EyeSpot: leveraging gaze to protect private text content on mobile devices from shoulder surfing

As mobile devices allow access to an increasing amount of private data, using them in public can potentially leak sensitive information through shoulder surfing. This includes personal private data (e.g., in chat conversations) and business-related content (e.g., in emails). Leaking the former might infringe on users’ privacy, while leaking the latter is considered a breach of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation as of May 2018. This creates a need for systems that protect sensitive data in public. We introduce EyeSpot, a technique that displays content through a spot that follows the user’s gaze while hiding the rest of the screen from an observer’s view through overlaid masks. We explore different configurations for EyeSpot in a user study in terms of users’ reading speed, text comprehension, and perceived workload. While our system is a proof of concept, we identify crystallized masks as a promising design candidate for further evaluation with regard to the security of the system in a shoulder surfing scenario

Opportunities and challenges with new railway planning approach in Sweden

Long lead times in railway planning can give rise to a significant discrepancy between the original plan and the traffic eventually operated, resulting in inefficient utilization of capacity. Research shows that the railway sector in Sweden would benefit from a different planning approach in which capacity consuming decisions are pushed forward in time whenever possible. This approach is currently being implemented at Trafikverket, the Swedish Transport Administration. With it follows a number of mathematical opportunities and challenges, some of which will be presented in this paper

The Maraca: a tool for minimizing resource conflicts in a non-periodic railway timetable

While mathematical optimization and operations research receive growing attention in the railway sector, computerized timetabling tools that actually make significant use of optimization remain relatively rare. SICS has developed a prototype tool for non-periodic timetabling that minimizes resource conflicts, enabling the user to focus on the strategic decisions. The prototype is called the Maraca and has been used and evaluated during the railway timetabling construction phase at the Swedish Transport Administration between April and September 2010

On the delivery robustness of train timetables with respect to production replanning possibilities

Measuring timetable robustness is a complex task. Previous efforts have mainly been focused on simulation studies or measurements of time supplements. However, these measurements don't capture the production flexibility of a timetable, which is essential for measuring the robustness with regard to the trains' commercial activity commitments, and also for merging the goals of robustness and efficiency. In this article we differentiate between production timetables and delivery timetables. A production timetable contains all stops, meetings and switch crossings, while a delivery timetable only contains stops for commercial activities. If a production timetable is constructed such that it can easily be replanned to cope with delays without breaking any commercial activity commitments it provides delivery robustness without compromising travel efficiency. Changing meeting locations is one of the replanning tools available during operation, and this paper presents a new framework for heuristically optimising a given production timetable with regard to the number of alternative meeting locations. Mixed integer programming is used to find two delivery feasible production solutions, one early and one late. The area between the two solutions represents alternative meeting locations and therefore also the replanning enabled robustness. A case study from Sweden demonstrates how the method can be used to develop better production timetables

Collective Representation and Employee Voice in the US Public Sector Workplace: Looking North for Solutions?

Legislation enacted in many states following the 2010 elections in the United States strengthened unilateral public employer control and weakened employee voice. This rebalancing of power occurred in the context of state public employee labour relations acts modeled on the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but with a narrower scope of bargaining than in the private sector. This narrow scope channels unions’ voice away from the quality of public services and towards protecting members from the effects of decisions unilaterally imposed by management. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the freedom of association guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a right to collective bargaining, but that this right need not be modelled on the NLRA. This article explores the evolving Canadian jurisprudence decoupling the right to a voice at work from an NLRA-style model as an alternative approach for US public sector labour law reform

Two Models of Interest Arbitration

Published in cooperation with the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolutio

Two Models of Interest Arbitration

Most states prohibit public employees from striking and the federal government makes a strike by a federal employee a felony. Many public employee labor relations acts give organized employees a right to arbitrate when their union and employer are unable to reach agreement on the terms of a contract. Much discussion of such interest arbitration schemes has focused on whether the process inhibits bargaining (the chilling effect) or is habit forming (the narcotic effect). These discussions contrast the use of traditional interest arbitration, where the arbitrator may award any outcome that falls between the parties’ final offers, with final offer arbitration where the arbitrator must award one party’s final offer, either on a package or an issue-by-issue basis, and analyze each approach’s effect on the chilling and narcotic effects. This article focuses on another undesirable characteristic of interest arbitration – its ability to allow union and employer leaders to avoid accountability to their constituents. Using data from 2008-2012, the article finds support that, at least in hard times, parties negotiating in a right-to-strike legal regime tend to take responsibility for making the difficult decisions necessary to respond to the economic environment while parties negotiating under an interest arbitration legal regime are more likely to arbitrate and push responsibility off onto the arbitrator. The article contrasts legal regimes which approach interest arbitration as an extension of the collective bargaining process with those which approach interest arbitration as a quasi-judicial adjudication. It finds that the latter approach exacerbates the tendency of union and employer leaders to use interest arbitration as a means of avoiding accountability to their constituents