Constitutional Constraints on Electoral Reform in Canada:Why Parliament is (Mostly) Free to Implement a New Voting System

Having promised that the 2015 national election would be the last conducted under the first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) electoral system, the federal government has initiated efforts to find a replacement. A national debate about the various alternatives to FPTP will undoubtedly continue, but a fundamental issue concerns whether Parliament faces any constraints on its authority to implement electoral reform. Two distinct concerns present themselves. First, does a change to the electoral system require a constitutional amendment, and if so, would such an amendment require provincial consent under the general amending procedure in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982? Second, would certain electoral systems violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Diabetic ketoacidosis

Diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) is the most common acute hyperglycaemic emergency in people with diabetes mellitus. A diagnosis of DKA is confirmed when all of the three criteria are present — ‘D’, either elevated blood glucose levels or a family history of diabetes mellitus; ‘K’, the presence of high urinary or blood ketoacids; and ‘A’, a high anion gap metabolic acidosis. Early diagnosis and management are paramount to improve patient outcomes. The mainstays of treatment include restoration of circulating volume, insulin therapy, electrolyte replacement and treatment of any underlying precipitating event. Without optimal treatment, DKA remains a condition with appreciable, although largely preventable, morbidity and mortality. In this Primer, we discuss the epidemiology, pathogenesis, risk factors and diagnosis of DKA and provide practical recommendations for the management of DKA in adults and children

Provincial Constitutions, the Amending Formula, and Unilateral Amendments to the Constitution of Canada: An Analysis of Quebec’s Bill 96

This article critically analyzes provincial authority to unilaterally amend the Constitution of Canada. Via an assessment of the purported amendments in Quebec’s Bill 96, which would recognize Quebecers as a nation and French as the only language of the province, the article argues that provinces cannot make direct amendments altering, adding, or repealing provisions of the Constitution of Canada. This argument is reflected in the wording of the various constitutional amending procedures, the historical and contemporary constitutional practice, and the underlying purpose of, and fundamental distinction and complex relationship between, the Constitution of Canada as supreme law and the constitution of the province. Notwithstanding this argument, the article also analyzes the specific matters in the Bill 96 provisions and concludes that their addition requires recourse to an amending procedure other than section 45. Adding recognition of Quebecers’ status as a nation to the Constitution Act, 1867 exceeds the scope of provincial authority, in part because it would not reflect a statement by Quebec in its own provincial constitution, something it would be free to enact via ordinary legislation. Instead, what Quebec proposes is to confer such recognition by the entire country. The language provision requires recourse to either the bilateral procedure under section 43 or the unanimity procedure of section 41, given the express requirements of those amending procedures. Finally, the unilateral enactment of these amendments would be contrary to the constitutional architecture. The article concludes by briefly examining subsequent provincial attempts to amend the Constitution, finding them equally illegitimate

Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada

This article critically examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the Senate Reform Reference from the perspective of its coherence in interpreting the various amending procedures in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. It analyzes the ways that the underlying logic of the Court’s reasoning, particularly with respect to the method of selecting senators and senatorial term limits, creates ambiguity and risks unintended consequences for future attempts at constitutional amendment. The Court’s explicit refusal to distinguish between the federal government’s unilateral ability to enact a retirement age and its logic that term limits, regardless of length, require the consent of the provinces under the general amending procedure lacks logical consistency and arguably erodes the unilateral amending procedure to a problematic degree. In the context of its reasoning with respect to changes to the method of selecting senators, the Court’s reliance on the amorphous notion of the “constitutional architecture” clouds the definable limits of “method of selection” under section 42(1)(b). The Senate Reform Reference introduces considerable ambiguity into what changes the federal executive can implement with respect to the appointments process itself. The article concludes by exploring the political implications that the decision has for the future of Senate reform specifically and for our ability to amend the constitution generally.Cet article porte un regard critique sur la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif au Sénat. Il aborde sa cohérence selon la perspective de l’interprétation des procédures d’amendement contenues dans la Partie V de la Loi constitutionnelle, 1982. L’article analyse les moyens dont la logique sous-jacente au raisonnement de la Cour, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la méthode de sélection des sénateurs et aux limites apportées à leurs mandats, crée de l’ambiguïté et court le risque de créer des conséquences involontaires affectant de futures tentatives d’amendements constitutionnels. La Cour refuse explicitement de distinguer entre la capacité qu’a le gouvernement fédéral d’imposer unilatéralement un âge de retraite et sa propre logique, selon laquelle la procédure générale d’amendement exige le consentement des provinces dans le cas de l’imposition de limites aux mandats des sénateurs, peu importe leur durée. Ceci démontre un manque de cohésion dans sa logique et érode la procédure d’amendement unilatérale à un degré problématique. D’ailleurs, le raisonnement de la Cour ayant trait au changement des modes de sélection des sénateurs se fie sur la notion amorphe de « l’architecture constitutionnelle » et, ce faisant, brouille les limites définissables de ce qui constitue un « mode de sélection » selon l’article 42(1)(b). Le Renvoi relatif au Sénat introduit un niveau considérable d’ambiguïté à l’égard des modifications du processus même de nomination sénatoriale que peut effectuer l’exécutif fédéral. Cet article conclut en explorant les implications politiques de la décision pour l’avenir de la réforme du Sénat, de façon spécifique, et pour notre capacité d’amender la constitution, de façon plus générale

Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada

This article critically examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the Senate Reform Reference from the perspective of its coherence in interpreting the various amending procedures in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. It analyzes the ways that the underlying logic of the Court’s reasoning, particularly with respect to the method of selecting senators and senatorial term limits, creates ambiguity and risks unintended consequences for future attempts at constitutional amendment. The Court’s explicit refusal to distinguish between the federal government’s unilateral ability to enact a retirement age and its logic that term limits, regardless of length, require the consent of the provinces under the general amending procedure lacks logical consistency and arguably erodes the unilateral amending procedure to a problematic degree. In the context of its reasoning with respect to changes to the method of selecting senators, the Court’s reliance on the amorphous notion of the “constitutional architecture” clouds the definable limits of “method of selection” under section 42(1)(b). The Senate Reform Reference introduces considerable ambiguity into what changes the federal executive can implement with respect to the appointments process itself. The article concludes by exploring the political implications that the decision has for the future of Senate reform specifically and for our ability to amend the constitution generally.Cet article porte un regard critique sur la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif au Sénat. Il aborde sa cohérence selon la perspective de l’interprétation des procédures d’amendement contenues dans la Partie V de la Loi constitutionnelle, 1982. L’article analyse les moyens dont la logique sous-jacente au raisonnement de la Cour, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la méthode de sélection des sénateurs et aux limites apportées à leurs mandats, crée de l’ambiguïté et court le risque de créer des conséquences involontaires affectant de futures tentatives d’amendements constitutionnels. La Cour refuse explicitement de distinguer entre la capacité qu’a le gouvernement fédéral d’imposer unilatéralement un âge de retraite et sa propre logique, selon laquelle la procédure générale d’amendement exige le consentement des provinces dans le cas de l’imposition de limites aux mandats des sénateurs, peu importe leur durée. Ceci démontre un manque de cohésion dans sa logique et érode la procédure d’amendement unilatérale à un degré problématique. D’ailleurs, le raisonnement de la Cour ayant trait au changement des modes de sélection des sénateurs se fie sur la notion amorphe de « l’architecture constitutionnelle » et, ce faisant, brouille les limites définissables de ce qui constitue un « mode de sélection » selon l’article 42(1)(b). Le Renvoi relatif au Sénat introduit un niveau considérable d’ambiguïté à l’égard des modifications du processus même de nomination sénatoriale que peut effectuer l’exécutif fédéral. Cet article conclut en explorant les implications politiques de la décision pour l’avenir de la réforme du Sénat, de façon spécifique, et pour notre capacité d’amender la constitution, de façon plus générale

Constitutional Constraints on Electoral Reform in Canada:Why Parliament is (Mostly) Free to Implement a New Voting System

Having promised that the 2015 national election would be the last conducted under the first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) electoral system, the federal government has initiated efforts to find a replacement. A national debate about the various alternatives to FPTP will undoubtedly continue, but a fundamental issue concerns whether Parliament faces any constraints on its authority to implement electoral reform. Two distinct concerns present themselves. First, does a change to the electoral system require a constitutional amendment, and if so, would such an amendment require provincial consent under the general amending procedure in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982? Second, would certain electoral systems violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Public Policy, Rights, and Abortion Access in Canada

Abstract The Suprem