Defense mechanisms: From the individual to the collective level

Abstract: In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as falling along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the relationship with other people and with one’s own environment, to defend one’s own self-describability and, indissolubly, the solidity of one’s own self-conscious being. At a social and collective level, on the other hand, the individual self-protective structures are supported by cultural interventions that organize and intersubjectively “domesticate” our subjectivity and our feeling of being-there.Keywords: Autobiographical Reasoning; Defense Mechanisms; Grief; Narrative Identity; Ontological Insecurity  Meccanismi di difesa: dall’individuale al collettivoRiassunto: L’articolo si occupa di costruzione e difesa dell’identità soggettiva come tema all’intersezione di psicologia e antropologia. In questa prospettiva, i meccanismi di difesa si dispongono lungo uno spettro che dal livello individuale conduce a quello collettivo. La mente individuale è la sfera delle difese intrapsichiche e delle manovre interpersonali a cui ognuno di noi fa ricorso, nella relazione con gli altri e col proprio ambiente, per difendere la propria autodescrivibilità e, inscindibilmente, la solidità del proprio essere autocosciente. Al livello sociale e collettivo, invece, le strutture autoprotettive dell’individuo sono sorrette da interventi culturali che organizzano e “addomesticano” intersoggettivamente la nostra soggettività e il nostro sentirci esistere.Parole chiave: Ragionamento autobiografico; Meccanismi di difesa; Cordoglio; Identità narrativa; Insicurezza ontologic

Bacon against Descartes. Emotions, Rationality, Defenses

Far from being a natural kind, ‘emotion’ turns out to be a conventional label that captures quite diverse phenomena; and such phenomena can no longer be relegated, as the ideology of passions suggested, to a ‘lower’ and ‘primitive’ psychic sphere, which threatens the nobility of ‘the thinking thing’. They belong to the unlevelled universe to which all psychological events belong. In general, cognitive sciences have brought to light the heterogeneity not only of emotions, but also of what is traditionally meant by ‘reason’. The experimental investigation of rationality and reasoning by the cognitive sciences has shown that there is no unitary cognitive sphere. There is instead a toolbox of imperfect analytic and operative tools that is heterogeneous and scattered, and consequently lacks the hierarchical structure that, according to the Cartesian model, culminated in self-conscious rationality. Thus, a paradigm shift is underway. Some research areas in cognitive sciences adopt a Baconian logic, in which errors and self-deceptions are seen as intrinsic to the ordinary cognitive-affective processes. Therefore, whereas in Freud the naive subject normally deceives herself because she is unable to accept the presence, deep down, of ‘inadmissible’ sexual and aggressive drives, in a dynamic psychology informed by the renewal of the traditional psychological categories outlined above, intrinsically defensive cognitive-affective mechanisms become the principles that rule over the construction of everyday reality

Free Will and Retribution Today

The paper addresses two issues that have been recently debated in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, and the theory of punishment. The first issue concerns the descriptive project, the second both the substantive and the prescriptive project. On theoretical, historical and empirical grounds, we claim that there is no rationale for fearing that the spread of neurocognitive findings will undermine the ordinary practice of responsibility attributions. We hypothetically advocate two opposite views: (i) that such findings would cause the collapse of all punitive practices; (ii) that, on the contrary, such findings would open the way to more humane forms of punishment, which would be justified on purely utilitarian grounds. We argue that these views are both wrong, since whereas a sound punitive system can be justified without any reference to moral responsibility, it will certainly not improve the humaneness of punishment

Mindreading, introspezione e metacognizione: implicazioni per la neuropsichiatria cognitiva

Riassunto: In questo articolo ci proponiamo di portare alla luce i netti confini che separano i concetti di mindreading, introspezione e metacognizione con l’obiettivo di dissipare alcuni fraintendimenti presenti nella letteratura clinica. A tal fine, iniziamo identificando due posizioni principali nell’odierno dibattito filosofico cognitivo sull’introspezione: da un lato le teorie che sostengono che “introspezione” è la denominazione impropria per un processo interpretativo; da un altro lato le teorie che continuano a ritenere che almeno in alcuni casi l’accesso alla propria mente sia diretto e non interpretativo. Dopodiché prendiamo posizione contro le teorie dell’accesso diretto e in favore di una certa versione dell’approccio interpretativista. Infine, da questo approccio ricaviamo alcune linee guida per l’uso della Theory of Mind in neuropsichiatria cognitiva.Parole chiave: Introspezione; Mindreading; Confabulazione; Metacognizione; Psicopatologia.Mindreading, Introspection, and Metacognition: Implications for Cognitive Neuropsychiatry Abstract: The aim of this article is to draw sharp boundaries between the concepts of mindreading, introspection and metacognition in order to rectify some common misunderstandings in the clinical literature. To this aim, we begin with identifying two main approaches in the current philosophical and psychological debate on introspection: at one end of the spectrum, the view that “introspection” is a misnomer for an interpretative activity; at the other end of the spectrum, the view that, at least in some cases, the access to one’s own inner life is direct and non-interpretative. Thereafter, we side against “direct access” theories and in favor of a particular version of the interpretativist approach to introspection. Finally, we propose some guidelines based on this approach for applying a Theory of Mind in cognitive neuropsychiatry.Keywords: Introspection; Mindreading; Confabulation; Metacognition; Psychopathology

