitarian power, and management values as the attributes that contribute most to the salience of the PRI as a stakeholder