Sex and Credit: Is There a Gender Bias in Microfinance?

This paper examines the effects of group identity in the credit market. Exploiting the quasirandom assignment of first-time borrowers to loan officers of a large Albanian lender, we test for own-gender bias in the loan officer-borrower match. We find that borrowers pay on average 29 basis points higher interest rates when paired with a loan officer of the other sex. The results indicate the presence of a taste-based rather than a statistical bias, as borrowers’ likelihood of going into arrears is independent of loan officer gender. Ending up with an opposite-sex loan officer also affects demand for credit, with borrowers being 11.5 percent less likely to return for a second loan. The bias is more pronounced when the social distance, as proxied by difference in age between the loan officer and the borrower, increases and when financial market competition declines. This is consistent with theories that predict a tastebased bias to be stronger when the psychological costs of being biased are lower and the discretion in setting interest rates is higher. Taken together, the findings suggest that owngender preferences can have substantial welfare effects.Identity;interest rates;gender;loan officers;microfinance

Sex and credit: Do gender interactions matter for credit market outcomes?

© 2017 This paper studies the effects of gender interactions on the supply of and demand for credit using data from a large Albanian lender. We document that first-time borrowers assigned to officers of the opposite sex are less likely to return for a second loan. The effect is larger when officers have little prior exposure to borrowers of the other gender and when they have more discretion to act on their gender beliefs, as proxied by financial market competition and branch size. We also find that first-time borrowers matched with opposite-sex officers pay higher interest rates and receive smaller and shorter-maturity loans, but do not experience higher arrears. Our results are consistent with the existence of a gender bias and learning effects that lead to the disappearance of the bias

Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement

Can protests cause political change, or are they merely symptoms of underlying shifts in policy preferences? We address this question by studying the Tea Party movement in the United States, which rose to prominence through coordinated rallies across the country on Tax Day, April 15, 2009. We exploit variation in rainfall on the day of these rallies as an exogenous source of variation in attendance. We show that good weather at this initial, coordinating event had significant consequences for the subsequent local strength of the movement, increased public support for Tea Party positions, and led to more Republican votes in the 2010 midterm elections. Policy making was also affected, as incumbents responded to large protests in their district by voting more conservatively in Congress. Our estimates suggest significant multiplier effects: an additional protester increased the number of Republican votes by a factor well above 1. Together our results show that protests can build political movements that ultimately affect policy making and that they do so by influencing political views rather than solely through the revelation of existing political preference

Sex and Credit: Is There a Gender Bias in Microfinance?

This paper examines the effects of group identity in the credit market. Exploiting the quasirandom assignment of first-time borrowers to loan officers of a large Albanian lender, we test for own-gender bias in the loan officer-borrower match. We find that borrowers pay on average 29 basis points higher interest rates when paired with a loan officer of the other sex. The results indicate the presence of a taste-based rather than a statistical bias, as borrowers’ likelihood of going into arrears is independent of loan officer gender. Ending up with an opposite-sex loan officer also affects demand for credit, with borrowers being 11.5 percent less likely to return for a second loan. The bias is more pronounced when the social distance, as proxied by difference in age between the loan officer and the borrower, increases and when financial market competition declines. This is consistent with theories that predict a tastebased bias to be stronger when the psychological costs of being biased are lower and the discretion in setting interest rates is higher. Taken together, the findings suggest that owngender preferences can have substantial welfare effects

Sex and Credit: Is there a Gender Bias in Lending?

Abstract: We exploit the quasi-random assignment of borrowers to loan officers using data from a large Albanian lender to show that own-gender preferences affect both credit supply and demand. Borrowers matched to officers of the opposite gender are less likely to return for a second loan. The effect is larger when officers have little prior exposure to borrowers of the other gender and when they have more discretion to act on their gender beliefs, as proxied by financial market competition and branch size. We examine one channel of influence, loan conditionality. Borrowers assigned to opposite-sex officers pay higher interest rates and receive lower loan amounts, but do not experience higher arrears. Together our results imply that own-gender preferences in the credit market can have substantial welfare effects

Inside the production function, the effect of financial contracts on growing firms' technology use: Evidence from a field experiment in Uganda

The data files contain data from interviews with Ugandan small business owners that are part of a randomized experiment evaluating the effect of loan contract structure on business performance. The aim of the project is to examine how alterations of the standard microfinance contract structure affect borrowing business owners' use of the loan and their business performance, measured in a variety of ways. The experiment was carried out in collaboration with the NGO BRAC Uganda and their Small Enterprise Lending (SEP) program that targets existing business owners. Beginning in 2014, we collaborated with the BRAC SEP program in 76 local branch offices in Central, Western, and Eastern Uganda. Every firm in the sample is a BRAC borrower in the catchment area of one of these branch offices, belonging to one of the business sectors we had pre-selected, that has been approved by BRAC credit officers and is eligible for a loan. Upon being eligible, firms are asked to participate in a Baseline survey. Once the survey is conducted with firms that gave their consent to participate, they are randomized into one of the treatment (and control) arms. Data was collected from clients in several waves: before assignment to a treatment or control group (Baseline), during the loan cycle (Diaries), and after completion of the loan (end-line). Each of these types of data are described in more detail in the metadata files User Guide and Readme.We examine how key aspects of the most common form of financing-debt-may inhibit young firms' expansion. Starting a business entails learning and risk taking, implying that project returns to investment can start low but increase over time (in other words, be "back-loaded") or be uncertain. Also, indivisible start-up costs often require large investments. Meanwhile, standard debt contracts available for micro-entrepreneurs from the formal or semi-formal financial sectors of many developing countries (such as microfinance) stipulate a constant repayment stream and caps on the initial loan size. The interaction of such features of the loan contract and the firm's production technology, may distort investment toward inputs that involve less learning, less uncertainty, and smaller projects; hampering firm growth. To shed light on the extent to which these theoretical mechanisms limit the effectiveness of microloans, we plan to collaborate with BRAC Uganda's Small Enterprise Lending Program to study the effect of the credit terms on starting firms' input use, profits, and repayment performance. As such, our project contributes to the DFID-ESRC Growth Research Programme's focus on Finance and Growth in Low Income Countries. Small and medium-sized firms are the engines of the Ugandan economy, comprising over 90 % of the private sector and BRAC Uganda has been lending to such firms since 2008 through its Small Enterprise Lending Programme. The loans range from 2.5 million to 13 million Ugandan Shillings (630 to 3,300 GBP) and are repaid monthly with a maturity of 12 months at an annual interest rate of 25%. The research project will select, among firms applying for BRAC loans from mid-2014, a representative sample of 1600 firms to be part of a randomized experiment. In order to investigate whether standard contractual terms in microloans from formal or semi-formal sources are restrictive for firms that face indivisible costs and/or are characterized by backloaded or uncertain project returns, we will (randomly) implement the following interventions for different groups of firms by: (i) changing the repayment frequency to distinguish the effects of uncertain project returns from those of backloaded returns; (ii) offering subsidies to ease the purchase of indivisible goods; and by (iii) offering consultancy services to shorten the learning process about the use of certain inputs to alleviate problems of backloadedness. We will survey these firms at baseline and upon completion of the loan-cycle (1-year after) to measure the change in firms' production and profits. In addition, we will use detailed and high frequency firm data to trace how the financial structure, a firm's learning curve, or the ease with which an indivisible good is acquired affects the use of machines and labor and how this in turn impacts profits and repayment performance. The project will provide unique evidence on the constraints caused by the interaction of financial structure and technology use that complements the recent emphasis on access to finance.</p

The Impacts of Credit on Village Economies

April 9, 200