Two open questions in the reformist agenda of the philosophy of cognitive science

Abstract: In this paper we carve out a reformist agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework. We are deeply sympathetic to this reformist program since we think that, despite strong criticism of the concept of computation and the related notion of representation, computational models should still be at the core of the study of mind. At the same time, we recognize the need for a liberalization of the computational and representational framework that can address deep dissatisfaction with the anti-biologism and radical internalism of classical cognitive science. However, reform is a difficult task, so in this article we focus on two open questions within the reformist agenda. The first concerns the possibility of combining mechanistic-computational and dynamical explanations. The second concerns related changes in the notion of representation and its use (with special attention to Andy Clark’s radical predictive processing).Keywords: Continuum of Representational Genera; Enactivism; Predictive Processing; Radical Embodied Cognition Thesis; RepresentationalismDue problemi aperti nell’agenda riformista della filosofia della scienza cognitivaRiassunto: In questo lavoro identifichiamo un’agenda riformista nel dibattito sui fondamenti della scienza cognitiva che incorpora alcune idee centrali provenienti dalla letteratura sulla cognizione 4E all’interno di una cornice computazionalista e rappresentazionalista. Tale agenda considera il quadro computazionalista e rappresentazionalista ancora imprescindibile ai fini dello studio integrato della mente e del cervello, ma ne persegue una liberalizzazione nell’intento di renderlo idoneo ad accogliere alcuni importanti spunti emersi dalla letteratura sulla cognizione delle 4E. Tuttavia, riformare è un compito difficile. In questo articolo ci concentriamo su due problemi aperti nell’agenda riformista. Il primo riguarda la possibilità di mettere assieme le spiegazioni meccaniciste e computazionaliste con quelle dinamiche. Il secondo riguarda i cambiamenti relativi alla nozione di rappresentazione e al suo impiego (con particolare attenzione all’elaborazione predittiva radicale di Andy Clark).Parole chiave: Continuum dei generi rappresentazionali; Elaborazione predittiva; Enattivismo; Tesi della cognizione incarnata radicale; Rappresentazionalism

Real Selves? Subjectivity and the Subpersonal Mind

The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naive account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other. In order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science) together with a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental

Moral Realism and Political Decisions. Practical Rationality in Contemporary Public Contexts

The challenge of realism is one of the common features of current philosophical debates, across different cultural traditions, and in many areas of investigation (epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, theory of action, etc.). The implications of realism for political philosophy and political practice, though, are just starting to become an object of systematic discussions. Such implications, however, are significant, since the area of politics is contiguous with that of ethics and action, for example. This volume intends to contribute to debates on the relevance of realism – especially moral realism – for politics. The essays included in the collection address a number of related issues, ranging from foundational problems of realism in ethics, action theory and politics, to questions about pragmatics, to difficulties in political theory, and to political hindrances related to economics and legal theory. The common focus of all essays is the relevance of realism for a conception of practical rationality in political contexts.Die Herausforderungen, vor die uns der Realismus stellt, sind in aktuellen philosophischen Debatten gegenwärtig und sie machen sich durch unterschiedliche kulturelle Traditionen und viele Untersuchungsbereiche (Erkenntnistheorie, Metaphysik, Ethik, Ästhetik, Handlungstheorie, etc.) hindurch bemerkbar. Die Auswirkungen des Realismus auf die Politische Philosophie und die politische Praxis sind jedoch erst seit kurzem Gegenstand systematischer Diskussionen, obwohl sie von Bedeutung sind, denn letztlich steht der Bereich der Politik immer in einem Zusammenhang mit Fragen der Ethik und der Handlung. Dieser Band möchte einen Beitrag zu den Debatten über die Relevanz des Realismus für die Politik leisten und hat dabei insbesondere den moralischen Realismus im Blick. Die hier versammelten Aufsätze enthalten eine Reihe von Auseinandersetzungen mit damit zusammenhängenden Problemstellungen, die von grundlegenden Problemen des Realismus in der Ethik, Handlungstheorie und Politik, Fragen zur Pragmatik, über die Schwierigkeiten der Politischen Theorie, bis hin zu politischen Hindernissen für Wirtschaft und Recht reichen. Der gemeinsame Fokus aller Aufsätze liegt dabei in der Betrachtung der Relevanz eines Realismus‘ für eine Konzeption einer praktischen Vernunft im politischen Kontext

Ancora sui fondamenti della scienza cognitiva (risposte ai commenti)

Nell’articolo bersaglio Mutamenti nei fondamenti della scienza cognitiva: una prospettiva riformista (GIP 2/2002) ho sostenuto – sviluppando alcune idee di Andy Clark e William Bechtel – che uno dei compiti principali che attende la scienza cognitiva teorica nei prossimi anni è l’innesto degli strumenti dalla teoria dei sistemi dinamici su una versione neurobiologicamente plausibile del modularismo computazionale e rappresentazionale. Nelle pagine che seguono rispondo ad alcune critiche che i commentatori dell’articolo hanno rivolto a questa tesi