Mise en place d'une expérience avec le grand public: entre recherche, vulgarisation et pédagogie

Methodological considerations on implementing a participative experimentWe present the implementation of an economic experiment conducted simultaneously in 11 French cities, with over 2700 participants, during four uninterrupted hours, during a popular-science event held in September 2015. Our goal is both to provide a roadmap for a possible replication and to discuss how the discipline can be used in new fields (science popularization, popular education, public communication)

Threat and punishment in public goods experiments

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the latter periods. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation, and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats

Studies on the Manufacture of Wood Adhesives from the Residue of Agriculture and Forest (II)

We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s [Am Econ Rev 95:384-394 (2005)] deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer

Emotions, sanctions, and cooperation

We use skin conductance responses and self-reported hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. We argue that the availability of sanctions sets in motion a “virtuous emotional circle” that accompanies cooperation. Emotional reaction to free riding leads cooperators to apply sanctions. In response, and in addition to the monetary consequences of receiving sanctions, the negative emotions experienced by the free-riders when punished lead them to increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of cooperation that becomes a new norm. Therefore, emotions sustain both the use of altruistic punishment and cooperation

La reconversion de la main-d'oeuvre : bilan des problematiques (1950-1988)

INIST AR 13620 / INIST-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et TechniqueSIGLEFRFranc